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Through the overview on the historiography of everyday life in Stalin's regime, this paper attempts to find some clues to the development of new methodology for researching the Soviet society and other ones as well. The study on various aspects of everyday life in Stalin's Russia has contributed to deepening our understanding about the mechanism of Stalin's Russia. But it has also revealed some issues that we have to consider. The first issue that we can detect in the historiography on people's way of life in the Stalin's Russia is about the problem of resistance vs accommodation of people to the regime. It is very difficult to ascertain the clear demarcation between accommodation and resistance in the everyday life of people. If we accept the idea that people in Stalin's Russia had managed to cooperate or oppose to the policy of the state, the assumption that the Stalin's regime was a totalitarian state should be discarded. The second issue is on the problem of continuity vs discontinuity. Though the socialist government had tried to transform rapidly the mode of everyday life by indoctrinating the socialist value, people in their everyday lives still maintained the old habits and customs which did not comply with doctrine of the socialist system. But this did not mean that people in the Stalin's Russia did not change internally at all, which raises the third issue in the historiography. We can find the existence of people with the deep conviction that the Stalinist value system had already established in the Russian society. These people had also tried hard to internalize voluntarily those values. In sum, the study on the everyday lives in the Stalin's regime has revealed the dynamics of the socialist Russia in the 1930s. Furthermore, there is a new attempt to enhance our understanding on the Stalin's Russia by applying the methodology of oral history. If we sincerely have tried to apply these achievements to the study of North Korea, the portrait of North Korea with a monolithic society still dominant in our society might be greatly renewed.

Imiaslavie is a dogmatic movement, which asserts that the Name of God is God Himself. The movement emerged among russian monks on Mt. Athos in Greek in the beginning of the 20th century, but both proponents and opponents claimed its connections with much religious thought throughout the history of Christianity. The proponents of Imiaslavie argued that like 'idea' of Plato, the Name of God must pre-exist before the world was created, and that the Name cannot not be anything but God Himself. The opponents, Imiaborstvo considered that Imiaslavie is a pantheistic teaching, and incompatible with Christianity. Imiaslavie was condemned for its heresy by Russian Orthodox Church., but it could not put an end on this issue. As indicated by many russian philosophers, including Sergey Bulgakov, Pavel Florensky, Aleksey Losev, Imiaslavie is not only a religious question. Conflict over the Name of The God between Imiaslavie and ImiaborstboI reflects that of two main steams of world view - idealism and materialism, and served as momentum of starting the Moscow school of Christian Neoplatonism, which opend the new pages in the field of Russian philosophy.

Uzbekistan resorts to nationalism, in addition; they hope to convert to the powerful Islamic system that they did in the past. The islamic culture isn't open to the other culture, moreover, it's aggressive. However, it can be another cultural possibilities that accept other cultures, at least the Russian Orthodox is present in Uzbekistan. Just as the Islamic population, Russian Orthodox Church is currently growing number in Russia. That means, Russia can grope the cultural and religious invasion toward in the Central Asia. After the regime transition, Russia of the truly stable period, will continue to interfere with Uzbekistan's complete political and economic independence as a strategic foreign policy toward in the Central Asia. Therefore, Uzbekistan will accept constantly the Russian Orthodox rather than exclude it. Because, take a dual position is more effective rather than exclusion in the point of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan takes advantage of the Russian Orthodox Church to their minority races. Because they think it's not a intimidation to their political system. Like this Uzbekistan continue to do so in the future as a strategic policy; Also, they put to use the Russian orthodox and Islam. Because this relationship only can maintain stable and equal relationship between Uzbekistan and Russia. From another point of view, because Uzbekistan is blamed that the country is the community of the Islamic fundamentalism only, it can be another excuse to the international communities. As a result, Uzbekistan's Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church in friendly relations will continue to persist with many efforts from Uzbekistan. For example, on the surface of a strategic retreat, merging Islamic hard-liners inside Uzbekistan, and trying to controlling the excessive Islamic force.

Since several decades ago, Russia has been demonstrating persistent interest to youth slang. As publications by Russian linguists, sociologists and journalists show, the attitude to slang in this country varies from full antagonism against this phenomenon as the factor of menace to purity of the national language to admiration of youth’s creativity which serves in a way to enrich the standard language. It is no coincidence that recently we have seen a large number of linguistic papers and a variety of slang dictionaries, both monolingual and bilingual, i.e. The Dictionary of Russian Slang, The Russian-English Dictionary of Slang and The Russian-German dictionary of slang. However, Russian-Korean dictionaries (including those which have been published most recently) do not contain slang at all. It causes an awkward situation that Korean learners have no reliable source to obtain any information about words and expressions, which are in fact inevitable in real communication. In this paper, the authors intend to unveil stages of development of youth slang and show ways of formation of slang lexicon and, and more specifically, the means of youth slang expressiveness. No matter how we may judge the ‘jargonization’ of modern Russia, without knowledge (albeit passive) of youth slang it is impossible to comprehend Russian press, Russian modern literature, or the language Russian high schools and universities’ students speak in their daily life. The authors conclude that teaching such element of the Russian language as youth slang on an advanced stage is necessary for understanding of the language of radio, TV and press, as well as casual, ‘free’ speech.