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St. Thomas has not left us a systematic political philosophy. This essay intends to give a rough sketch of what elements his systematic political philosophy would contain. For that purpose, this essay attempts to bring together some of St. Thomas’ philosophical principles and doctrines which have direct relevance to the political life. In doing so, this paper abstracts as much as possible the philosophical elements from his speculative theology. The content of this essay is nothing more than a brief survey of those principles and doctrines of his. Main presuppositions of his political philosophy are as follows: 1. God’s existence as the creator and supreme governor of the world. 2. His understanding of man: man as creature of God, made in His image, as a being of eudaemonia, as a spiritual being and a person, his supernatural life of grace and his supernatural destiny. 3. His doctrine of laws and the natural law, his doctrine of moral virtues including justice, his theories of peace, of just war and self-defence and his doctrine of theological virtues including charity. Main features of his political philosophy are as follows: 1. The human political community is nothing more than a portion of God’s kingdom so that the political power and authority are an aspect of God’s indirect government of the world through the secondary causes and, as any power and authority, have their origins ultimately in Him. 2. Man is by nature a social and political being and, therefore, the political community is a natural institution and the coercive character of law enforcement is a result of the original sin. 3. The political community should indirectly support and promote beyond its material, educational and moral aspirations, the life of grace of the Christians and their vocation to the supernatural destiny. 4. The political community should be founded on the demands of justice and the political power and authority and social order should be bound by just laws. 5. The ruler and the citizens are all ordained to the common good in their own ways. 6. Against an unjust rule, the community as a whole has the right (and at times the obligation) of resistance. 7. The secular power is not excluded from the ecclesiastical power but the church, however, may not intervene in the affairs of the secular power as long as the latter fulfills its own functions within the limits of the natural law. 8. The political community should aim at peace which is the tranquility of order in each member, among the members and in the community at large. Peace may be considered as a work of justice insofar as justice prohibits obstacles for attaining it. Peace, however, is properly an effect of charity. As in other areas of philosophy, St. Thomas has left us a number of valuable insights in political philosophy. His principles are not only very accurate but also very often ultimate; and his theses are very objective and well-balanced. The intellectual acumen and wisdom contained in these principles and theses reveal that they are not simply works of a talented philosopher but of a genius. St. Thomas’ political thought as a whole is as comprehensive as it is profound. It is my opinion that his understanding of human person and human rights, his theory of law and natural law, his theories of justice, right resistance, of just war and self-defence and peace, etc. can serve for generations to come as guidelines in creating a genuinely human political community.
존 로크의 재산권 이론 : 단서 조항과 정의론에 대한 재해석
한국가톨릭철학회 가톨릭철학 제5호 2003.03 pp.63-90
※ 원문제공기관과의 협약기간이 종료되어 열람이 제한될 수 있습니다.
The purpose of this thesis is to study Lockian theory of property based on his Two Treatises of Government, book II. chapter 5. In this thesis, section two and three includes an analysis of four concepts; freedom, consent, agent of power and possessive individualism, all four of which are the key factors in understanding Lockian theory of property. Freedom and consent, among these, are the main concepts that runs through Lockian theory of epistemology, political philosophy and his philosophy of religion. An Essay concerning Human Understanding premises the mental freedom of a human being, and Two Treatises of Government and A letter on Toleration stress political freedom and religious freedom respectively. Locke views a human being as a performer of power and a possessive individual, and thereby Locke approves the individual property rights. Human beings, as in the case of all other creatures, prioritize self-preservation in the ultimate sense and in this regards, power is a necessary mean, which can be acquired by possessing property. Human beings also strive to satisfy their desire and as Macpherson puts it, T. Hobbes and J.Locke describe a human being as a possessive individual. In section four, Lockian Proviso and his concept of labour are analysed. The well-known Proviso is stated as follows. “Man can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others” “as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils.” In this thesis, this Proviso is named ‘nominal Proviso.’ There are two other clauses, named ‘moral Proviso’, and they are stated as follows. “God gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational(man)” “Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.” In my respect, these moral Proviso are the essential elements to comprehend Lockian theory of property fully. Lockian concept of labour is centered on the theory of labour value. This thesis interprets his concept of labour in a relational aspect, since Locke intended to emphasize interdependence in labour. Section five focuses on the relation between justice and charity. In Charles Monson’s words, Locke tried to explain that justice and charity, desert and need are not in dilemma. Rather, they are co-related and are merely different in the way of distribution. When distributing social property according to one’s desert, the possession of the outcome of one’s labour is approved, while distributing according to one’s need, the right to life is relatively well protected. Therefore, these two elements, desert and need, are the concrete methods to accomplish justice. In addition, this thesis sees that Locke intended to tell in his theory that charity is beyond individual morality and is public obligation to protect the poor’s right to live. In other words, individual property rights can be morally justified only when justice and charity are interdependent.
현대 가톨릭 사회윤리에서 정의와 공동선에 대한 연구 - Johannes Messner의 자연법 사상을 중심으로 -
한국가톨릭철학회 가톨릭철학 제5호 2003.03 pp.93-127
※ 원문제공기관과의 협약기간이 종료되어 열람이 제한될 수 있습니다.
In order to understand and explain the individual, the society, and the common good, Messner chooses the inductive method that focuses on the experience. Nevertheless, his basic perspective also follows the traditional Catholic theory of the Natural law that emphasizes the deductive method. He basically attempts to unite individual and society through the ontological, metaphysical aspect. According to his theory, individuals obtain personality through the image of God. And society is not the sum of individuals but an ontological existence. Messner argues that there are two aspects inhuman nature: the individual and the social. He observes these two aspects so that he could rectify the misunderstandings caused by individualism and collectivism. There is a close relationship between the justice and the common good, because the common good is the complete realization of the justice. By explaining the meanings and the kinds of the common good, Messner extends the understanding of individualism and collectivism. Also, “the existential ends” he suggests is a unique idea, and it supports the new natural law which contains his apprehension of individual, society, and the common good.
Both the utilitarianistic approach and the catholic social teaching regard the public interest. But the utilitarianism―the greatest happiness of the greatest number―centers on a quantitative dimension, while the Catholic social principle argues in favor of the quality. Moreover, the utilitarianism considers only with the larger society in the principle of subsidiarity and neglects the principle of personality. Both John Rawls―the origin of justice in a procedural fairness―and the Catholic social principle regard an unfortunate member; however, the Maximin strategy of J.Rawls works only in the case of varying-sum game and the Catholic social teaching works in the case of zero-sum game too. There are similarities between Robert Nozick―the minimal state argument―and the Catholic social principle; however, those two distinct accounts coincide. R.Nozick points up only the individual aspect of the principle of personality, while the Catholic social teaching discusses both the individual and social dimension of personality, R.Nozick stresses on only the smaller society, but Catholic social teaching stresses on both the smaller as well as the larger society of the principle of subsidiarity. When the lowest member is treated just, hence every member in that society is treated just, then in those societies, the peace can be settled down. The justice of the Catholic church―option of the poor―discusses the cause of poor from the beginning. If the cause of poor state is sorely laziness, then the main point of an issue shall not be the rich or the poor, but be the just or the unjust. The social justice as a common denominator and the common good as a common numerater are the same in the content, but the social justice prefers a micro-approach, the other a macro-approach.
Violence: St. Thomas explores the essence of violence through an investigation of will. An act of will along with act of intellect is a inclination from an inner principle. Violence and coercion are caused from the outside. As such, violence and coercion is fundamentally against the natural inclination of will, that is, against human nature. Human Nature: St. Thomas thinks about human nature from the proposition ‘homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore.’ So a human being has material and immaterial nature. Personality: St. Thomas explains the personality in such human nature, that is, human person consists in it. His definition of person is ‘omne individum tarionalis naturae dicitur persona’ which is endowed with immateriality. The image of God: A man is made after (ad) the image of God, that is, the image of the Holy Trinity. All the human acts proceed from such personality. So they should not be inflicted by unjust violence. St. Thomas’ conception of Justice: Achieving justice is a necessary precondition for ending violence and establishing peace. Justice is the lasting and constant will of rendering to each one his right. The Confucian conception of Justice: Living during periods of constant warfare, Confucius and Mencius tried to arrive at their conceptions of justice by looking at what they regarded as ‘injustice’. They talked much about ‘rectification of names’(正名), ‘overcoming the self and returning to propriety’(克己復禮), ‘human heartedness’(仁), ‘reciprocity’(恕), ‘man is by nature good’(性善說) and ‘rule of human-heartedness’(仁政). St. Thomas’ theory of Peace: Peace consists essentially in union among appetites of the same person. He took Augustine’s definition of peace as a ‘tranquility of order’ to mean that such peace begins with restful status within a personality in which all the movements of appetites are at harmony with each other. He thinks love is a cause of peace. Peace is caused by love according as charity loves God and neighbour. The Confucian concept of Peace: Confucius thinks about peace based on human-heartedness(仁), ritual propriety(禮) which is vitalized by human-heartedness, that is, love. He also thinks that it is when name and reality do not match that we have chaos and even war. The social consequence of ritual propriety is value peace. Confucius’ philosophy of human-heartedness is succeeded by Mencius’ theory of rule of human- heartedness(仁政) and the rule of the way(王道政治). Harmony among men means a state of peace. Conclusion: a) In confucianism we encounter a more naturalistic, humanistic and immanent conceptions such as ‘rectification of names’ ‘overcoming the self and the returning to ritual propriety’ ‘sense pity’ etc. four constants. Teachings of Christ, on the other hand, because they are based on the relation of God and man, explain human life from the view of transcendence-immanence and immanence-transcendence. b) Confucius in general and Mencius in particular define war as evil and thereby reject it completely while searching for an ideal state of peace without war, government of human-heartedness and rule of way. St. Thomas, on the other hand, admits the use of just force in cases of personal and state-based defence. However, he makes it clear that peace and order in this life is an incomplete peace in comparison to the real peace without war, peace without conflict and instability, and eternal peace achievable in the next world. In the Confucian theory, peace is naturalistic, humanistic and immanent. In St. Thomas’ theory, on the other hand, peace being based on the love of God and neighbour, is of transcendental-immanent and immanent-transcendental character likewise in the case of justice. c) Conception of Peace for the future: Today in the face of astonishing advances in science and technology, mankind is increasingly forced to humanize them. In fact the unimaginable progress of science and technology contributes to human life greatly by prolonging life and providing fast-paced and comfortable life etc. At the same time it is shaking our world view and values from their foundations, thereby, seriously injuring the image of God within man. Such advances in science and technology can also be put in the service of violence, leading to unimaginable consequences. The people in Asia have been the victims of colonialization. Although they restored their lost territories, they still think economies are exploited, human rights oppressed and cultural treasures looted. Here, mankind must remind the old saying ‘res clamat ad dominum.’ On the other hand, the people of underdeveloped countries have to remind themselves that they are greatly benefited by the progress of science and technology, economic system, bio-medical science, liberal arts, social welfare system, democracy, digitalization, internet, cyber-space, etc. developed by the developed countries. The best way for a solution of problems is through conversations with a mutual respect, wisdom, courage, forgiveness and love. For building up the peace of mankind for the future there is the mission of the Catholic Church and Catholic philosophers with the co-operation of good will in general.
Honoured as the ‘Seraphic Doctor’, St. Bonaventure must without a doubt be counted among the most important theological figures of the thirteenth century. Today’s readers, however, are unlikely to recognize him as a philosopher in so far as he took a leading role in checking what he considered to be a dangerously uncritical acceptance of Aristotelianism. My aim in this paper is to depict Bonaventure as a philosopher who developed his metaphysics in terms of the notion of light. Bonaventure considered light as the Absolute Being or God who is the first principle and the source of all goodness and truth, and explained creation of every finite being by virtue of the mode of rays radiated from the source. Light in the created universe is a participation in God's light. All the activities of finite beings stem from the basic energy of light. Even knowledge, sensible and intellectual, takes place through light, or illumination. At this point, his understanding of light goes beyond the level of physics. Furthermore, this metaphysics of light leads us to claim that Bonaventure was one of the most distinguished philosophers in the middle ages.
토마스 아퀴나스 인간학의 논리적 출발점에 대한 정당화 - 지성 단일성 논쟁에 대한 그의 해결책을 중심으로 -
한국가톨릭철학회 가톨릭철학 제5호 2003.03 pp.231-251
※ 원문제공기관과의 협약기간이 종료되어 열람이 제한될 수 있습니다.
St. Thomas’ concept of man is characterized by self-determination, self-governance and self-creation based on his notion of rational nature. These characteristics presuppose that each one has his own intellect, that is, everyone should be a subject of his own intellectual activity. The presumption seems to be commonly accepted these days. No one may raise any further questions about it. But the sphere of 13th century was different. There was a big controversy about the unity of human intellect. A muslim philosopher Averroes, who was called the Commentator, insisted that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, could not belong to each individual person. This position runs counter to that of St. Thomas. Accordingly, St. Thomas should cope with Averroes’s arguments. Just pointing out the commonly accepted empirical fact that each one is a subject of his own intellectual operation do not suffice for that purpose. It needs to be supported by the philosophical arguments. The pivotal point is whether St. Thomas’s notion of human soul, which is not only a substantial form of the body but also a subsisting form in itself, could be theologically justified or not. As is well known, St. Thomas willingly accepted the Aristotelian matter-form principles, which seems favor not the position of his own but that of Averroes. He, however, do not confine himself to that principles. As is usual, his unique metaphysical principle of ‘esse’ plays also a core role in his argument for his notion of human soul.
토마스 아퀴나스의 Species Intelligibilis 개념과 그것의 13세기 철학에서의 위치 - 『신학대전』 Ⅰ, 85, 2를 중심으로 -
한국가톨릭철학회 가톨릭철학 제5호 2003.03 pp.252-281
※ 원문제공기관과의 협약기간이 종료되어 열람이 제한될 수 있습니다.
There are diverse opinions about the ‘intelligible species’ by means of which the scholars tried to explain the relation between the cognitive act and the extramental object. The scholars in early and middle 13th century, including St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentaries on the sentences, did not clearly distinguish between the intelligible species and the intelligible form which the extramental things possess. Consequently, the intelligible species was regarded not only as the medium of the cognition but also as the object of cognition. According to this position, therefore, the intelligible species plays a role of the medium because it is just the known intelligible form of the things. But in I, 85, 2 of Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas considers that the intelligible species is the principle of the cognition. But this positive determination presupposes the negative one that the intelligible species is not the direct object of the cognition. In doing so, St. Thomas Aquinas not only criticizes the opinion of his contemporaries as well as the scholars before him but also corrects his own early view. According to him, from the presence of species in the intellect it may not be concluded that it is known by the intellect. For the intelligible species is only the form of the intellect by which it cognizes the reality. And the position that the species is the very object is opposed to the position that it is the medium of cognition, because any position which compromises the two given positions would result in the solipsism, scepticism or relativism. The arguments developed by Thomas Aquinas in I, 85, 2 are accepted widely in various forms in the late 13th century. It is interesting to notice that even those who refuse the intelligible species, make use of St. Thomas’ determination of species and his arguments in their polemics.
Hegel betont die teleologische Wiederherstellung der Ordnung der Strafe, indem er eine semantische Unterscheidung zwischen Rache und Strafe machte. Er ist immer der Meinung, daß die verlezte Ordnung unbedingt wiederhergestellt werden soll, da wir in ihr wohnen. Strafe erkennt solche Tatsache an, daß Ordnung, die gar nicht verletzt werden soll, zerstrt wird. Daraus ergibt sich, daß solche verletzte Ordnung wieder hergestellt werden soll. Hegel erkennt der Rache solche Wiederherstellung ab, da sie immer nicht die Wiederholung der Ordung, sondern die andere Rache produziert. Durch solche semantische Unterscheidung macht Hegel deutlich, daß der Verbrecher wegen der Zerstrung der Ordnung in Selbst Widerspruch geraten ist, weil er die Ordnung, in der er wohnt, spontan zerstrt. Wiedervergeltung garantiert keineswegs die ffentliche Rehabilitierung der Ordnung, da sie auf privater Ebene die einzelne Rache vollzieht. Dagegen soll Strafe auf die ffentliche Wiederherstellung der sittlichen Ordnung abzielen, indem sie die Recht zerstrende Handlung an die objektive Lebensform verbinden lßt. Daraus ergibt sich, daß Ihr Endzweck in der objektiven Wiederherstellung der sittlichen Ordnung durch die ffentliche Durchsetzung von Strafe liegt. Hegel machte darauf aufmerksam, daß die Strafetheorie, welche sich auf Vertragstheorie grndet, nicht in der Lage ist, die zerstrte Rechtsordnung in Ordnung zu bringen, da die Zuflligkeit des Vertrags die objektive Herstellung der Ordnung nicht garantieren kann. Nach solcher Vertragstheorie ist der den Vertrag Zerstrender in solche Inkonsistenz geraten, weil er nicht mit sich selbst in Übereinstimmung steht. Aus solcher Inkonsistenz ergibt sich keine zwingende Notwendigkeit, die zerstrte Rechtsordnung in Wiederherstellung zu bringen. Aus diesem Grund kommt Hegel auf solchen Gedanken, Rechtsordnung ber den Vertrag hinaus mit der unzerstbaren Lebensform in Verbindung zu bringen. Sonst gewinnt die Logik der Selbstzerstrung an keiner zwingenden Bedeutung. Die Unmglichkeit der Selbstzerstrung fhrt notwendigerweise zu Unm-glichkeit der gesetzlichen Lebensform, denn die Zerstrung des Rechts verwickelt sich in endgultiger Weise in Selbst-Verletzung. Der performative Wiederspruch, wie Hegel ihn anders gedrckt den Selbst- Widerspruch nannte, bringt uns dazu, die sittliche Lebensform unbedingt als das Seinige in Gang zu bringen. Die ffentliche Sanktion der Strafe rechtfertigt sich in solcher ungetrennten Verbindung jedes Einzelnen mit der sittlichen Rechtsordnung. Deshalb kommt die Zuflligkeit oder Beliebigkeit der Strafe außer Geltung. Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der Strafe macht uns darauf merksam, daß die sittliche Lebensform unter keinen Umstnden zerstrt werden soll, denn sonst ihre Verletzung ist in Selbst-Zerstrung geraten. Der Endzweck der Strafe liegt darin, die zerstrte Rechtsordnung in Wiederherstellung zu bringen, indem sie solchen Verlezter straft. Die Unumgnglichkeit der Strafe rechtfertigt sich nur in der Wiederherstellung der zerstrten Rechtsordnung, da sich die ffentliche Autoritt des Rechts auf solcher wiederherstellenden Errichtung grndet. Aus diesem Grund ist es bewiesen, daß Strafe zur Herstellung der unzerstbaren Ordnung dient.
바티스타 몬딘, 『전환기로의 새로운 문화 모색』- 이재룡 옮김, 가톨릭출판사, 2002, 416쪽 -
한국가톨릭철학회 가톨릭철학 제5호 2003.03 pp.322-331
※ 원문제공기관과의 협약기간이 종료되어 열람이 제한될 수 있습니다.
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