Earticle

자본시장과 금융투자업에 관한 법률(“자본시장법”) 제184조는 투자회사에 상근임직원 고용을 금지하고 자산운용을 집합투자업자에게 위탁하도록 강제한다. 이러한 명목회사(paper company) 구조는 사회기반시설투융자집합투자기구(“인프라펀드”)의 운용 구조를 법률로 획일화하고 대리인 비용을 제도화한다. 한 국내 상장 사회기반시설투융자회사(이하 'M펀드')의 경우 2006년부터 2018년까지 누적 배당금의 32.1%를 운용보수로 지급하였으며, 2018년 주주행동을 통해 기본보수율 인하와 성과보수 폐지가 이루어졌음에도 시가총액 증가에 따라 운용보수 총액은 계속 증가했다. 이는 논란의 핵심이 보수율의 적정성 여부가 아니라 외부운용 구조 자체에서 발생하는 이해상충에 있었음을 보여준다. 이글은 호주의 경영내재화 경험과 결합증권(Stapled Security) 구조를 검토하여, 자기관리 인프라펀드 신설, 경영내재화 전환절차 법정화, 인프라결합증권 도입을 제안한다. 아울러 투자자 보호, 세제, 이해상충 문제를 검토한 결과, 자기관리와 외부운용 중 어느 하나를 강제하는 것이 아니라 투자자가 운용 구조를 선택할 수 있도록 사회기반시설에 대한 민간투자법(“민간투자법”)을 개편하는 것이 바람직하다는 결론을 도출하였다.

Article 184 of the Korean Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act requires investment companies to operate as paper companies and to delegate asset management to external managers. This structure institutionalizes agency costs by law. For example, M fund paid management fees amounting to 32.1 percent of its cumulative dividends over a twelve-year period. Even after shareholder activism in 2018 reduced the basic management fee and abolished performance fees, the total amount of fees continued to increase as market capitalization grew. This suggests that the core issue lies not in the level of fees but in the externally managed structure itself. This article examines the Australian experience with management internalisation and stapled securities and proposes three legislative pathways: (i) self-managed infrastructure investment companies, (ii) a statutory procedure for management internalisation, and (iii) infrastructure stapled securities. It argues that Korean law should permit investors to choose between self-management and external management rather than mandating a single governance structure.

본 연구는 유가증권시장에서 현금배당의 증가, 감소 그리고 유지공시라는 경제적 사건을, 고배당선호이론(신호전달가설, 대리인비용 감소가설 및 손안의 새 가설) 관점에서 실증 분석함으로써, 배당공시에 대한 시장의 효율성을 검정함과 동시에 현금배당공시가 주가에 미치는 영향을 확인하였다. 고배당선호이론 하에서 본 연구의 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 일반적으로 배당정책은 기업에 실질적인 자본을 증가시키며 투자정책 측면과도 밀접한 관계가 있기 때문에 기업 가치에 상당한 영향을 미친다는 연구결과들이 주를 이루고 있다. 이와 마찬지로, 본 연구의 분석결과에서도 배당의 공시효과가 존재하는 것으로 밝혀졌으며, 배당감소 및 유지 공시에서 또한 양(+)의 초과수익률이 확인되었다. 둘째, 배당의 공시효과를 설명하는 각 가설의 적합성을 판단하기 위해서는 매출액성장률이 높은 기업, 대주주 지분율이 낮은 기업, 배당수익률이 높은 기업으로 구성된 그룹의 시장반응이 더욱 강해야 하는데, 분석결과, 전년도 배당수익률을 기준으로 네 집단으로 분류하여 누적평균 비정상수익률을 분석한 손 안의 새 가설 검정에서만 집단 간 시장반응에 뚜렷한 차이를 발견할 수 있었으며, 산업더미와 연도더미를 고려한 회귀분석결과에서도 전년도 배당수익률만이 각각의 기간별 누적초과수익률에 유의한 영향을 미치는 것을 확인하였다. 이러한 사실은 배당정책을 임하는 기업 경영진에게는 정책적 시사점을, 자본시장의 투자자들에게는 투자 수익적 측면에서 시사점을 제공하며, 배당을 통한 성장과 분대의 균형이 중요시되는 최근의 시점을 반영했다는 점에서 학문적 시사점을 제공한다고 할 수 있다.

This study revisits the information of content of dividend announcement including recent events from 2011 to 2016 in Korean stock market. Miller and Modigliani (1961) presented an irrelevance of dividend under the assumption of a perfect market, but the actual capital market has many market imperfections. Afterwards, a number of studies had claimed that the announcement effects of dividends are existed, and various research results were presented, such as the high dividend preference theory and the low dividend preference theory. In previous studies, the effects of dividend announcement was explained by signaling theory, principal-agent theory, and firm-size theory. In this study, we not only examine the three previous hypotheses but also try to test the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis which is newly proposed from the behavior finance. Also, we further examine a firm-specific cross-section regression of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of different windows on different firm specific independent variables for all the announcement of dividend change. The results of this study are summarized as follows. In case of dividend announcement in Korean stock market, significant CARs was observed only in the specific year (2013) compared to the market return. For a more detailed, we divided all our sample into four groups depending on growth in sales, block-holders' ownership, firm-size and dividend yield as a proxy for signaling, principal-agent, firm-size and bird-in-the-hand hypotheses and we examined whether the cumulative excess returns differed for each group or not. As hypothesis of this study, the hypothesis that the firms with the highest sales growth rate will have stronger market reaction will not be confirmed because the positive information about the company's profits is transmitted to the investors. On the other hand, in the case of a company with a high sales growth rate, the decrease in dividends is considered to be an active investment, which is a good news. However, we can conclude that this study rejects the signaling hypothesis based on the analysis that the market response of the group with low sales growth rate is stronger. Also, the results of the Agency cost reduction hypotheses test show that there is a negative relationship between the shareholder's share-holding ratio and the share price response to dividend announcement, which is a result of partially supporting the agency cost reduction hypothesis as well as the results of some previous studies. As a result of the ‘bird in the hand’ hypothesis test, it was confirmed that the firms with higher dividend yields in the previous year showed a strong market response to the dividend disclosure and positive (+) relationship existed. This means that investors prefer immediate cash generated from dividends rather than future capital gains. Assuming that the dividend yield of the previous year is the same, it is strongly anticipated that firms with high expected dividend yields. In particular, the stronger share price response in the maintenance announcement compared to the increase and decrease in dividends indicates that investors prefer to maintain dividends over the previous year. The reason for this is considered to include the burden of tax burden and concern about negative signs of the company. Our results contradict the signaling and principal-agent hypotheses, which argue that management has an incentive to distribute information about the company's future profit to the market through dividend policy and the increase (decrease) in dividends leads to an increase in additional external borrowing, which makes the firm a strict monitoring target of the capital market and therefore plays a role in reducing agency costs. Contrastively, our results support the firm-size and bird-in-the-hand hypotheses.

최근 국내에 진출한 다국적 기업들의 극명하게 대조되는 행태가 논란이 되고 있다. 본 연구는 해외 명품 패션브랜드 기업들이 높은 본국 배당 송금에 비하여 사회 기부활동 등 사회공헌도가 낮다는 언론 보도에 의하여 유명의류상호 기업들의 대리인 비용을 살펴보고자 하였다. 대리인 비용은 매출액 자산비율(AT), 영업비용 대비 매출액(OPEXP), EBITD 대비 총자산(EBITD)비율을 표본기업별로 구한 값과 2014년 지배구조등급으로 대상을 받은 S-OIL의 비율차이를 각각 구하여 3가지 차이비율의 공통된 속성을 변수를 산정하기 위하여 주성분분석(PCA)으로 공통변수를 추출하고 이 변수를 대리인 비용의 지수변수(ACI)로 선정하였다. 유명의류상호로 선정된 기업을 관심변수로 하고 대리인비용지수(ACI)를 종속변수로 하는 회귀분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과 유명의류상호로 선정된 기업은 판매비와관리비 분야에서 대리인비용이 높게 나타나고 수익성 분야에서 대리인비용이 낮게 나타났다. 그러나 주성분분석에 의한 전체적인 대리인비용은 일반기업과 차이기 나지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 민감도 분석으로 표본집단과 동일한 재무적 특성을 가진 기업들을 PSM방법으로 1:1 matching 표본을 구성하여 비교분석한 결과 판관비 부문에서만 유명의류상호기업의 대리인비용이 높게 나타났다. 추가 분석으로 유명의류상호기업에 국한 하지 않고 211개 산업군에서 브랜드파워 1위로 선정된 기업을 대상으로 대리인비용을 차이를 확인한 결과 본 분석의 결과와 동일한 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 국내에서 최초로 유명의류상호기업의 대리인비용을 분석하여 실증적 결과를 제시하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다고 할 것이다.

Motivated by the recent cases of negligent social responsibility as manifested by foreign luxury fashion brands in Korea, this study investigates whether agency costs depend on the sustainability of different types of corporate governance. Agency costs refer either to vertical costs arising from the relationship between stockholders and managers, or to horizontal costs associated with the potential conflicts between majority and minority stockholders. The firms with luxury fashion brand could spend large sums of money on maintenance of magnificent brand image, thereby increasing the agency cost. On the contrary, the firms may hold down wasteful spending to report a gaudily financial achievement. This results in mitigation of the agency cost. Agency costs are measured by the value of the principal component. First, three ratios are constructed: asset turnover, operating expense to sales, and earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation. Then, the scores of each of these ratios for individual firms in the sample are differenced from the ratios for the benchmark firm of S-OIL. S-OIL was designated as the best superior governance model firm for 2013 by CGS. We perform regression analysis of each agency cost index, luxury fashion brand dummy and a set of control variables. The regression results indicate that the agency costs of the firms with luxury fashion brand exceed those of control group in the fashion industry in the part of operating expenses, but the agency cost falls short of those of control group in the part of EBITD, thus the aggregate agency costs are not differential of those of the control group. In sensitivity test, the results are same that the agency cost of the firms are higher than those of the matching control group with PSM(propensity matching method). These results are corroborated by an additional analysis comparing the group of the companies with the best brands with the control group. The results raise doubts about the effectiveness of management of the firms with luxury fashion brand. This study has a limitation that the research has performed only for 2013 and this paper suggests that there is room for improvement in the current research methodology.

본 연구는 2005∼2011년까지 7년 동안 한국거래소에 상장된 비금융기업을 대상으로 경영자소유지분이 부채만기와 대리인비용에 미치는 영향을 검증한다. 이는 경영자소유지분이 감소할수록 외부 이해관계자들로부터의 빈번한 모니터링을 회피하기 위해 장기부채를 선호할 것이라는 가설을 검증하기 위한 것이다. 특히 본 연구는 경영자소유지분과 부채만기 사이의 관계는 기업의 소유와 경영의 분리 여부에 따라 다를 것이라는 가설을 검증한다. 이는 전문경영자기업이 다수를 차지하고 있는 미국과 달리 소유경영자기업이 많은 한국기업의 소유구조를 반영하기 위함이다. 실증분석을 통해서 소유경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분과 단기부채비중 사이에 뚜렷한 관계가 존재하지 않지만 전문경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분과 단기부채비중 사이에 유의한 양(+)의 상관관계가 존재함을 발견하였다. 이러한 결과는 전문경영자기업의 경우 경영자소유지분이 높아질수록 대리인 비용이 감소하여 단기부채비중이 증가하게 될 가능성이 높음을 시사한다. 또한 앞의 결과에 대한 강건성 분석 차원에서 경영자소유지분과 대리인비용 사이의 관계도 검증한다. 그 결과 소유경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분이 높을수록 대리인비용이 뚜렷하게 증가하는 반면, 전문경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분이 높을수록 대리인비용이 감소하는 증거를 발견하였다. 따라서 미국시장과 마찬가지로 국내 시장에서도 경영자소유지분이 증가할수록 단기부채 사용이 높아지며 이러한 패턴은 소유경영자기업보다는 전문경영자기업에서 보다 뚜렷한 현상이라고 할 수 있다

This study extends Data et al.’s (2005) study by rigorously examining the relation between managerial stock ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. Datta et al. (205) reason that as managerial ownership declines, there will be less alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. They also reason that, in this situation, managers choose a smaller proportion of short-term debt since issuing short-term debt leads to frequent monitoring from stakeholders. In their study, Datta et al. (2005) show that the higher the managerial ownership, the larger the proportion of short-term debt. This study hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on corporate debt maturity varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. Specifically, we test whether, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interests with shareholders increases, increasing the proportion of short-term debt. In contrast, we also test whether, for owner-controlled firms, there is an inverse relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. This study contributes to the literature on corporate debt maturity from the perspective of ownership structure. This study also extends Datta et al.’s (2005) study by reexamining the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity in the different types of ownership structure. This study also hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on agency costs varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. We predict that, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a larger proportion of short-term debt increases, decreasing agency costs. In contrast, we predict that, for owner-controlled firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a smaller proportion of short-term debt become lower, increasing agency costs. Datta et al. (2005) argue that as managerial ownership increases, managers choose the larger proportion of short-term debt, thereby increasing an alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders. They do not, however, provide evidence on the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs. Furthermore, we complement Datta et al.’s (2005) study by considering agency costs in the determination of corporate debt maturity. Using the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Exchanges (KRX) between 2005 and 2011, this study examines the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity. Specifically, this study investigates the role of managerial ownership in the debt maturity decisions using a pooled OLS regression controlling for leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, the investment-grade dummy, abnormal earnings, stock volatility, firm size, and regulation industry dummy. For the entire sample firms, we find an insignificant relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. We also find that, for the subsample of owner-controlled firms, managerial ownership is insignificantly related to the proportion of short-term debt, while, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the relation is a positive and significant. Notably, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the proportion of short-term debt increases by about 8.48% as managerial ownership increase from median to 95 percentile. The increased managerial ownership is not only important statistically, but has also economical significance. Furthermore, regarding the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs, we find consistent results with previous findings. This study uses the inverse of expense ratios and asset turnover ratios as proxy for agency costs. We expect that if managerial ownership increases and thus agency costs declines, the coefficient on managerial ownership will be negative. In regression models using the entire sample firms, we find that as managerial ownership becomes higher, agency costs increase. For the subsample of owner-controlled firms, there is a positive and significant relation between managerial ownership and expense ratios. In contrast, for the subsample of agent-led firms, we find a negative and significant relation between managerial ownership and expense ratios, indicating that as managerial ownership increases, agency costs decline. In addition, the results of regressions using the inverse of asset turnover ratios are consistent with previous findings.

본 연구는 2005년 4월부터 2012년 말 기간 중 5% 룰에 따른 지분공시 자료를 이용해 기관투자자 및 외국법인의 보유지분의 부분매각이 경영진의 주주가치 훼손행위를 경고하는 효과가 있는지를 살펴보았다. 그 결과, 투자기업의 악재성 공시에 이은 기관 및 외국인투자자의 보유지분의 부분매각 행위는 시장에서 긍정적으로 받아들여지는 경우 영업비비율로 측정한 경영진의 사적소비 견제와 토빈큐 및 산업 토빈큐(Tobin’s Q)로 측정한 기업가치 개선에 효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 경향은 특히 경영참여 목적을 가진 외국인투자자가 보유지분의 일부를 매각한 경우에 현저했다. 기관 및 외국인 투자자가 경영진 견제를 위해 일반적으로 활용하는 의결권 반대행사는 주총에서 특정 의안에 대해서만 가능하다. 국내 투자문화에서 보유지분의 부분매각을 주주행동과 연결시키기에는 시기상조이지만 기관 및 외국인투자자가 영향력 있는 주주로서 경영진에 대해 항시적으로 질책성 의사표시를 할 수 있다는 점에서 그 유용성을 찾을 수 있겠다.

Institutional investors are obligated to actively exercise their shareholder rights to perform fiduciary duties as trustees. Korean institutional investors, however, do not perform these duties diligently because they indirectly invest in entrusted assets and are reluctant to exercise shareholder rights out of concerns over investing companies, political affairs, and institutional constraints. Foreign investors, in contrast, are more likely to exercise their shareholder rights because they are free from these concerns. This paper investigates the role of domestic and foreign institutional investors as corporate monitors using a daily mechanism rather than voting rights, which are exercised only on specific proposals at general shareholder meetings. We analyze how the agency costs and value of target firms are affected by the sale of a portion of their stocks by domestic and foreign institutional investors. Our sample comprises all institutional investors’ disclosures of an equity ownership change to abide by the “5% rule” in the period from April 2005 to December 2012. Under the 5% rule governing large share acquisitions of publicly held companies, a person or institution who holds 5% or more of the equity securities in a target company or thereafter changes its holdings by 1% or more must file a report with the Financial Supervisory Commission and Korea Exchange (KRX) within five days of the transaction or change date. We exclude from the sample announcements made by a target company between the trading date and announcement date of stock sales because the firm announcement effect and institutional investor disposal effect are likely to be intertwined. We also exclude disclosures that generate a positive market response because only unfavorable announcements are followed by monitoring-motivated stock sales. If a target firm makes an announcement before an institutional investor’s announcement of share disposal, we include that announcement only if it shows a statistically significant negative market response at the 10% level, as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the stock sale disclosure date. CAR is calculated by summing all market-adjusted abnormal returns around the target firm’s announcement. If a target firm makes no announcement within five days of institutional investors’ announcement of a stock sale, the announcement is included in the final sample to ensure that we do not rule out the disposal of a portion of shares that is too small to attract an announcement obligation by institutional investors to punish management seen to be destroying shareholder value. A sale is regarded as a monitoring-motivated sale when the CAR around the announcement date of an institutional investor stock sale is positive at the 10% significance level. We expect that institutional investors’ sale of a portion of their stake reduces a target firm’s agency costs and increases corporate value if it has a “kick-in-the-pants” motivation and that strategic investors are more likely to reprimand and exert influence on management than financial investors. However, the opposite outcome is also possible if management subordinates shareholders’ passive stock sales to the more active exercise of shareholder rights. In multiple regression analysis, the dependent variables are agency costs measured by the ratio of operating expenses to sales, which tend to decrease when managers’ perks are restrained, and the asset turnover ratio, which tends to increase when assets are used more efficiently. Another dependent variable is firm value measured by (industry-adjusted) Tobin’s Q. The explanatory variables are a monitoring dummy indicating a positive market response, an institutional investor intention-to-hold stock dummy indicating a strategic investment, an unfavorable announcement-by-the-target-firm dummy, a foreign investor dummy, and a foreign investor intention-to-hold stock dummy. Two-stage least-squares regression analysis is performed with one year lagged data to consider the possible endogeneity of the monitoring dummy representing monitoring motivation. We find that an institutional investor’s sale of a portion of its stock is more likely to reduce operating expenses relative to sales when an unfavorable disclosure by the target company generates a positive market response to the institutional investor’s announcement of that sale and when foreign investors are labeled as strategic investors. Our results also show that stock sales by institutional investors improve firm value. For foreign investors, firm value is improved only when they report the purpose of their stock holdings to be management participation. Strategic institutional investors tend to have a negative effect on firm value except in the case of kick-in-the-pants-motivated sales, which suggests that we should encourage strategic foreign investors to improve the long-term performance of firms. In sum, institutional and foreign investors monitor firms through the sale of a portion of their shares, in addition to registering a “no” vote on firms’ proposals in shareholder meetings and engaging in face-to-face talks with management.

본 연구에서는 가족기업의 경영활동을 견제하고 감시기능을 하고 있는 이사회 활동에 따라 경영 성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 상장기업을 대상으로 가족 기업을 가족경영기 업, 가족소유기업, 가족참여기업으로 세분화하였다. 연구기간은 2009년부터 2012년까지 4개년도 1,852개의 상장기업을 대상으로 하고 있으며, 가족기업은 전체 표본기업 중에서 76.3%로 나타나 국 내 가족기업의 비율이 상당히 높은 것으로 나타났다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 가족소유기업 에서는 지배주주와 외부 주주 간 대리인 문제를 심화시킬 수 있기 때문에 이를 완화하기 위한 이사 회의 감시와 견제가 클 경우 경영성과는 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 가족경영기업은 사외이사보다 는 가족구성원, 경영자문가에 대한 의존도가 높기 때문에 가족구성원의 중재자 역할이나 후계자 선 정에 있어서 사외이사가 거의 도움이 주지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 가족경영기업과 가족참여기업은 이사회 보수(율)과 감사위원의 수가 높을수록 경영성과는 증가하였다. 둘째, 이사회 특성변수는 가 족기업의 대리인 비용에 영향을 미치고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 가족기업 전체에서 이사회 보수(율) 이 높을수록 대리인 비용이 감소하였으며, 가족참여기업에서 사외이사비율이 높을수록 대리인 비용 이 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 반면에 가족참여기업에서 감사위원 역할이 유용하지 못한 것으로 나 타났다. 셋째, 가족경영기업과 가족참여기업은 주식시장에서 기업가치를 인정받지 못하고 있으나 비 가족기업에 비해 상대적으로 높은 경영성과를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 반면에 가족기업 특성에 따 른 대리인 비용의 차이를 분석결과 가족경영기업과 가족참여기업은 비가족기업보다 대리인 비용이 크게 나타났으나 가족소유기업은 비가족기업보다 대리인 비용이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 가족 경영기업과 가족참여기업의 경우 대리인비용을 감소시킬 수 있는 감시기능의 강화 등이 이사회 역 할에 있어서 중요과제로 인식되어져야 함을 시사한다고 할 수 있다.

The performance of family business can be affect by the governance of firm. Specifically, the governance of family firm includes such factors like degree of ownership of stock and participation in managerial decision by family member(s). But there is no definite definition of family firm in korea. So, we devided 1852 KOSPI listed company into firms owned by family, firms managed by family, firms participated by family and non family firms to verify the relation between governance of firm with family and managerial performance and market value of equity. In general, we found 76.3% of family firm within samples and related results like below. First, in case of firms owned by family with dominating stockholder, agency cost between dominating stockholder and outside firm stockholders seems to grow. To minimize agency cost and improve the managerial performance, monitoring and keeping in check by board of directors is needed. In another words, monitoring by board of directors can reduce the agency cost caused by family. Firms managed by family and firms participated by family seems to have increasing agency cost with paying more salary compared with other type of firms. But in other ways. this seems to be the incentive to increase market value of the firm and that is proportionate to the number of auditors. Second, characteristic factors related with board of directors seems to affect agency cost of family business. In general, as the salary paid to the board of directors grow, agency cost of family firms seems to decrease. But, as outside director increase and as auditor decrease, the agency cost seemed to decrease in case of firms participated by family especially. This means auditors do not find their role in family business. And to narrow our scope, firms managed by family and firms participated by family seem to suffer from higher agency cost compared with non family firms but firms owned by family vice versa. Third, family firms do not gain their appropriate ranking though they get the higher managerial performance compared with non family firms as usual.

본 연구는 기업지배구조가 어떻게 기업가치 제고에 기여하는 가를 알아보고자 대리인 이론에 근거하여 이사회의 독립성이 기업들이 보유하고 있는 현금성자산의 수준과 효율적 배분 및 가치에 대해 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석하고 있다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 2001회계연도부터 2010회계연도까지 한국 상장기업의 전체 사외이사를 독립 적인 사외이사와 비독립적인 사외이사로 구분하여 독립적 사외이사 비율과 비독립적 사외이사 비율을 산출하여 이용하였다. 이러한 본 연구는 기업의 주요 자원인 현금성 자산에 내재되어 있는 대리인 비용을 통제하기 위하여 이사회의 실질적인 독립성이 중요하다는 점을 강조하고 있다. 실증분석 결과에 따르면 이사회의 독립성 수준이 높은 기업일수록 현금성 자산의 보유 수준이 낮고, 현금성 자산을 효율적으로 배분하고 있으며, 그리고 현금성 자산에 대한 시장의 평가가치가 높게 나타났다. 이러한 연구 결과는 이사회의 독립성 수준에 따라 현금보유의 가치가 다르다는 점을 보여주고 있으며, 따라서 경영자의 사적유용 행위를 방지하여 기업가치를 제고하고 투자자의 권리를 보호하기 위해서는 이사회의 실질적인 독립성 개선이 필요하다는 근거를 제시 하고 있다.

This study empirically analyzes the relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings in Korea, a representative emerging market, using its data of listed firms with interests in contradictory recent research results concerning corporate governance and cash holdings. The variables used as proxies to represent types of corporate governance are very important. Unlike previous studies, this study uses the independence of boards as a proxy variable for corporate governance level because boards play a crucial role in monitoring management and simultaneously implementing decision-making processes. In addition, a principal decision-making process carried out by a board aims to protect investor profit and enhance firm value by efficiently allocating firm resources, and previous research has emphasized that independence is important to boards’ effective functioning. To measure board independence, we use the ratios of independent and non-independent outside directors used in previous studies, drawing on a very large amount of data gathered on the individual outside directors of Korean listed firms for the 2001-2010 period. Based on these data, the ratios of independent and non-independent directors are extracted after classifying two types of outside directors by setting up more stringent criteria, which include the educational and vocational backgrounds of individual outside directors as well as their legal qualifications. In this way, the study considers the importance of independent outside directors by empirically analyzing the effect of each ratio, and highlights that board independence originates with independent outside directors. More specifically, we provide empirical evidence in relation to the following three main questions. (1) Does the amount of cash holdings differ according to the degree of corporate governance (board independence) in Korean listed firms? (2) Are cash resources efficiently allocated according to the degree of corporate governance (board independence) in Korean listed firms? (3) Does the value of cash holdings differ and consequently affect firm value according to the degree of corporate governance (board independence) in Korean listed firms? The empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, when a board becomes more independent, the firm’s cash holdings decreases, while cash outflow increases. As the board’s independence grows, it is able to more efficiently control managers’ incentives to accumulate cash resources internally. Second, as board independence increases, high-growth opportunity firms may increase their investment options, while low-growth opportunity firms may increase their dividend options. Our analysis of the interaction between board independence and cash holdings in investments and dividends, according to growth opportunity, indicates that its effects on dividends were significant, but its effects on investments were not. In firms with high growth opportunity, as the ratio of non-independent outside directors increases, internally held cash is not spent on investments but on dividends, which confirms that the firms’ growth opportunities are not being used efficiently. In contrast, in firms with low growth opportunity, as the ratio of independent outside directors increases, managers are prohibited by the board from spending internally held cash, which instead is likely to be spent on dividends. Finally, firm value increases in firms with higher levels of board independence and more cash holdings. In other words, as board independence increases, investors value cash holdings more highly. This indicates that the value of cash holdings differs according to the type of corporate governance. Our findings confirm that the relationship between board independence and cash holdings in Korea, an emerging market, is different from that in the U.S., a well-developed market. More importantly, this study enables us to understand how good corporate governance enhances firm value. It shows that in firms with high board independence, the market estimates that the monitoring function of the board works effectively and that cash holdings are not exploited for managers’ private benefit; instead, they are allocated efficiently according to the firm’s characteristics, such as to growth opportunities. This market view is then reflected in the valuation of cash holdings, which in turn increases firm value.

본 연구는 기업이 대리인 비용을 줄이기 위한 감시장치인 고품질의 감사제도를 구축했을 때 원가의 하방경직성이 완화되는지를 검증하고자 하였다. 대부분의 선행연구들은 감사품질의 대용치로 감사인 규모 또는 산업전문감사인 여부를 사용하고 있는데, 이는 산업전문감사인이 해당 전문산업에 속한 기업을 감사할 때 전문적인 지식과 경험에 의하여 더 높은 품질의 감사업무를 수행할 수 있으리라는 논리에 근거한다. 따라서 본 연구는 대표적인 감사품질의 대용치인 감사인의 산업전문성에 따라 원가의 하방경직성이 완화되는지를 실증분석하였다. 분석을 위해 2007년부터 2013년까지의 2,101개 금융업을 제외한 증권거래소에 상장된 기업을 표본으로 사용하였으며, 실증을 위해서 원가의 하방경직성을 측정한 Anderson et al.(2003)의 다중회귀모형을 사용하였다. 실증분석 결과, 원가의 하방경직성은 분석에 사용된 거의 모든 원가항목에서 관찰되었다. 또한 산업전문감사인에 의해 감사를 받는 피감사기업이 비산업전문감사인에 의해 감사를 받는 피감사기업과 비교하여 원가의 하방경직성(또는 탄력성)이 작을(클) 것이라는 본 연구의 가설에 대한 분석 결과는 감사인의 산업전문성 조건 ③에서 지지되는 결과를 나타냈다. 본 연구는 선행연구에서 제시하는 원가의 하방경직성의 주요원인인 대리인 문제에 대해서, 이를 억제할 수 있는 감사제도를 통해 실증적으로 규명하고자 하였다는데 의의가 있다.

This study tests whether the Auditor Industry Specialization has an effect on Asymmetric Cost Behavior. Anderson et al. (2003) explained that key motive of management’s decisions inducing cost stickiness is to pursue its private interest for the purpose of maximizing its own utility. In other words, sticky costs are related to agency problem. Although many studies have widely accepted the possible logic that sticky costs stem from agency problem, few have empirically examined the association between asymmetric cost behavior and agency problem. This study aims to investigate directly whether agent-inspecting system outside a firm such as audit industry specialization lessens cost stickiness caused by agency problem. Samples are listed firm-year observations of 2,101 from the year of 2007 to 2013, and multiple regression model derived by Anderson et al. (2003) is applied. Empirical results show that costs are less stickier in case of firms with industry specialist auditors than in those without industry specialist auditors. The results indicate that asymmetric cost behavior is related to agency problem.

본 연구에서는 기업지배구조와 경영자에 대한 스톡옵션 부여의 공시효과 간 관계를 분석하였다. 이를 위해 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 제조기업 중 1997년 8월부터 2010년 12월 까지의 기간 동안 임직원에게 스톡옵션을 부여한 255건의 공시를 대상으로 스톡옵션 부여의 공시효과와 공시효과의 결정요인을 탐색하였다. 사건연구결과 스톡옵션 부여는 유의한 정(+)의 공시효과를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 횡단면 분석결과, 수익성, 부채비율, 기업규모, 부여물량, 최대주주 및 특수관계인 지분율, 5%이상 외국인주주 지분율이 공시효과에 유의한 영향을 미치는 변수인 것으로 나타났다. 구체적으로, 수익성이 낮을수록, 부채비율이 낮을수록, 기업규모가 클수록, 스톡옵션 부여물량이 많을수록, 대주주 지분율이 높을수록, 5% 이상 외국인 지분율이 낮을수록, 개별기업의 스톡옵션 부여에 따른 공시효과가 커졌다. 공시효과는 최초 공시일 때에만 유의적으로 나타났으며, 특히 전문경영기업에서 강하게 발견되었다. 본 연구의 결과는 스톡옵션에 대한 주식시장의 반응은 기업의 지배구조 특성에 따라 다르며, 대리인 문제에 대한 대안으로 활용되고 있는 스톡옵션 부여가 보다 긍정적인 반응을 얻기 위해서는 건전한 기업지배구조가 선행요건임을 시사한다.

We analyze the manufacturing firms that introduced stock options during 1997～2010, and investigate the announcement effects of stock option grant and its determinants, especially focusing corporate governance. The main results and implications of our study are as follows. The announcements generate significant and positive abnormal returns around event day, which is similar to the findings of the previous studies. As for the determinants of market response, we find that corporate governance is related to price reaction for stock option grant. Specially, the more the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the less the sum of the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders who own more than 5% shares of a firm, the more favorable the announcement effects. In addition, it is found that announcement effects are negatively related with ROE and leverage. Also, the more the amount of stock option granted and the larger the firm size, the more positive the market reactions. Lastly, these results are profound in the firms run by professional manager when we divide the sample into the firms run by the owner and those run by professional manager. Our results suggest that effectiveness of stock options granted for the purpose of mitigating agency cost depends on corporate governance.

본 연구는 가족기업과 대리인비용의 관계를 분석하고자 한다. 이에 2001년부터 2008년까지 한국 증권거래소의 상장기업을 대상으로 실증분석한 결과, 첫째, 전체 조사기간 중에 가족기업은 비가족기업보다 차지하는 비중이 상당히 높았다. 둘째, 가족기업과 비가족기업 간의 종속변수 대한 t검정결과 가족기업과 비가족기업은 차이를 보였다. 통제변수에 대한 t검정결과는 대주주 지분율, 외국인 지분율, 기업규모, 광고비율, 부채비율은 가족기업과 비가족기업은 차이를 보이며 유의하였다. 그러나 기업연령과 부채비율은 두 집단 간 큰 차이를 보이지 않았으며 유의하지 않았다. 셋째, 패널분석방법에 의한 결과 FDT 더미변수는 대리인 대용변수인 AG1과 AG2는 유의하였으며, AG3에서는 유의하지는 않았지만 양(+)의 방향을 보이고 있었다. AG1과 통제변수의 인과관계에서는 외국인 지분율, 기업연령은 대리인비용에 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미침을 알 수 있었고, 기업규모와 부채비율은 유의적인 음(-)의 영향을 미쳤다. 통제변수인 대주주 지분율과 광고비율은 유의하지 않았다. AG2와 통제변수의 인과관계에서는 기업연령, 광고비율, 부채비율은 대리인비용에 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미쳤고, 기업규모는 유의적인 음(-)의 영향을 미쳤다. AG3에서는 대주주 지분율이 유의하지 않았지만 예측된 부호대로 양(+)의 방향을 보이고 있었다. 외국인 지분율은 유의적인 음(-)의 영향을 미쳤고, 기업연령, 광고비율, 부채비율은 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미쳤다. 본 연구는 가족기업이 대리인비용에 미치는 영향을 분석한 것으로 가족기업에 대한 성과가 대부분인 연구를 한층 더 발전 시켰다. 또한 본 연구는 횡단면 자료와 시계열 자료를 결합한 패널자료를 이용하여 이론적 모형을 패널자료분석법으로 실증적으로 분석하였다는데 이전 연구와 차별점을 찾을 수 있다

This study examined whether am family business and agency costs within the firm. Nearly all businesses start out as family business, the most common form of business organization in the world. So we investigate the relation between KOSDAQ family business and financial performance from 2001 to 2008. The major findings of the study are as following. First, family business in KOSDAQ account for 75.1% that this weight is higher than non-family business. Second, the profitability and Control variables of family business is higher than that of non-family business as for AG1, AG2 and AG3. Third, the panel is a result of analytical methods are as follows. FDT is a dummy variable agency variable: AG1 and AG2 was a significantly. And AG3 Although does not significantly the positive (+) is the direction. An analysis of AG1 and control variables: Foreign ownership, age in agency costs significantly positive (+) were able to know the influencing. Firm size and debt ratio significantly negative (-) influenced. But a significantly percentage of shareholder equity and the ad did not. An analysis of AG2 and control variables: Age, advertising rates, the debt ratio agency costs significantly in the positive (+) influenced. Company size significantly negative (-) influenced. An analysis of AG3 and control variables: Majority ownership is not significantly predicted the signbut the positive (+) influenced. Foreign ownership is significantly negative (-) influenced. Age, advertising rates, the debt ratio significantly positive (+) influenced. This study uses panel data by analysis was differentiated. We hope that this paper will motivate further research and improvement in the concepts, measurements.

Finance is unique in that researchers question even the integrity of managers. Researchers in other disciplines in management sciences consider managers to be agents with good intentions. They focus on supplying good instruments for managers to put into practice, failing to question the intent of managers. But researchers in corporate finance equipped with agency theory question the more fundamental problems and ask what if managers are bad or if managers are plagued with agency problems? These kinds of questions are the topics of corporate governance. Researchers in corporate finance who have a way of seeing things differently have brought and will bring many spectacular achievements in both the academic and practical world. This paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance issues in the Korean capital market setting, where corporate governance issues are important because Korea’s chaebols, family-owned conglomerates, are blamed for minority shareholder expropriation via unlawful inheritances and accounting fraud with all the success in international markets. This survey focuses on the effectiveness of internal governance and external markets to monitor and control managers. The topics covered in the following four sections are: (1) The effect of corporate governance structure on corporate policy, (2) Corporate governance and firm value, (3) Market discipline, and (4) Determinants of governance structure. Finally, the discussion and conclusion are presented in the last section.

We try to test a value information effect of free cash flow by using related variables alone or in composition. Our study will be a contribution in that it adds to the understanding of the market response to dividend payout and capital expenditures - especially when these financial activities are related with free cash flow. Also, our study chooses an analytic approach which is differentiated from extant literatures mainly depending on event studies. Our test result shows that more free cash flow are linked to lower firm value spread. Corporate activities that diminish free cash flow - for example capital expenditures, dividend payout, use of debt - are linked to higher market value. More growth options are confirmed to be associated with more firm value spread. The interaction terms also exhibit consistency. Asian financial crisis in late 1997 brought about test results somewhat different from pre-crisis periods.

[연구목적] 본 연구는 코로나 19 이후 우리나라 코스닥시장에서 국제다각화기업만을 한정하여 기업의 대리 인비용이 경영성과와 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 검증하는 것이다. [연구방법] 표본은 코로나 19가 시작된 2019에서 2023년까지의 5년 동안 본연구의 표본선정 조건을 모두 충 족한 4,275개 표본을 선정하여 실증분석 결과를 도출하였다. 본 연구에서는 자산회전율과 접대비 비율 그리고 판매비와관리비와 여유현금흐름 비율을 대리인 비용의 대용치로 사용하였으며 경영성과의 대용치는 자산순이 익률, 기업가치의 대용치 Tobin Q를 사용하였다. [연구결과] 다변량회귀분석 결과, 첫째, 코스닥시장의 국제다각화 기업에서는 자산회전율이 높을수록 경영성 과가 높았으며, 접대비 비율이 적절히 통제될수록 경영성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미침을 알 수 있었다. 또한 판매 비와관리비에 대한 적절한 통제도 경영성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미침을 알 수 있었다. 영업현금흐름은 예상처럼 경영성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미쳤다. 다만, 여유현금비율의 경우 예상과 달리 통계적으로 유의하지 않았다. 이 는 코로나 팬데믹을 겪으며 기업이 보유한 현금비율이 매우 낮아 경영성과와 관련성이 낮았음을 유추할 수 있었다. 둘째, 코로나 팬데믹 이후 코스닥시장의 국제다각화 기업에서는 자산회전율이 높을수록 기업가치가 낮게 나타났으며, 접대비 비율과 판매비와관리비 및 여유현금비율이 높을수록 기업가치가 낮아지는 결과를 보 였다. 이러한 결과는 코로나 19의 영향에 기인한 특수한 상황으로 판단되어진다. [연구의 시사점] 본 연구의 결과, 코로나 19 이후 우리나라 코스닥시장에서 국제다각화 기업의 대리인 비용 에 대한 적절한 통제가 기업의 경영성과에만 긍정적인 영향을 미치고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 기업가치와의 관련 성에서는 정 반대의 결과를 보여주었다. 이러한 결과는 코스닥시장에서 국제다각화 기업들이 대리인 비용을 적절히 통제할 수 있는 메커니즘을 구축함으로써 기업의 경영성과를 제고시키고, 기업가치를 증가시키기 위한 근거가 될 것으로 판단된다.

[Purpose] This study is to verify the effect of corporate agent costs on management performance and corporate value by limiting only international diversification companies in the KOSDAQ market in Korea after COVID-19. [Methodology] The sample was selected from 4,275 samples that met all the sample selection conditions of this study for five years from 2019 to 2023, when COVID-19 began, and the results of empirical analysis were derived. In this study, asset turnover and entertainment cost ratio, sales and management costs, and free cash flow ratio were used as substitutes for agent costs, and Tobin Q, a substitute for asset net income and corporate value, was used as a substitute for management performance. [Findings] As a result of multivariate regression analysis, first, in international diversification companies in the KOSDAQ market, the higher the asset turnover ratio, the higher the management performance, and the more properly controlled the entertainment cost ratio, the more positively the management performance was found. In addition, it was found that proper control over sales and management costs had a positive effect on management performance. Operating cash flow had a positive effect on management performance as expected. However, the free cash ratio was not statistically significant, contrary to expectations. It could be inferred that the cash ratio held by companies during the Corona pandemic was very low, and thus the relationship with management performance was low. Second, in international diversified companies in the KOSDAQ market after the COVID-19 pandemic, the higher the asset turnover ratio, the lower the corporate value, and the higher the entertainment cost ratio, sales cost, management cost, and free cash ratio, the lower the corporate value. These results are judged to be a special situation due to the impact of COVID-19. [Implications] As a result of this study, it was found that proper control over the agency costs of international diversified companies in the Korean KOSDAQ market after COVID-19 has a positive effect only on the management performance of the company. In terms of the relationship with corporate value, the opposite result was shown. These results are considered to be the basis for enhancing corporate management performance and increasing corporate value by establishing a mechanism for international diversified companies to properly control agent costs in the KOSDAQ market.

국방 무기체계를 연구개발 및 구매하는 과정에서 방산비리가 발생하면 정부는 해당업체에 대해 강력한 페널티를 부과하고 있다. 특히 원가부정행위가 발생하면 부당이득금 및 가산금뿐만 아니라 부정당업자 제재, 이윤 삭감, 착·중도금 지급금지, 각 종 인증취소 등 과중한 페널티를 부과함에 따라 방산업체와 일부 언론은 과다한 조치라고 주장한다. 정부가 유일한 고객인 방산업체는 일부 사소한 잘못이라도 발생하면 과도한 페널티 부과로 도산이나 폐업에 직면할 수 있 기 때문이다. 원가부정행위가 발생할 시, 당연히 상응한 조치를 해야 되겠지만 과도한 조치여부에 대한 분석 및 검토를 해야 할 시점이 되었다. 본 연구는 방산업체의 원가부정행위에 대하여 책임은 묻되, 이중삼중의 과도한 페널티를 적정하게 제시할 수 있는 정책적 제언에 목적을 둔다. 국내 방위산업의 발전과 수출증진을 위해 방산업체 지원 및 육성 정책 관련 방향성을 제시하였다.

When defence corruption occurs in the acquisition process of defence weapon system, the government imposes strong penalties on the companies. In particular, in the event of cost fraud, the industry and some media argue that it is an excessive measure, as it imposes excessive penalties such as sanctions against unfair profits and additional fees, sanctions against unfair skilled workers, profit reduction, prohibition of payment of start-ups and intermediate payments, and cancellation of certification. This is because defence companies that are the only customers in the government may face bankruptcy or closure due to excessive penalties if some minor errors occur. Naturally, if cost fraud occurs, it is necessary to take countermeasures, but it is time to analyze and review for excessive measures. The purpose o f this s tudy is to make policy proposals that can adequately present the excessive penalty of the triple, despite the responsibility for the cost misconduct of defence companies. For the development and export promotion of the defence industry, the direction related to the support and fostering polices of defence companies was presented.

기업이 부채선택시 금융기관차입금과 같은 사적부채와 자본시장을 통한 회사채와 같은 공적부채를 사용할 수 있는데, 일반적으로 사적부채는 독점적 정보를 보호하기 위해서나 대리인문제를 해결하기 위해서 사용이 가능하다. 본 연구에서는 제품시장경쟁정도 즉 산업집중도가 높은 산업이냐 아니냐에 따라서 금융기관차입금이용에 있어서 차이가 있을 것으로 보고 산업집중도가 높은 기업의 경우는 금융기관차입금을 더 많이 사용하는 것인 지에 대해서 분석하였다. 본 연구에서는 2001년부터 2017년까지 한국거래소 유가증권시 장에 상장된 비금융산업의 기업을 대상으로 패널회귀분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과는 다 음과 같이 요약할 수 있다. 첫째, 기업의 산업집중도가 높을수록 금융기관차입금 비중이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 현상을 세부그룹군으로 구분해도 동일하게 나타나는지를 살펴보았다. 기업규모에 따라 구분한 결과 대규모기업군에서는 이러한 현상이 뚜렷이 나타나고 있었다. 부채사용이 높은 기업군에 있어서도 기업의 산업집중도가 높을수록 금융기관차입금이 더 높은 것을 발견하였다. 둘째, 기업의 금융기관차입금 비중은 동일산 업내 평균적인 금융기관차입금 비중과 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타나 동료효 과(peer group effect)의 존재를 확인할 수 있었다. 이러한 연구결과들은 제품시장경쟁이 갖는 정보독점의 성격을 반영한 것으로 볼 수 있다.

Corporations can use private and public debt. In general, firms can use private debt to protect proprietary information or to avoide agent problems. In this study, we show that there is a difference in the use of private debt depending on whether the industry is highly competitive or not. In the case of firms with high industrial concentration, we analyzed whether the borrowings of financial institutions are used more. In this study, panel regression analysis was conducted for firms in the non-financial industry listed on the KRX from 2001 to 2017. The results are as follows. First, the higher the concentration of industry in the industry, the higher the proportion of borrowings in financial institutions. We also examined whether these phenomena are the same in subgroups. This phenomenon was evident in large companies. In the case of companies with higher use of debt, we found that the higer the concentration of industry in the industry, the higher the borrowings of financial institutions. Second, the borrowing ratio of financial institutions is significantly positive(+) with the average borrowing ratio of financial institutions in the same industry, so we confirm there exist a peer group effects. These findings reflect the nature of the information asymmetrics of product market competition.

Jensen(1986)의 여유현금흐름 가설 검증을 위해 한국증권시장에 상장된 기업 중 재무제표를 갖추 고 있는 계속 상장되어 있는 모든 기업(186개)을 대상으로 고정효과 모형에 의한 패널 회귀분석을 실시하였다. 종속변수는 토빈의 q이며, 기업가치에 영향을 미치는 것으로 알려진 여러 가지 변수들 을 통제변수로 사용하였다. 검증가설은 ‘(1)여유현금흐름의 보유는 대리인비용 발생에 대한 투자자 들의 기대를 높이므로 여유현금흐름이 많을수록 시장에서의 평가가 좋지 않을 것이고, (2) 여유현금 흐름이 많은 기업이 투자지출을 늘리면 여유현금흐름을 감소시켜 주므로 시장평가가 좋아질 것이며, (3) 여유현금흐름 감소 정보를 담고 있는 배당을 지급한 후에 투자를 하면 시장평가가 좋아진다’ 등 이다. 첫 번째 가설은 High-q 기업과 Low-q 기업 모두에게 있어서 IMF금융위기 전후의 모든 시 기에서 유의적으로 지지되었다. 두 번째 가설과 세 번째 가설 역시 유의적으로 나타났다. 이러한 결 과는 검증에 사용된 통제변수의 영향을 받자 않는 강인성을 보였다. 특히 투자 및 배당지급은 한국 증권시장에서 긍정적인 정보를 전달하는 것으로 확인되었다. 이와 함께 여유현금흐름 정보를 담고 있는 통제변수들(기업규모(-), 부채비율(+), R&D(+), 총자산증가율, 매출액증가율, 주당이익/주가 비율)도 대부분 여유현금흐름의 대리인가설을 지지하는 것으로 나타났다.

We test Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis with Korean market data. Market response at the free cash flow information is our concern. We selected non-financial companies with financial statements during 1980-204. Fixed effect panel regression is used for the analysis. The dependent variable is Tobin's q, and some variables known to have effects on firm value are employed as control variables. Our test hypotheses are (1) Information of having much free cash flow is related to detrimental effect on firm value, (2) capital expenditures lower the level of free cash flow, and are resultantly good news, and (3) dividend payout is associated with lowering free cash flow, and thus contributes to decreasing agency cost of free cash flow'. We document that these three hypotheses are significantly accepted for all periods and high-q firms. The first hypothesis, however, is not accepted for low-q firms. The ancillary free cash flow hypotheses concerning firm size, capital structure, R&D, and growth opportunities are significantly accepted on the whole. Our conclusion is that Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis is significantly supported in Korean market. Especially capital expenditures and dividend payout are found to have positive informational content in Korean market.

본 연구의 목적은 국내 중소기업 인수합병시장 참여자인 M&A 중개기관을 대상으로 거래비용이론을 적용하여 분석하는 것이다. 연구의 목적을 달성하기 위해 경제학에서 출연하여 다양한 분야에서 연구되고 있는 거래비용이론의 핵심요인인 자산특유성, 불확실성, 기회주의와 거래빈도에 대한 이론적인 배경과 선행연구로 연구모형과 가설을 설정하였다. 연구 방법은 중소기업 인수합병시장에서 M&A 중개기관으로 활동하고 있는 참여자를 대상으로 설문하여 구조방정식 모형인 PLS(Partial Least Squares)통계 도구를 활용하였다. 변수는 자산특유성을 M&A동기로 하였고, 불확실성은 중소기업의 M&A무관심, 기회주의는 기회주의 및 거래빈도는 거래망실적공시로 정의하여 측정하였다. 분석결과로 첫째, 자산특유성인 M&A동기는 거래망 실적공시 부(-)의 영향을 주었지만, 중개기관 활동성과와 기회주의에는 부정적 영향을 미치지 않았다. 둘째, 기회주의는 M&A무관심에 영향을 미치는 반면, M&A무관심은 거래망 실적공시와 중개기관 활동성과에는 직접적인 영향을 미치지 못했다. 셋째, 거래빈도인 거래망실적공시는 중개기관 활동성과에 큰 영향을 주었다. 본 연구는 인수합병시장에서 상담, 중개와 거래협상을 전문으로 담당하는 중개기관의 실증적인 분석에 의의가 있으며 시장참여자인 경영컨설팅관계자에도 시사점을 제공할 수 있을 것이다.

This study aims to analyze the activity factors for M&A brokerage agencies, who are participants of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) mergers and acquisitions market from the perspective of transaction cost theory. To achieve the purpose of the study, we applied the transaction cost theory to form research models and hypotheses from theoretical backgrounds and existing studies on asset specificity, uncertainty, opportunism, frequency of transactions. For more information we surveyed experts in an intermediary institution working in the SME mergers and acquisitions market by utilizing a Partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM). For variable measurement, asset specialty in the SME mergers and acquisitions market was defined as a M&A motive, uncertainty as indifference of SMEs towards the market, opportunism as the target corporations’ opportunistic tendencies, and frequency of transactions as official notice of performance in M&A trading network. The result of the analysis: First, M&A motive had a significant influence on disclosure and opportunistic trading network performance. Secondly, opportunism is uncertainty affecting indifference, apathy, on the other hand, does not affect a network performance and intermediary institutions’ activity performance. Third, trading performance disclosure frequencies appeared to affect the intermediaries’ activities. This study is to demonstrate that intermediaries are responsible for mediation and counseling of the companies in the mergers and acquisitions market, and wishes to draw implications from the perspective of M&A brokerage agencies who are institutions which form infrastructure for mergers and acquisitions market of SMEs.

This study empirically examines the influence of corporate governance structure upon corporate investment activities and productivities. Findings are as follows. First, R&D investment decreases with the increase of the manager's ownership, and increases with the increase of tangible asset investments. This finding implies that managers avoid to make investment decisions in which risks are high. Second, institutional investors'ownership has a negative influence upon tangible asset investments and corporate capital investments, implying that they do not play a particular restraining function and work for the long-term recovery investment with a myopic viewpoint. These findings show the corporate governance structure is correlated with corporate investments and productivities.

Purpose: It has been suggested that a potential advantage of international diversification is positive return. Nonetheless, many scholars have little considered the effects of agency cost on the relationship between international diversification and financial performance. Research design, data, and methodology: Of the firms which had been listed in KOSDAQ from 2011 to 2018 since international financial reporting standards, a total of 5,312 samples were finally selected and analyzed empirically. As proxies of management performance, Return on Assets and Return on Time (ROT) were used, and as proxies of agency costs, Asset Turnover Ratio, Entertainment Expense Ratio, Sales to Administrative Expense Ratio, Free Cash Flow Ratio were applied. Hypotheses were examined with the use of multivariate regression analysis. Results: Firstly, international diversification firms’ asset turnover ratio as a proxy of agency costs positively influenced management performance. Given that, a good plan to increase international diversification firms’ management performance is to raise their asset turnover ratio. Second, international diversification firms’ entertainment expenses negatively influenced management performance statistically and significantly. Third, international diversification firms’ selling and administrative costs negatively influenced management performance. It was found that corporate managers’ appropriate control for selling and administrative costs whose scale can be adjusted by their arbitrary choice in order to increase sales was helpful to the management performance of international diversification firms. Fourth, international diversification firms’ free cash negatively influenced management performance, so that it was statistically significant only to return on net assets. Conclusions: This research is meaningful in the point that it proved that it is possible to improve the management performance of firms by controlling their agency costs appropriately. In addition, they can give policy makers a ground for coming up with a plan to establish such control system naturally in companies.