Earticle

초록

영어

Finance is unique in that researchers question even the integrity of managers. Researchers in other disciplines in management sciences consider managers to be agents with good intentions. They focus on supplying good instruments for managers to put into practice, failing to question the intent of managers. But researchers in corporate finance equipped with agency theory question the more fundamental problems and ask what if managers are bad or if managers are plagued with agency problems? These kinds of questions are the topics of corporate governance. Researchers in corporate finance who have a way of seeing things differently have brought and will bring many spectacular achievements in both the academic and practical world. This paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance issues in the Korean capital market setting, where corporate governance issues are important because Korea’s chaebols, family-owned conglomerates, are blamed for minority shareholder expropriation via unlawful inheritances and accounting fraud with all the success in international markets. This survey focuses on the effectiveness of internal governance and external markets to monitor and control managers. The topics covered in the following four sections are: (1) The effect of corporate governance structure on corporate policy, (2) Corporate governance and firm value, (3) Market discipline, and (4) Determinants of governance structure. Finally, the discussion and conclusion are presented in the last section.

목차

Abstract
 Ⅰ. Introduction
 Ⅱ. The Effect of Corporate Governance Structure on Corporate Policy
  1. Perquisite Consumption
  2. Investment
  3. R&D
  4. Cash Holdings
  5. Wage Decisions
  6. Chaebol and Internal Market: Tunneling/propping
  7. Financing Decision
 Ⅲ. Corporate Governance and Firm Value
  1. Ownership Structure and Firm Value with Ownership Measure as a LHS Variable
  2. Ownership Structure and Firm Value with Corporate Governance Index as a LHS Variable
  3. Ownership Structure and Accounting Profitability
  4. Outside Director’s Role, Blockholder’s Holdings, etc.
  5. Distribution of Shares and Firm Value
  6. Disparity and Firm Value and Related Issues
 Ⅳ. Market Discipline
  1. Discipline in Debt Market
  2. Discipline in Managerial Labor Market
  3. Discipline in Product Market and M&A
  4. Discipline in Capital Market: Security Offerings
  5. Discipline in Insurance Markets
  6. Distribution of Stock Returns
  7. Governance Premium: Stock Returns
 Ⅴ. Determinants of Governance Structure
  1. Managerial Compensation: Stock Options
  2. Share Ownership, Outside Directors, and Holding Company
 Ⅵ. Discussions and Conclusions
  1. Problems in Research Design
  2. Normative Issues: Policy Implications
  3. Future Research Directions and Conclusion.
 References

키워드

저자

• Chae-Yeol Yang [ Professor, College of Business Administration, Chonnam National University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330