Earticle

Are powerful CEOs more effective in responding to pressure from the economic environment? Concentrating decision-making power may facilitate rapid decision-making. However, the quality of decision-making may be compromised, with severe consequences for the firm if a powerful CEO is less likely to receive independent advice or to have his decisions scrutinized. We empirically investigate the relation between CEO power and decision-making under pressure by examining firm performance when industry conditions deteriorate. We focus on industry downturns since these represent an exogenous ‘shock’ to a firm’s environment. The decision making context is important and we focus on three settings where the net effect of CEO power is likely more consequential: when the firm is innovative and decision making is likely more complex, when the industry is competitive and poor decisions can be more serious in terms of firm value and when the industry is characterized by high managerial discretion. In these settings powerful CEOs are found to perform significantly worse than other CEOs during industry downturns -- suggesting contexts in which centralized decision-making is potentially of greater concern.

We examine how CEO power affects the extent of analyst coverage. Due to agency conflicts, powerful CEOs may not adopt a disclosure policy that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. The amount of information disclosed by the firm influences the information environment, which affects the financial analyst’s incentives to “cover” or “follow” the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that analyst coverage helps improve firm value. The positive effect of analyst coverage on firm value, however, is greatly mitigated in firms with powerful CEOs. Strong CEO power appears to counteract the beneficial role of analyst coverage.

This study investigates the role of powerful CEOs on future stock price crashes. Our results reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and stock price crash risk. Specifically, powerful CEOs tend to conceal more negative news, increasing stock price crash risk, which indicates the presence of incentives to take private benefits. However, extremely powerful CEOs decrease stock price crash risk, suggesting that sufficient entrenchment may mitigate further private benefits from concealing negative news. Additionally, the nonlinear relationship is observed only in competitive industries. This fact implies that strong external monitoring mitigates CEOs’ incentives to pursue private benefits, but raises extremely powerful CEOs’ career concerns, which encourages them to conceal more negative news.

본 연구는 중국 상장기업을 대상으로 CEO영향력이 기업의 녹색혁신에 미치는 영향과 임원배상책임보험(D&O 보험)의 조절효과를 실증분석하였다. 분석결과, CEO영향력을 더미변수와 연속형 변수로 각각 측정한 경우 모두 직접효과는 유의하지 않았다. CEO영향력과 D&O 보험의 상호작용항은 일관되게 유의한 양(+)의 값을 보여, D&O 보험이 CEO영향력과 녹색혁신 간의 관계를 강화하는 조절변수로 작용함을 확인하였다. 이는 CEO영향력의 효과가 독립적으로 나타나기보다 D&O 보험이라는 제도적 장치와 결합될 때 보다 뚜렷하게 녹색혁신으로 연결될 수 있음을 시사한다. 본 연구는 CEO영향력의 효과가 거버넌스 장치에 의해 조건부로 나타날 수 있으며, D&O 보험이 이를 녹색혁신으로 연결하는 제도적 장치로 작용할 수 있음을 시사한다. 아울러 기업의 녹색전환을 지원하기 위한 제도적 환경의 정비 필요성을 보여준다.

This study examines the effect of CEO power on firms’ green innovation and the moderating role of Directors and Officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) using Chinese listed companies. The results show that, whether CEO power is measured as a dummy variable or a continuous variable, its direct effect is generally insignificant. By contrast, the interaction between CEO power and D&O insurance is consistently positive and significant, indicating that D&O insurance strengthens the relationship between CEO power and green innovation. These findings suggest that CEO power is more likely to promote green innovation when supported by an institutional mechanism such as D&O insurance. They also imply that the effect of CEO power is conditional on governance arrangements and that a sound institutional environment is important for firms’ green transition.

경영자 영향력은 경영자의 전략적 선택에서 핵심적인 역할을 수행한다. 본 연구 에서는 경영자 영향력이 감사비용과 비정상감사보수에 미치는 영향을 실증 분석 하였다. 더불어 중국기업 지배구조(국유/비국유기업)와 회계법인규모(BIG4/ non-BIG4)가 조절요인으로 작용하는지를 실증 분석하였다. 2009년부터 2019 년까지 중국 A주의 상장기업 28,780개 기업-연도 표본을 대상으로 연구하였다. 비정상감사보수는 실제감사비용에서 기대감사비용을 차감한 값이다. 실증분석 결과, 경영자 영향력은 종속변수인 비정상감사보수에 통계적으로 매우 유의하게 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 대리이론의 관점에서 경영자 영향력이 클수록 경영자는 대리인으로서의 자신의 행동을 위임자들에게 보증하기 위해 보 증비용(bonding cost)을 지불하기 때문에 감사비용과 비정상감사보수가 증가한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 경영자 영향력이 비정상감사보수에 미치는 영향은 중국기 업 지배구조나 회계감사법인 규모에 관계없이 매우 지대하게 유의하였다. 국유기 업의 총감사비용 평균은 비국유기업의 경우보다 더 높았으며, 비국유기업의 비정 상감사보수 평균은 양(+)인 반면에, 국유기업의 비정상감사보수 평균은 음(-)으 로 나타났으며, 두 집단의 평균은 통계적으로 유의하게 차이가 났다. BIG4기업은 non-BIG4기업에 비해 경영자 영향력은 비정상감사보수에 더 높게 나타났다.

This study empirically investigates the impact of CEO power on auditing costs and abnormal audit fees among publicly listed companies in China's A-share market from 2009 to 2019. A total of 28,780 firm-year observations listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were used for this analysis. CEO power was operationalized as a dummy variable, incorporating factors such as concurrent managerial roles, stock dispersion, and managerial tenure. Abnormal audit fee was calculated by subtracting the expected audit costs from the actual auditing fees. Three hypotheses were posited for the study. Hypothesis 1 posits that CEO power would significantly impact abnormal audit fees. Hypothesis 2 suggests that this impact would vary depending on the corporate governance structure (state-owned vs. non-state-owned). Additionally, Hypothesis 3 asserts that the size of the accounting firm will act as a moderating variable. The primary empirical findings are outlined as follows: First, CEO power was found to exert a statistically highly significant positive impact on the dependent variable of abnormal audit fees. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 was accepted. The findings can be interpreted from the perspective of agency theory as indicating that the greater CEO power, the more they, as agents, incur bonding costs(a type of agency cost) to assure their principals of their actions, which in turn leads to an increase in auditing costs and abnormal audit fees. Second, the average total audit costs for state-owned enterprises(SOE) were higher than those for non-SOE. T-tests for the homogeneity of means between the two groups revealed statistically significant differences. While the abnormal audit fees for non-SOE were positive on average, those for SOE were negative. Notably, in both SOE and non-SOE, the effect of CEO power on abnormal audit fees was statistically significant. Third, the average total auditing fees for BIG4 accounting audit firms were statistically significantly higher than those for non-BIG4 firms. However, no statistically significant difference was observed in the abnormal audit fees between the two groups. This implies that the overall auditing costs do not deviate significantly from the expected audit costs, regardless of the size of the accounting firm. The effect of CEO power on abnormal audit fees was statistically highly significant in both BIG4 and non-BIG4 firms. Fisher’s permutation test revealed that there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups with respect to the POWER estimator. Compared to non-BIG4 firms, the CEO power in BIG4 firms was found to be higher on abnormal audit fees. The implications and limitations of this study are outlined below. Given the escalating prominence of Chinese enterprises in the global economy, an investigation into China’s auditing market emerges as a particularly pertinent subject. Such an inquiry promises to be instrumental in dissecting and comprehending managerial behaviors. Additionally, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by delineating an auditing function from the vantage point of agency theory, capable of substantiating the actions of individuals, thereby providing a scaffold for subsequent scholarly endeavors. Conversely, the present research has not accounted for temporal and sectoral variables within its analytical framework. The ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, are presumed to have exerted a profound impact on corporate governance. There is a prospect for future research to extend its scope by incorporating the pandemic’s repercussions and industry-specific attributes. Beyond the measures adopted in this study, it is hoped that future research will employ diverse techniques to investigate further the effect of managerial influence on audit costs or abnormal audit fees.

We examine the effects of corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the choice of board leadership structure and the value and performance of firm according to firm’s life-cycle changes. Employing a large and extensive sample during the 1995-2005 period, we find that the board leadership choice is associated with governance characteristics including board independence, managerial entrenchment, and CEO abilities measured by CEO age and CEO tenure after controlling for various firm characteristics. In addition, after correcting for the endogenous treatment effect, our results show that while CEO dualities, i.e., CEO-chair of the board or CEOnomination committee member, or CEO pluralities, i.e., CEO-chair of the board, and a chair or a member of the nomination committee, positively influences firm value and performance in firm’s early stage, CEO duality or CEO pluralities adversely influences firm value and operating performance in firm’s late stage. These results are supportive of the life-cycle theory, suggesting that CEO power concentration is beneficial in firms’ early stage, but harmful in firm’s late stage at which firms require check-and-balance as opposed to dictatorship. In addition, the impact of external monitoring by institutional ownership on firm value and performance is more effective than those of independent board and blockholders’ ownership while the impact of Sarbane-Oxley Act on firm performance is not significant.

The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident.We also show that power-driven overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make value-destroying acquisitions, relative to nonoverconfident CEOs. The results suggest that previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs are mainly led by power-driven overconfident CEOs.

CEO 해임은 회사 성과에 중대한 영향을 미친다는 점에서 가장 중요한 의사결정 중 하나이다. 권력순환이론(Power circulation theory)에 따르면 권력은 CEO 해임에 영향을 줄 수 있다. 이 이론을 바탕으로 본 연구는 중국 상황에서 정치적 연계와 권력 거리가 CEO 해임에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 본 연구는 두 가지 측면에서 기존 연구를 확대하고 있다. 즉 권력순환이론에서 도출된 권력의 두 가지 측면인 정치적 연계와 권력 거리 문화 차원이 중국 상황에서 중국기업의 CEO 해임에 어떻게 영향을 미치는지 분석하였다. 본 연구는 정치적 연계가 높거나 권력거리가 높은 지역일수록 중국에서 CEO 해임 가능성은 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 정치적 연계의 종류에 따라 CEO 해임에 미치는 영향력이 차이가 발견되었는데 지역정부와의 정치적 연계가 중앙정부와의 정치연계보다 CEO 해임 에 더 큰 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다.

CEO dismissal is one of the most important decisions in that it critically impacts firm performance. According to the theoretical lens of power circulation theory, power determines the rate of CEO dismissal. Drawing on this theory, this study investigates the impact of political ties and power distance on CEO dismissal within the Chinese context. The current article advances existing research and theory by addressing these two underexplored areas, namely, power circulation theory-related factors such as political ties and power distance, as determinants of CEO dismissal within the Chinese context. Our results display that the two power factors, political ties and power distance, are essential determinants of CEO dismissal in China. Specifically, we find that these two factors decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal in China. This study also finds that local political ties have a more significant impact on CEO dismissal than do central political ties.

본 연구는 Bebchuk et al.(2011)이 제시한 CPS(CEO Pay Slice)를 이용하여 측정한 최고 경영자의 영향력(power)과 감사시간 및 감사보수와의 관계를 연구하였다. 특히, 이러한 관계가 최고경영자가 전문경영인인지 여부에 따라 달라지는지 분석하였다. 본 연구는 사업보고서에서 연간 총보수가 5억원을 초과하는 개별 등기임원에 대한 보수정보의 확인 이 가능하게 된 2013년부터 2019년까지를 대상으로 연구하였으며 실증분석 결과는 다음 과 같다. 첫째, 선행연구와 동일하게 CPS로 측정한 최고경영자의 영향력과 감사시간 및 감사보수 간에는 유의한 음(-)의 관계가 나타났다. 이는 최고경영자가 자신의 영향력 이 증가할수록 자신에 대한 모니터링 수단이 될 수 있는 외부감사의 품질에 부정적으로 영향을 미치고 있음을 시사한다. 둘째, 최고경영자가 전문경영인인지 여부를 나타내는 더미변수와 CPS 간의 교호변수를 이용하여 회귀분석한 결과, 최고경영자가 전문경영인 인 경우, CPS와 감사보수 간의 음(-)의 관련성이 유의하게 완화되는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 기업 내에서 유사한 수준의 영향력을 행사하는 최고경영자라고 하더라도 그가 전문경영인인지 혹은 소유경영인인지 여부에 따라 기업에 미치는 영향의 방향이 달라질 수 있음을 암시한다. 본 연구는 최근 CPS를 활용하여 진행되고 있는 최고경영자의 영향력(경영권 집중화 수준)과 관련된 연구에 그 영향력의 원천과 관련된 관점의 분석을 추가하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다.

This study examines the relation between CEO power, measured by CPS(CEO Pay Slice) introduced in Bebchuk et al.(2011), and audit hour & audit fee. Especially, this study analyses the relation changes by whether the CEO is a professional manager or not. We analyzed using a total of 1,099 firm-year data, which the information on CEO compensation were available. The results of the empirical tests are as follows. First, a significant negative relation was found between CEO power and audit hour & audit fee. This suggests that as CEO power increases it negatively affects the quality of external audit that can be a mean of monitoring the CEO. Second, the relation is significantly weakened when the CEO is a professional manager. This result suggests even if CEOs have a similar level of power, their influence on the firms may differ by whether the CEO is a professional manager or a proprietary manager. This paper is meaningful that it added and analyzed a professional manager variable to researches related to CPS and gives some more ideas for future researches.

This research empirically analyzes the impact of ESG disclosure on firm value in Chinese listed companies and investigates the moderating role of CEO power in this relationship. In recent years, companies have increasingly emphasized sustainable management and social responsibility, with ESG disclosure becoming an important strategic tool. ESG disclosure transparently communicates a company’s approach and performance in fulfilling its social responsibilities and pursuing environmental sustainability, playing a crucial role in conveying the company’s long-term value and credibility to stakeholders such as investors and consumers. The growing importance of ESG factors has led to an increased focus on sustainability, making it essential for companies to disclose information related to environmental, social, and governance practices. However, while some studies have shown positive effects of ESG disclosure on firm value, others have found negative or insignificant effects. These inconsistent results suggest that various external, industrial, and internal factors may influence the impact of ESG disclosure on firm value. Notably, managerial characteristics, particularly CEO power, may serve as a significant differentiating factor in determining the quality and quantity of ESG disclosure, which in turn affects firm value. This research analyzes the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm value based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2023 and empirically examines the moderating effect of CEO power on this relationship. The results confirm that companies with stronger CEO power tend to experience a more positive impact of ESG disclosure on market value and financial performance. In other words, companies with CEOs who actively promote ESG activities are more likely to see ESG disclosure contribute significantly to long-term growth and competitive advantage. These findings suggest that CEO power is an important moderating variable that enhances the effect of ESG disclosure, highlighting the crucial role of managerial characteristics in driving a company’s sustainable management strategy. Additionally, this research differentiates itself from existing research by demonstrating how managerial characteristics moderate the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm value, providing a deeper understanding of the connection between ESG disclosure and CEO power. Thus, the current research empirically demonstrates the important role of CEO power in maximizing the effects of ESG disclosure and enhancing firm value through strategic decision-making. These results provide valuable insights for future research on the strategic use of ESG disclosure and decision-making in firms.

본 연구는 일반적으로 프랜차이즈 시스템으로 운영되는 편의점에 있어서, 편의점의 본부와 가맹점간의 파워인식, 갈등 및 성과에 대한 연구와 가맹점 경영자차원의 연구가 미흡하였다는 전제하에 수행하였다. 연구결과 그 시사점을 제시하면, 첫째, 경제적 파워를 내포하고 있는 보상적 파워는 편의점이 확산되어 정착되고 있는 현시점에서 갈등완화 및 거래성과에 대한 영향이 미약하다. 둘째, 경제적인 보상이나 처벌과 같은 강제적 파워의 행사보다는 경영지도, 각종 정보의 제공, 교육 및 훈련 등의 행사가 본부와의 관계에서 갈등을 줄일 수 있고 거래성과를 높일 수 있다. 셋째, 본부는 가맹점 경영자와의 갈등방지와 가맹점의 거래성과 향상을 위하여 계약서에 규정된 본부의 역할을 충실히 수행하고 가맹점에 대한 적극적 지원을 이루어야 할 것이다. 넷째, 편의점 본부가 가맹점을 효과적으로 관리 및 유지하고 상호 이해관계를 증진시키기 위하여 편의점 가맹점 경영자가 느끼는 갈등을 지속적으로 파악 및 개선하여 거래성과를 높이는 등 협력적 관계를 이루어 나가는 것이 필요하다.

This study was performed under the premise that there had been few studies about the power perception, conflict and performance between franchiser and franchisee and studies with the view of franchisee CEO. The conclusion could be summarized as following. First, reward power involving economic power has weak effect on easing conflict and business performance at the moment when the convenient store is spreading and settling. Second, offering management guidance, variety of information, education, training and so on is the method which could reduce conflict against franchiser and would help obtaining good results rather than exercising coercive power such as economic reward and penalty. Third, franchiser needs to perform the best role as a headquarter based on the contract rules and offer support toward franchisee as actively as possible in order to prevent conflict against franchisee and improve the business performance of franchisee. Fourth, it is necessary to construct cooperative relationship by consistently perceiving the conflict level which franchisee CEO’s feels and developing Business Performance by improving the matter in order to manage franchisee effectively and efficiently and to increase the relationship between franchiser and franchisee.

본 연구는 최고경영자의 융통성 성향이 지원적 리더십에 미치는 영향을 알아보고, 권한위 임이 최고경영자의 융통성 성향과 지원적 리더십 간에 매개역할을 하는지 검증하였다. 본 연구를 위해 경인지역의 143개 기업의 최고경영자와 중간관리자를 대상으로 설문지를 이용하여 자료를 수집하였다. 수집된 자료를 이용한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 최고 경영자의 융통성 성향은 지원적 리더십에 직접적인 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 권한위임은 최고경영자의 융통성 성향과 지원적 리더십 간에 매개역할을 한다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 본 연구에서 나타난 연구결과는 최고경영자의 융통성 성향은 지원적 리더십에 영향을 미치는 것이 아니라 권한위임과 같은 조직구조적 특성을 통하여 나타난 다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 권한위임 등과 같은 조직구조적 특성의 변화를 도모하게 되면 하부조직이나 부하들이 지원적 리더십을 인식하게 되고, 결국 구성원의 자발적 참여와 창의력과 협력을 유도할 수 있다는 점을 조직의 최고경영자는 기업경영 현장에 적용할 수 있다는 것을 본 연구는 시사하고 있다.

This study investigated the influence of the CEO's flexibility disposition on supportive leadership, and verified whether the delegation of power plays a mediating role between the CEO’s flexibility disposition and supportive leadership. For this study, data were collected using questionnaires targeting top and middle managers of 143 companies in Gyeongin area. The analysis results using the collected data are as follows. First, it was found that the CEO's flexibility disposition did not directly affect the supportive leadership. Second, it shows that the delegation of power plays a mediating role between the CEO's flexibility disposition and supportive leadership. The findings of this study show that the flexibility disposition of the CEO does not directly affect supportive leadership, but through organizational structural characteristics such as delegation of authority. If the CEO who is seeking to supportive leadership changes the characteristics of the organizational structure, such as delegation of power, subordinates become aware of the supportive leadership, and in the end, it can induce members' voluntary participation, creativity and cooperation. This research is showing that as the organizational structure changes, the subordinates become aware of supportive leadership, and in the end, the CEO of the organization can apply it to the process of corporate management.

The primary goal of business entities has shifted from profit-orientation toward broader socially motivated perspectives over the recent years. In the past, due to the over-emphasis on the short-term profits, business community frequently had to confront criticisms and protests raised by society at large. Today’s corporations are well aware of the importance of keeping balance between social responsibility and the pursuit of financial goals to ensure their long-lasting survival and prosperity. As such, business organizations make efforts to enhance their corporate image as a way to improve long-term profitability. With the heightened recognition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in society, corporate entities have continuously refined their strategies to meet diverse stakeholders’ demands. In accordance with these circumstances, extensive research efforts have been undertaken to assess the empirical association between CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP) under diverse geographical context. However, rarely has it focussed on the association between CSR and CEO and CEO’s power, even though the final decision maker for CSR is the CEO. To fill void, this study examines the empirical relation between CSR and CEO power in Korean context. Based on agency theory, Barnea and Rubin(2010) suggests that powerful CEOs have an interest in over-investing in CSR in order to obtain private benefits of building reputation, possibly at a cost to shareholders. On the other hands, the conflicts resolution view asserts that powerful CEOs engage in the optimal level of CSR that lead to improve firm value through resolving the conflicts among various stakeholders. While those two views are predicting contradictory impact of CEO power on CSR, empirical research examining the association between CEO power and CSR in Korean context does not exist, to our knowledge. As such, this study is the first that provides Korean evidence on the relationship between CEO power and CSR. To achieve the above research objective, we examine whether the CSR performance is systematically related with the proxy of CEO power using a ordered probit regression model. In addition, we verify how the CSR performance with CEO power impact upon firm value using OLS and 2SLS. We assess CSR performance using ESG grade developed by KCGS(Korea Corporate Governance Service). CEO power is developed using CEO pay slice suggested by Bebchuk et al.(2011). Our sample is drawn from companies listed on the KRX for which the information of executive compensation and ESG grade are available. Our sample period covers 4 years from 2013-2016 and the final sample includes 621 firm-years from both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a negative and significant relationship between CEO power and CSR. Second, we find that the interactive terms of CPS×CSR is positively correlated with firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. These results imply that powerful CEOs engage in the optimal level of CSR that lead to improve firm value. In other words, our results show that powerful CEO restricts over-investing in CSR that do not contribute to increasing firm value and involve only additional expenditure in Korean context. Major contribution of this study is one of the pioneering researches aiming at providing Korean evidence investigating the empirical association between CEO power and CSR performance. And second contribution derives from the improvement of research design over many previous studies. In particular, we incorporate recent innovations in measuring corporate governance system into our research design by using CEO pay slice as an empirical proxy of CEO centrality. In addition, we conducted additional analysis of the relation between interaction terms and firm value after controlling for potential endogeneity by using two-stage least squares regression analysis based on the simultaneous equation approach.

We examine the effects of corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the choice of board leadership structure and the value and performance of a firm according to the firm’s life-cycle changes. Employing a large and extensive sample during the 1995- 2005 period, we find that the board leadership choice is associated with governance characteristics including board independence, managerial entrenchment, and CEO abilities measured by CEO age and CEO tenure after controlling for various firm characteristics. In addition, after correcting for the endogenous treatment effect, our results show that while CEO dualities--i.e., CEO-chair of the board or CEO-nomination committee member- - or CEO pluralities--i.e., CEO-chair of the board, and a chair or a member of the nomination committee--positively influences firm value and performance in firm’s early stage, CEO duality or CEO pluralities adversely influences firm value and operating performance in firm’s late stage. These results are supportive of the life-cycle theory, suggesting that CEO power concentration is beneficial in firms’ early stage, but harmful in firm’s late stage at which firms require check-and-balance as opposed to dictatorship. In addition, the impact of external monitoring by institutional ownership on firm value and performance is more effective than those of independent board and blockholders’ ownership while the impact of Sarbane-Oxley Act on firm performance is not significant.

Purpose - We investigate how firms transfer financial risks to employees in a form of flexible employment contracts and layoffs. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the literature on the prevalence of shareholder value ideology and the associated ‘risk shift’, we examined how stock price volatility is associated with a firm’s use and hiring of nonstandard employees, and the number of employees lay-offed. We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal, multi-source, dataset of Korean firms from 2003 to 2011. Findings - We found support for the relationship between stock price volatility and flexible employment contracts and layoffs after controlling for actual risks such as increased debt or decreased sales. However, we found that the relationship is moderated by the power of professional CEOs relative to that of shareholders, in that powerful CEOs are more likely to transfer the external risks, i.e. stock price volatility, to employees. Research implications or Originality - This study contributes the emerging stream of literature that explore the effect of stock market pressures and governance structures on human resource management.

Recently, the influence of boards of directors on the efficiency of ESG practices has been extensively explored in academic literature. However, the impact of board characteristics on ESG performance has not been thoroughly examined in Korean research. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating how substantive board independence and interlocks involving outside directors and CEOs influence ESG performance, and how this relationship is moderated by CEO power. We analyzed panel data from 4,926 firm-year observations of Korean-listed firms with ESG scores from 2012 to 2021. Our empirical evidence reveals that substantive board independence, particularly non-affiliated outside directors, positively influences ESG, including environmental and social performance. Additionally, outside director interlocks are positively associated with ESG and social performance, while CEO interlocks negatively affect all ESG aspects in companies belonging to business groups. Furthermore, we demonstrate that specific board characteristics significantly affect ESG outcomes, and this relationship varies depending on the role of CEO power. Our findings indicate that effective board leadership is the most decisive factor linking higher ESG performance to enhanced long-term shareholder value for all stakeholders. By integrating stakeholder perspectives with extended agency theory, we elucidate how resource allocation decisions made by the board and CEO significantly impact strategic ESG performance.

[Purpose] This study investigates how export share and CEO power affect Income smoothing in Korean export firms amid heightened global uncertainty and increased volatility caused by recent tariff measures. [Methodology] Using panel data from 2018－2021, the study conducts regression analyses to test the individual and joint effects of export share and CEO power on Income smoothing. [Findings] The results show that firms with higher export share engage less in Income smoothing due to stronger external monitoring. CEO power is also negatively associated with Income smoothing, indicating a tendency toward long－term credibility rather than manipulation. Their interaction further reduces the likelihood of Income smoothing. [Implications] The study highlights how external exposure and internal governance jointly promote accounting transparency and provides insights for improving disclosure and governance in uncertain export environments.

This paper is aimed to investigate the relationship between CEO dominant power and organizational performances and examine the influence of endogenous / exogenous factors on the relationship of them. We developed and tested hypotheses using data from 147 manufacturing firms with only one CEO among 437 listed manufacturing firms in Korean Stock Market as of 2014. To measure the variables, In particular, we classified CEO dominant power into CEO dominant power in organizational structure (CEO's tenure, CEO's share ratio) and CEO dominant power in corporate governance (ratio of outside directors, ratio of institutional investors). Endogenous factor is whether or not firms belong to large corporation group, and exogenous factor is intensity of industry competition. We apply multiple and hierarchical regression analysis, and ANOVA to test hypotheses. The results of the study are as follows; Firstly, CEO dominant power in organizational structure (CEO's tenure, CEO's share ratio) has a positive effects on organizational performances. However, CEO dominant power in corporate governance, and the interaction of the two types of the CEO dominant power do not have statistically significant effects on organizational performances. Secondly, whether the large corporation group as an endogenous factor and the intensity of industry competition as an exogenous factor do not play moderating role in the relationship between CEO dominant power and organizational performances. This study measured the CEO's dominant power of the listed manufacturing companies in Korean Stock Market by using the CEO's tenure and CEO's share ratio, not the demographic (or psychological) characteristics. And we also found that the stronger dominant power of CEO in organization structure, the more positively it can play a role in the improvement of the organizational performances. The results of this study will help us to understand the role of endogenous and exogenous factors (whether or not firms belong to large corporation group, and intensity of industry competition) in relationship between the CEO's dominant power and organizational performances in Korean Stock Market. In addition, this study will provide an opportunity to think more deeply about the moderating role of endogenous and exogenous factors in the relationship.

The performance of npn SiGe HBT on thin film SOI is investigated at 32 nm technology node by applying body bias. An n-well is created underneath thin BOX to isolate the body biased SOI HBT from SOI CMOS. The results show that the HBT voltage gain and power gain can be programmed by applying body bias to the n-well. This HBT can be used in variable gain amplifiers that are widely used in the receiver chain of RF systems. The HBT is compatible with 32 nm FDSOI technology having 10 nm film thickness and 30 nm BOX thickness. As the breakdown voltage increases by applying the body bias, the SOI HBT with 3 V $V_{CE}$ has very high $f_tBV_{CEO}$ product (839 GHzV). The self heating performance of the proposed SOI HBT is studied. The high voltage gain and power gain (60 dB) of this HBT will be useful in designing analog/RF systems which cannot be achieved using 32 nm SOI CMOS (usually voltage gain is in the range of 10-20 dB).

본 연구의 목적은 최고경영자(CEO)의 경험과 기업의 국제화 간의 관계뿐 아니라 CEO의 영향력이 이 둘 사이의 관계에 미치는 조절효과에 대해서 분석하는 것이다. CEO의 경험을 해외경험과 직무경험으로 구분하여, CEO의 해외경험이 많을수록 기업의 국제화가 높아지며, 결과 지향적 직무경험자가 과정 지향적 직무경험자보다 국제화 수준을 높인다고 주장하였다. 또한, CEO의 영향력이 강할수록 CEO경험과 국제화 간의 관계가 강화된다고 주장하였다. 2002년부터 2006년까지 KOSPI 200에 속한 85개 제조 기업을 분석한 결과, CEO의 해외경험과 직무경험이 기업의 국제화에 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, CEO의 영향력이 클수록 이러한 관계가 더욱 두드러지게 나타났다. 본 연구는 국내연구에서 간과되었던 CEO 경험과 영향력이 기업의 국제화 수준에 주요한 영향을 미친다는 점을 실증적으로 보여주었다.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between CEO experience and the internationalization of a firm and to further investigate the moderating effect of CEO power for the relationship between CEO experience and firm internationalization. More specifically, we measured CEO experience in terms of his/her foreign experience and job experience, and examined the effects of both the CEO foreign and job experiences on firm internationalization. We propose that CEO foreign experience has a positive effect on firm internationalization, and that those CEOs with outcome-oriented job experiences tend to have greater firm internationalization than those with process- oriented job experiences. Further, we propose that CEO power strengthens such relationships between CEO experience and firm internationalization. The results from the sample of 85 Korean firms in the manufacturing industries for the period of 2002 to 2006 generally confirm our hypotheses. Our findings imply that CEO experience influences a firm’s strategic decisions for firm internationalization and that the internationalization effect of CEO experience depends on CEO power across firms.