Earticle

초록

영어

This study investigates the role of powerful CEOs on future stock price crashes. Our results reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and stock price crash risk. Specifically, powerful CEOs tend to conceal more negative news, increasing stock price crash risk, which indicates the presence of incentives to take private benefits. However, extremely powerful CEOs decrease stock price crash risk, suggesting that sufficient entrenchment may mitigate further private benefits from concealing negative news. Additionally, the nonlinear relationship is observed only in competitive industries. This fact implies that strong external monitoring mitigates CEOs’ incentives to pursue private benefits, but raises extremely powerful CEOs’ career concerns, which encourages them to conceal more negative news.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Ⅲ. Research Design and Sample Selection
1. Research Design
2. Sample Selection
Ⅳ. Empirical Analyses
1. Descriptive Statistics
2. Regression Analyses
Ⅴ. Conclusions
References
Appendix

키워드

저자

• Chaehyun Kim [ Senior Researcher, School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  재무연구 [Asian Review of Financial Research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-0351

• eISSN

  2713-6531

• 수록기간

  1988~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재,SCOPUS

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330