The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident.We also show that power-driven overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make value-destroying acquisitions, relative to nonoverconfident CEOs. The results suggest that previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs are mainly led by power-driven overconfident CEOs.
목차
ABSTRACT I. Introduction II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development III. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics IV. Empirical Results V. Conclusion References Appendix A
키워드
CEO OverconfidenceCEO PowerMergers and Acquisitions
저자
Hyoseok (David) Hwang [ Assistant Professor of Finance in the Rutgers School of Business at Camden, NJ ]
Hyun-Dong Kim [ Assistant Professor of International Finance in the Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University in Seoul 04107, South Korea ]
Corresponding author
Taeyeon Kim [ PhD student in the college of Business at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(KAIST) in Seoul 02455, South Korea ]