Earticle

본 논문에서는 유비쿼터스 센서 네트워크 (USN)의 에너지 효율성을 개선하기 위해 각 개체의 상호 작용을 분석하는데 유용한 도구인 게임 이론을 이용하여 센서 노드들의 휴면 주기를 제어하는 알고리즘을 소개한다. 이를 위해 본 논문에서는 대표적인 비협조적 게임인 죄수의 딜레마를 응용하여 휴면 제어 게임 (sleep control game)을 정의 한다. 휴면 제어 게임에서 각 노드는 매 동작 사이클 시작점에 휴면 여부를 결정하며, 이를 위한 게임의 수익 함수는 트래픽 예상 규모, 네트워크 상황 및 메시지 예상 지연값을 고려한다. 센서 노드는 수익 함수를 바탕으로 전송성능은 유지하면서 에너지 소비량을 최소화할 수 있는 휴면 전략을 선택한다. 패킷 수준의 시뮬레이터를 이용해 제안된 알고리즘이 센서 노드의 전송 성능을 해치지 않으면서 불필요한 동작으로 인한 에너지 소비를 효과적으로 줄일 수 있음을 확인하였다.

In this paper we apply the game theory, which is a popular tool for explaining how economic individuals interact, to analyze the wakeup control of sensor nodes. We redefine a wakeup control game as a modified version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the wakeup control game each node decides whether it wakes up or not at the beginning of every cycle. Payoff functions of the wakeup control game consider the expected traffic volume, network conditions and the expected packet delay. According to the payoff function each node selects the best wakeup strategy which may minimize the energy consumption and maintain the latency performance. Through the detailed packet level simulations we evaluate the performance of our algorithm and confirm that our algorithm can effectively reduce the energy consumption for unnecessary wakeup without the loss of the latency performance.

이 논문에서는 백스케터 통신에서 악의적인 간섭이 존재할 때, 게임이론을 적용하여 간섭으로부터 회피하고 통신의 성능 최적화를통한 성능 분석에 관한 내용을 다룬다. 백스케터 통신을 원신호원을 반사하여, 백스케터 신호를 전송하기 때문에 악의적인 간섭에취약하게 된다. 이를 해결하기 위해 리더-펄로워 관계인 스텔켈베르그 게임이론을 적용하며, 라그랑지안 승수 방법을 통해 최적화를수행한다. 또한, 네쉬 게임이론과 스텔켈베르그 두 가지 게임이론을 백스케터 통신에 적용하고 적용된 게임이론에 따른 백스케터통신의 간섭 회피 성능을 비교 분석을 수행한다. 본 논문의 시뮬레이션을 통해 스텔켈베르그 게임이론이 악의적인 간섭 회피에서더 나은 성능을 보임을 증명하고, 백스케터의 통신 최적의 성능과 스텔켈베르그 게임 균형을 확인한다.

In this paper, we study an interference avoidance scenario in the presence of a interferer which can rapidly observe the transmit power of backscatter communications and effectively interrupt backscatter signals. We consider a power control with a sub-channel allocation to avoid interference attacks and a power-splitting ratio for backscattering and RF energy harvesting in sensors. We formulate the problem based on a Stackelberg game theory and compute the optimal transmit power, power-splitting ratio, and sub-channel allocation parameter to maximize a utility function against the interferer. We propose the utility maximization using Lagrangian dual decomposition for the backscatter communications and the interferer to prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithms effectively maximize the utility, compared to that of the algorithm based on the Nash game, so as to overcome a malicious interference in backscatter communications

이 연구는 체벌을 최소화 할 수 있는 방법을 구안하는 것이다. 연구내용은 체벌상황을 게임이론에 의해 분석하여 그 게임의 균형을 도출하고, 어떤 경우에 가장 체벌이 최소화되는지 및 체벌을 최소화할 수 있는 게임상황을 어떻게 만들 것인지를 연구하는 것이다. 연구방법은 정보공개정도에 따라 불완전정보게임, 불비정보게임, 완전정보게임 이론을 적용하여 분석하였다. 그 결과 먼저, 교사와 학생을 효용극대화의 인간, 합리적 인간으로 가정할 필요가 있었다. 둘째, 교사와 학생 간에 체벌관련 정보의 공개정도가 증가함에 따라 학생은 체벌 받을 행동을 하지 않고 교사는 체벌하지 않는 게임의 균형이 이루어 졌다. 그러나 체벌을 하지 않겠다고 공표한 경우에는 체벌 받을 행동이 증가하였다. 결국 체벌 전면금지 조치보다는 체벌가능성을 열어 둠으로써 체벌 받을 행동을 억제시킬 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.

The purpose of this study is to come up with the proper method of corporal punishment, based upon game theory. Analyzing the instructional and discipline situation using the game theory, how to reach the equilibrium of the game was explored and under what circumstances corporal punishment can be minimized was examined. The research method was basically literature review, survey, and rational analysis of incomplete information, imperfect information, and perfect information game theory. The major conclusions are as follows: First, the rationality of students and teachers pursuing maximum utility needs to be assumed. Second, in the game of imperfect information, the actions able to cause corporal punishment were done by students and corporal punishment was not done by teachers. Third, in the game situation of incomplete information, when the probability of corporal punishment is over 50%, bad actions were done by students. Forth, in game situation of complete information, the actions able to cause corporal punishment were not done by students, corporal punishment didn't have to be done by teachers. In a word, holding the possiblity of corporal punishment rather than prohibiting corporal punishment could inhibit the bad behaviors.

Trade shows are popular venues for marketers’ pre-launch demonstrations of advanced-stage product concepts, and frequently induce buyers to wait for new models rather than purchase current models without delay. In this study, we develop a two-period model to analyze the inter-temporal strategic interactions in a firm’s pricing strategy for the old and new models when a product concept demonstration is utilized. Our analysis focuses on the interplay of product positioning and product concept demonstrations that induces varying degrees of purchase delays and shapes the firm’s dynamic pricing strategy. We show that pre-launch product concept demonstrations increase profits only when the new model has sufficient horizontal or vertical differentiation from the existing model, and that the mechanisms leading to a profitable concept demonstration are quite different between the two types of differentiations. Product concept demonstrations induce greater volumes of delayed purchases at very low or very high levels of horizontal differentiation, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern, and lead to a lower price for the new model in comparison to its absence. We also find that a simpler pricing policy may dominate more complex pricing strategies when the old model continues to be available on the market along with the new model.

This paper reconsiders the assumptions about human rationality viewed from mainstream economics and game theory. Humans perceive the world and choose their own actions through the frame of perception acquired by the culture and tradition of the social community in which they live. Behavior mediated by inherited cultures appears irrational from the point of view of traditional rationality. However, when culture is viewed as an informal institution, the content of rationality may be different for individuals who are constrained by the institution. Through these discussions, it is possible to explain social phenomena that cannot be explained by existing game theory without giving up the traditional concept of rationality. It also examines whether culturally mediated human behavior can enhance the rationality of society as a whole. When a specific culture does not guarantee social rationality, the areas and roles that can be intervened by law or policy, which are formal institutions, are also examined.

전 지구적인 환경체인 안에서 탄소감축을 위한 공동의 노력이 계속 진행중이다. 그러나, 소극적인 국가나 기업들에 의하여 탄소감축노력이 상쇄되는 현상인 ‘탄소누출(carbon leakage)’이 일어나고 있어 효과가 반감되어 왔다. 국제사회에서 소극적인 태도를 제재하거나 강제하는 것 은 어렵다는 한계를 극복하지 못하고 있었다. 게임이론상 모두가 합심하 여 탄소감축 하는 것이 가장 좋은 전략이지만, 그렇지 못하였다. 탄소누 출을 근본적으로 막고 함께 탄소감축 노력을 하는 방향으로 게임의 방향 을 전환시키기 위한 게임체인저로서 탄소국경조정제도 도입이 주장되어 오다가 이제 본격적으로 시행되는 단계에 이르렀다. ‘탄소국경조정제 도’(CBAM; Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism)는 탄소집약적인 상품을 수입하거나 수출할 때 탄소감축노력에 대한 평가를 하여 기준치 보다 초과하는 탄소량에 대하여 추가적으로 ‘부담금을 부가’하고, 기준치 보다 많이 감축된 노력에 대하여는 보조금처럼 ‘환급’하거나‘부담을 면제 하거나 감경’하여주는 조절메카니즘을 의미한다. 탄소국경조정제도는 시 멘트, 철강, 철, 알루미늄, 비료, 전기 등을 첫 적용대상으로 하지만, 점 차 그 대상과 범위를 확대해 나가게 될 것이다. 우리는 EU와 미국 등 수출과 수입에 크게 의존하면서 탄소감축제품과 탄소집약상품을 동시에 거래하고 있다. 우리 정부와 기업이 어떻게 EU와 미국 등지의 탄소국경 조정제도에 대비하고, 우리의 탄소배출권거래시장을관리하며, 산업계 전 반에 걸쳐 탄소감축노력을 어떻게 할 것인지에 따라 탄소국경조정제도는 큰 충격이 되거나 아니면 새로운 경쟁력확보의 기회가 될 것이다. 탄소 국경조정제도는 환경보호와 경제성장을 반비례관계로 설정하던 종래의 패러다임을 크게 전환하여 양자를 비례관계로 설정하려고 하는 것이라고 생각된다. 탄소국경조정제도에는 재정조치의 유형과 비재정조치의 유형이 모두 포함된다. EU 탄소국경조정제도는 탄소배출권거래제와 연동하여 탄소배 출권의 주간 거래 종가 평균가격으로 CBM인증서를 구매하도록 하면서, 탄소감축노력 만큼 이에 대한 혜택을 주는 방식으로 운영하게 된다. 배 출권구입의무의 성질은 보는 관점에 따라 세금과 동일한 재정적 조치로 보는 관점도 있다. 탄소국경조정메카니즘에의하여 부과되는 탄소배출권 구입의무부과방식의 경우는 조세와 유사하지만, 세수확보목적없이 반대 급부를 전제로 하므로 일종의 비재정조치로서 환경규제라는 법제도로보 는 것이 보다 타당하다고 생각한다. 탄소국경조정제도는 그동안 비협조적 게임이론(non-cooperative game theory)이 적용되던 환경분야를 협조적 게임이론(cooperative game theory)이 적용되는 것으로 구조적으로 변모시킬 수 있는 역할을 할 수도 있다. 탄소국경조정제도라는 나무는 기후변화 대책이라는 숲과 의 관계에서 생각하여야 한다. EU는 시행착오를 거치면서 파리협정이후로 보다 완화되면서도 자율성을 강조하면서 속도조절을 고려하는 방식으 로 탄소배출권거래제를 새롭게 꺼내 들게 되었다. 이것을 우리는 EU의 그린뉴딜 정책이라는 관점으로 바라볼 수 있다. EU는 역내에서의 탄소 감축노력들이 반감되는 것을 방지할 수 있도록 탄소국경조정제도를 실시 하게 되었다. 동시에 탄소국경조정제도를 운영하는 기준으로서 탄소배출 권거래시장의 경매가격으로 설정하도록 하고 있다. 한편 탄소국경조정제 도는 불필요한 과도한 무역규제가 아닌지, 따라서 국제자유무역거래질서 를 파괴하는 또 다른 환경장벽이 아닌지 논란이 심각하게 되고 있다. 미 국과 중국 등을 중심으로 GATT 제III조 내국민대우의무, 제I조 최혜국 대우의무 위반 여부 등이 논란이 되고 있다. 그러나, EU는 GATT 제 XX조 환경보호를 위한 예외규정을 원용함으로써 EU 탄소국경조정제도 의 법적 정당성을 주장하고 있어 논리적인 충돌이 일어나고 있다. 자유 롭고 공정한 경쟁의 자유는 국제사회가 공존할 수 있는 핵심적이고 중대 한 가치이자 질서이다. 그러나 탄소감축노력을 통하여 기후변화에 대처 하여야 하도록 하는 환경보호의 이익은 결코 열등한 가치라고 볼 수 없 다. 양자는 대등한 가치질서에 해당하며, 어느 하나를 일방적으로 우선 시킬수 없다. 따라서 이를 규범조화적해석방법으로 접근하여야 할 필요 가 있다고 생각한다. 또한 사안에 따라서 그때 그때 이익형량을 비례의 원칙에 부합하게 하여야 한다고 생각한다. 따라서 경쟁의 자유를 존중하 되, 환경보호라는 정당한 이익이 있는 경우에는 GATT의 예외규정을 완 화하여 해석하여 적용시키는 논리가 가장 타당하다고 생각된다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 EU의 입법 패키지인 '핏포55(Fit for 55)' 등 입법관련 내용, 미국의 자국의 이익에 따라 변화되는 입법내용, 중국과 기타 국가들의 입법내용 등을 검토하면서 시사점을 도출하려고 하였다. 또한 탄소국경조정제도의 국내 도입과 관련된 현황을 점검하였다. ｢기후 위기대응을 위한 탄소중립·녹색성장기본법｣, ｢온실가스 배출권의할당 및 거래에 관한 법률｣, ｢2050 탄소중립위원회의 설치 및 운영에 관한 규정｣, ｢탄소소재 융복합기술개발 및 기반 조성 지원에 관한 법률｣, ｢탄소흡수 원유지 및 증진에 관한 법률｣등 국내법률들과 관련 대법원 판례 및 헌법 재판소 결정을 검토하면서 입법정책적인 과제를 도출하고자 하였다. 이제 탄소국경조정제도는 파리협약 등 기후변화협약의 국내법적 이행 을 효과적으로 돕기 위한 것으로 이해하여야 한다. 또한 이러한 법적 정 비와 더불어서 국내 탄소배출권거래제를 활성하면서 탄소국경조정제도와 연동하여 EU와 미국 등지에서도 동등하거나 유사한 평가를 받을 수 있 도록 하여야 할 것이다. 이를 위하여 자율규제, 공동규제인 규제된 자기 규제를 기존의 고권적 규제와 병행하여 활용하면서, 탄소감축노력에 대 한 인센티브를 구체적으로 보장하는 것을 확장해 나가야 한다. 이를 위 하여 헌법과 행정법에서 요구되는 국가는 환경국가이자 동시에 보장국가 와 제어국가의 모습을 거리의 원칙과 비례의 원칙에 따라 수행하여야 한 다. 헌법과 행정법의 이론 역시 탄소국경조정제도 등 현대적인 문제를 조화롭게 해결할 수 있게 되도록 현대적으로 변화되어 가야 한다.

Joint efforts to reduce carbon within the global environmental chain are ongoing. However, the effect has been halved because ‘carbon leakage’, a phenomenon in which carbon reduction efforts are offset by passive countries or companies, has occurred. The international community could not overcome the limitation to sanction or enforce a passive attitude. In game theory, it is the best strategy to reduce carbon by working together, but it was not. The introduction of the carbon border adjustment system as a game changer to fundamentally prevent carbon leakage and change the direction of the game toward a joint carbon reduction effort has been argued, but has now reached the stage where it is being implemented in earnest. The 'Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism' (CBAM) evaluates carbon reduction efforts when importing or exporting carbon-intensive products, and additionally 'adds a levy' for the amount of carbon that exceeds the standard value. It refers to a control mechanism that 'refunds' or 'exempts or reduces burden' like a subsidy for more reduced efforts. The carbon border adjustment system is initially applied to cement, steel, iron, aluminum, fertilizer, and electricity, but will gradually expand its scope and boundary. We trade carbon-reducing products and carbon-intensive products at the same time, relying heavily on exports and imports from the EU and the US. Depending on how the Korean government and companies prepare for the carbon border adjustment system in the EU and the United States, manage our carbon trading market, and make efforts to reduce carbon throughout the industry, the carbon border adjustment system may be a big shock or an opportunity to secure new competitiveness. The carbon border adjustment system includes both types of fiscal measures and types of non-fiscal measures. The EU carbon border adjustment system will be operated in a way that provides benefits as much as carbon reduction efforts while allowing the purchase of CBM certificates at the average weekly price of carbon credits in conjunction with the carbon trading system. Depending on the point of view of the nature of the obligation to purchase emission permits, some view it as the same financial measure as tax. In the case of the obligation to purchase carbon credits imposed by the carbon border adjustment mechanism, it is similar to tax, but it is premised on the return of benefits without the purpose of securing tax revenue. The carbon border adjustment system may play a role in structurally transforming the environmental field where non-cooperative game theory has been applied to one where cooperative game theory is applied. The tree of the carbon border adjustment system should be considered in relation to the forest as a climate change countermeasure. Through trial and error, the EU came up with a new carbon emission trading system that has been relaxed since the Paris Agreement, while emphasizing autonomy and considering speed control. We can view this in terms of the EU's Green New Deal policy. EU is claiming the legal legitimacy of the EU carbon border adjustment system by invoking the GATT Article XX exceptions for environmental protection, and a logical conflict is occurring. Freedom of free and fair competition is a core and important value and order for the international community to coexist. However, the benefits of environmental protection, which require efforts to cope with climate change through carbon reduction efforts, cannot be regarded as inferior. Therefore, I think that it is necessary to approach this as a norm-harmonic interpretation method. In addition, I think that depending on the case, the punishment should be in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Therefore, in this study, the EU's legislative package, 'Fit for 55', etc., the legislative contents that change according to the interests of the US, China and other countries are reviewed to draw implications. In addition, the status related to the domestic introduction of the carbon border adjustment system was checked. ｢The Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Response to the Climate Crisis｣,「ACT ON THE ALLOCATION AND TRADING OF GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSION PERMITS｣, ｢Regulations on the establishment and operation of the 2050 Carbon Neutrality Committee｣, ｢CARBON MATERIALS CONVERGENCE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION SUPPORT ACT” and ｢CARBON MATERIALS CONVERGENCE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION SUPPORT ACT｣, etc., as well as related Supreme Court precedents and decisions of the Constitutional Court were reviewed to derive legislative policy tasks. Now, it should be understood that the carbon border adjustment system is intended to effectively help the domestic legal implementation of climate change conventions such as the Paris Convention. In addition to this legal revision, the domestic carbon emission trading system should be activated and linked with the carbon border adjustment system so that it can receive equal or similar evaluations in the EU and the United States. To this end, while using self-regulation and regulated self-regulation which means co-regulation, in parallel with existing high-level regulations, it is necessary to expand the specific guarantee of incentives for carbon reduction efforts. To this end, the state must act as an environmental state and at the same time a Ensuring state and a Steering state according to the principle of distance and proportionality in the basis of the constitution at the area of administration. And the theory of the constitution and administrative law also needs to be modernized so that it can harmoniously solve modern problems such as the carbon border adjustment system.

인공지능과 빅데이터의 기술혁신에도 인공지능과 빅데이터가 시장경쟁 영향에 대한 이론연구들은 아직 초기이 다. 따라서 본 논문은 인공지능, 빅데이터, 데이터 공유가 신규 진입기업에 미치는 영향을 게임이론을 활용하여 분석하 였다. 먼저 기업의 경영환경을 내부와 외부로 구분하였다. 이후 인공지능 알고리즘을 (1) 고객마케팅, (2) 비용 절감, (3) 비용 절감을 위한 자동화 알고리즘으로 구분하였다. 또한 빅데이터를 외부 및 내부 데이터로 구분하였다. 분석 결과 외부 데이터의 공유는 기존 기업의 고객마케팅 알고리즘에는 영향이 없고 신규 기업의 진입장벽을 완화했다. 하지만 기존 기업의 비용 절감 알고리즘들과 내부 빅데이터의 개선은 신규기업의 시장진입 장벽이 될 수 있다. 이러한 시사점들 은 (1) 인공지능, 빅데이터, 데이터 공유에 따른 시장구조, 경쟁, 기업행태 영향분석과 (2) 인공지능과 빅데이터 정책 수립 시 이바지할 수 있다.

Despite the innovation of AI and Big Data, theoretical research bout the effect of AI and Big Data on market competition is still in early stages; therefore, this paper analyzes the effect of AI, Big Data, and data sharing on an entry firm by using game theory. In detail, the firms' business environments are divided into internal and external ones. Then, AI algorithms are divided into algorithms for (1) customer marketing, (2) cost reduction without automation, and (3) cost reduction with automation. Big Data is also divided into external and internal data. this study shows that the sharing of external data does not affect the incumbent firm's algorithms for consumer marketing while lessening the entry firm's entry barrier. Improving the incumbent firm's algorithms for cost reduction (with and without automation) and external data can be an entry barrier for the entry firm. These findings can be helpful (1) to analyze the effect of AI, Big Data, and data sharing on market structure, market competition, and firm behaviors and (2) to design policy for AI and Big Data.

이 연구는 북한 이슈를 보도한 국내외 뉴스 기사의 뉴스 가치가 어떠한지를 비교･분석한다. 이를 위해 기존 연구에서 제시된 뉴스 가치 평가 기준인 갈등 성, 흥미성, 진실성, 공정성, 다양성, 탐사성 기준을 수용하고, 이에 ‘전문성’ 항 목을 더하여 전문용어를 적절하게 사용했는지를 측정하는 분석 틀을 새롭게 적용했다. 구체적으로, 게임이론에서 정의하는 ‘치킨 게임’이라는 전문용어가 북한 관련 뉴스 기사의 맥락에 맞도록 적합하게 사용되었는지를 분석했다. 분 석대상은 네이버 뉴스에서 ‘북한’과 ‘치킨 게임’, 구글 뉴스에서 ‘North Korea’와 ‘chicken game’을 검색어로 삼아 추출된 언론 기사에서 각각 100건씩 무작위로 수집한 뉴스이다. 북한 이슈에 대한 국내와 해외 보도의 뉴스 가치 수준에 차 이가 있는지를 살펴보기 위해 내용분석 및 일원변량분석(one-way ANOVA)을 실시한 결과, 국내 뉴스는 미국에 비해 진실성과 전문성 수준이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 그 외 갈등성, 흥미성, 공정성, 다양성, 탐사성 수준의 유의미한 차이는 나타나지 않았으며, 전통매체와 온라인 매체의 뉴스 가치 수준 차이 역시 나타나지 않았다. 이러한 연구결과에 대해 추가적으로 논의하고 함의를 도출 했다.

This paper analyzes how Korean and American news cover the issues of North Korea from the perspective of news values including conflict, interest, truthfulness, fairness, diversity, exploration, and expertise. In particular, we suggest a new framework of evaluating “expertise” by focusing on whether the term “chicken game” is properly used in the context as game theories refer to. The subjects of analysis were 100 randomly collected Korean news from Naver, and American news from Google which were extracted from the search results of “North Korea” and “chicken game.” Throughout content analysis and one-way ANOVA, we found that Korean news showed significantly lower levels of the news value in terms of “truth” and “expertise” than those of United States. We conducted further analysis focusing on the cases of misusing the term “chicken game” and discussed the results.

이 글은 기존의 합리적 선택이론들이 지역주의 문제의 게임이론 모형화와 관련된 쟁점들을 충분히 다루지 않고 있다는 문제의식에서 출발하여 지역주의의 투표를 어떻게 게임이론으로 설명할 있는지를 모형화해 보려는데 목적이 있다. 먼저 합리적 선택이론에 대한 기존의 비판들이 합당한지를 검토한 다음 게임의 모형화 문제를 다루었다. 연구결과 투표영향력(voting power)을 전략에 대한 보수(payoff)로 삼을 경우 지역주의 투표와 비지역주의 투표가 죄수의 딜레마 구조를 이룬다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 그리고 지역 단위에서도 무임승차 가능성이 존재하므로 지역주의 투표의 문제는 지역내부와 지역 간이라는 두 차원에서의 딜레마가 중첩되어 있는 ‘중층적 죄수의 딜레마(layered prisoners’ dilemma)’ 구조로 이해될 수 있음을 밝혔다. 게임이론적 접근법이 갖는 의의로는 지역주의 투표의 옳고 그름에 대한 규범적 판단의 근거를 찾을 수 있다는 점이 가장 중요함을 지적했으며, 지역주의 투표의 해소방안과 관련해서는 양자적 상호작용(dyadic interaction)에 바탕을 두고 있는 반복게임의 해법 논리가 지역주의 투표 문제에 적용되기는 어려우므로 투표자들의 ‘확장된 자기이익’에 기초한 선호의 변형만이 근본적인 해결책이 될 수 있을 것임을 주장했다.

This study tried to explain regional voting behavior by applying game theory. Literature review on the rational choice theory does not deal with game theoretic model fully on regional voting issue. After examining the existing research, this study focused on making a model of regional voting behavior and analysed the types of it. Research finding are as follows: Regional voting and non-regional voting had a prisoners' dilemma structure. Regional voting behavior has layered prisoners’ dilemma on condition that voting power is considered as a payoff. It has internal and intra-regional section and each one has free rider problem. The result of this study implies that dyadic interaction of repetition game does not adjust to the regional voting behavior. If this finding is true, the best way to resolve regional voting behavior will be voters' natural preference transfer based on the self- interest well understood.

Selecting the best supplier in weapon systems research and development(R&D) is one of the most important steps for program success. The R&D program is awarded to the company considering both the firm’s technology capability and pricing. The government uses Negotiation Process (NP) to select the best supplier. So, we need a systematic approach in negotiation to select the best supplier. The purpose of the paper is to use and analyze the NP using game theory that is being used widely in various areas. The paper says that NP in weapon systems R&D has many problems to be solved for efficient and successful program management. These problems are as follows: limited time, confusion in economic acquisition, poor preparation of strategies and alternatives, poor analysis of the company, excessive focus on short-term outcome, and poor methods in making sure of satisfactory performance. This paper shows that game-theoretic approach can aid in preparing for negotiation, setting up strategies, and analyzing the environment and results of the NP. Currently, there already are existing data that proves that the game-theoretic approach (equilibrium) can be useful in analyzing the NP. Based on the study adapting game theory, this paper proposes many alternatives to improve the NP in weapon systems R&D. These alternatives include the necessity of setting-up effective strategies before negotiation, flexibility to change game rule, adoption of multi-suppliers, and so on. This study contributes in a systematic approach toward successful NP in weapon systems R&D. In addition, this study can be applied to various areas such as non-weapon systems R&D and core technology R&D.

In this letter, we propose a game-theory based heuristics for assigning frequency resources in communication systems. We suggest an algorithm that combines centralized and distributed behavior under the consideration of net filter discrimination (NFD) which leads to efficient usage of frequency resources. We show that by applying the heuristics, (because we applied a distributed algorithm that uses local information only) we can do the following: maximize the sum of users’ signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR), minimize the standard deviation of SINRs between users, and also reduce the computational complexity. All of these achievements concern crucial issues in, for example, military communications where users need high-quality communication, less probability of isolation, rapid action corresponding to rapidly-varying military situations.

This paper analyzes how market structure affects firms’ strategic choices in terms of the adoption of investor relations (IR). The effect of one firm’s IR activity may vary depending on the strategy choice of another firm in the market. In adopting game theory as a general tool to understand the strategic interaction among firms in this context, we utilize an economic model in which two competing firms are faced with the choice of whether or not to adopt IR. The game’s result shows that there are three possible scenarios depending on the cost implications of IR: (i) Status of Unadopted IR (UIR), (ii) Status of Monopolistic IR (MIR), and (iii) Status of Competitive IR (CIR). The findings reveal that in the case of MIR, firms are faced with a “game of chicken.” In this scenario, firms are incentivized to adopt an IR strategy prior to their counterpart’s adoption in order to take advantage of the effects of IR. In this case, these effects provide a greater reward to the firm which engages in monopolistic IR, a reward which otherwise disappears. In the CIR case, however, the adoption of IR is a dominant strategy for both firms, although their 'payoffs' are less than is the case where neither firm adopts IR. This is a typical case of “the prisoners’ dilemma.” It clearly demonstrates why IR has been adopted by firms all over the world, regardless of whether or not its beneficial effects are outweighed by the costs involved. We also find that there exists a certain condition relative to costs in which IR activity, which would have been adopted in a monopolistic situation, is not adopted by either firm in the model in a duopolistic situation.

The endgame stage of Go presents a unique challenge for scientific research. Contrary to previous stages, in the endgame the key to a successful analysis is board decomposition into smaller, independent local positions. Go players typically analyze these positions separately and prioritize moves based on their value. In this paper, I introduce a novel program that automates this decomposition-based analysis for the endgame stage of Go. AlphaZero has revolutionized Computer Go, by applying a generic move-selection mechanism, based on neural network judgments and the MCTS search algorithm. However, it does not specifically address the complexity of endgame in the aforementioned manner. On the other hand, by leveraging the decomposition-based analysis, my program reaches decisions in the endgame with relatively little computation. Additionally, it offers insights for Go practitioners by providing accurate move value evaluations. Notable prior work on automated endgame analysis was done by Martin Müller (1995). His program Explorer checked all possible variations in every undecided position and aggregated the results based on an algorithm inspired by the Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT). However, due to the exponential growth of the number of variations, Explorer’s application was limited to small, tightly bounded local positions. In contrast, my program leverages a neural network to predict optimal local moves, dramatically reducing the number of variations that need to be explored. Provided that the neural network’s predictions are correct, the program can accurately evaluate move values by considering relatively few variations, just like human Go experts do. Thanks to this approach, it is the first program capable of analyzing large, unbounded local positions, which are commonly encountered in real games. The neural network was fine-tuned from a pre-trained AlphaZero reimplementation on the task of optimal local move prediction. Training data was gathered from KataGo self-play games, utilizing KataGo’s network to perform board decomposition.

In this paper, we interpret the move decision of baduk by an economic point of view. We then build an economic theory approach to the baduk player's decision making process. We propose a hypothetical baduk valuation function(BVF) and impose such assumptions on the BVF that prevail in economic objective Junctions. From the BVF, we derive testable forms to estimate and test our theory. We also develop a 2-stage simulated estimation method to resolve the censored dependent variable problem arising from the resigned games. Through this, we can convert the win/lose series of the resigned games to the observable expected point gap series. The sample data are supportive of our theory. Parameter estimate of the number of total moves variable is significant in both the absolute point gap model and the mere point gap model, which verifies that the economic decision making theory can add some power to explaining the move decision mechanism of the baduk players. In addition, our regression model provides little evidence for the effect of the recent increase of dum on offsetting the first move advantage of the black player.

A game, especially, a game with roles must be organized in harmony with members, where attacks and defenses should be properly performed to win in constant battles and to exist in the game world. In order to fulfill one’s role faithfully, a tool capable of realizing the character's ability is needed. In a game, weapons are used with the most representative tools, and attack types and strategies vary depending on the shapes and types of weapons. Also, weapons are the most important items that symbolize players and used as a measure to show their strength. Players are constantly engaged in battles to obtain better weapons. Games related researches in the meantime show that one of the biggest influences on game success is a balance. Generally, game balance refers to a combat ability and the equipment between character occupations (roles). Therefore, analyzing the relationship between the characters’ occupations and weapons is an important task. This study was conducted to suggest a methodology for analyzing the relationship between occupations and weapons in game characters by analyzing games using the tri-origin theory. The tri—origin used in this study is a prototypical concept that inherits and develops the traditional Oriental Yin-Yang theory, and explains the fundamental elements of the world with three powers. The tri-origin theory is an analytical tool for analyzing the relationships, which are not found through the existing numerical analysis or quantitative analysis. In three existing concepts such as Homo, Hetero, and Neutro. In a game, the outcome of a battle is determined depending on how well each role is harmonized according to the occupation and on the setting of the relationship between occupations and weapons. Victory is a result from the harmonious combination of Hetero as an attack and Homo as a defense harmonize, corresponding to Neutro. Therefore, in order to set up a successful game, it is needed to analyze the game in depth. This will then make it possible to design and interpret a game successfully.

This research will take PokemonGo, as a case of location-based augmented reality (AR) mobile game, and explore the existence of its links to tourism within the full spectrum of mobile AR games. So far this field of empirical study in tourism is yet the minority due to the uncommon characteristics mobile AR technology holds. By illuminating the aspect of AR games which wholly immerses with the real geographic space, the study seeks to find the relation between AR satisfaction and destination satisfaction. The research model and measurement indices are drawn from the balance theory and data collection from PokemonGo users will be analyzed.