Earticle

With the advancement of next-generation communication technologies, urban air mobility (UAM) is rapidly emerging as an alternative mode of transportation alongside traditional ground-based transportation. Furthermore, the development of future air mobility service platforms, including Regional Air Mobility (RAM) for inter-regional travel, is currently in progress. To transition ground-based transportation systems into aviation mobility, it is essential to integrate a wide range of technologies, regulations, and guidelines, not only for physical infrastructure such as ground control centers and vertiports but also for aircraft manufacturing and operation. The urban operating environment for urban air operations must include capabilities for safe and efficient operation. This urban air operating environment encompasses the secure operation of physical elements like aircraft, vertiports, and air traffic control centers, as well as the operation of information security technologies in the cyber domain. The operational data of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) service platforms is becoming increasingly reliant on communication technologies, and a high level of dependence, making effective cybersecurity measures essential, as cyber threats can directly impact safety. Aircraft, vertiports, and air traffic control centers must ensure safety and reliability in the physical domain while establishing a trustworthy information exchange system in the cyber domain. Implementing robust cybersecurity protocols and operating technologies capable of identifying and responding to potential threats are also required. However, potential threats exist, including interference from ground-based operations, disruptions, exposure of aviation-related information (CSNi), interception, tampering, and theft. Current UAM operational systems face vulnerabilities in management and operation, such as unauthorized use by non-permitted individuals, involving UAM aircraft, UAM pilots, Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems, operators, vertiports, and vertiport operators. Therefore, this paper aims to propose a trustworthy operational structure for AAM operators as a response to security requirements for securing safe and operational AAM and addressing potential cyber threats.

Recently, as security incidents have occurred in which passengers open the aircraft doors on airplanes in flight, opinions are increasing that fundamental measures need to be taken. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, punishment for in-flight illegal acts related to aircraft operations has been strengthened around the world, and the number of in-flight illegal acts has been increasing in frequency and severity for a long period of time, showing a long-term trend. Illegal acts on board aircraft can pose a threat to an unspecified number of people in the limited space of the aircraft, and in severe cases, there is a risk that it can greatly affect the safety of the flight, so special attention and strict application of the law for deterrence are required. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognized the need for laws that can be commonly applied to illegal acts on board aircraft that may affect aircraft safety due to the nature of international aviation that passes through the airspace and high seas of multiple countries. Accordingly, the “Tokyo Convention” was adopted in 1963. It was later written in the Montreal Protocol (2014) to supplement the Tokyo Convention and went into effect on January 1, 2020, but South Korea has not yet signed or ratified it. However, since the Aviation Security Act stipulates that even if there are international conventions other than those in effect domestically for the security of civil aviation, those conventions shall be followed, it can be interpreted that the Montreal Protocol (2014) is also applicable. Accordingly, we would like to examine whether some provisions of the Protocol require enactment by comparing them with domestic law.

The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is converging with the aviation industry, evolving into various aviation services. The aviation industry now provides new forms of aviation services through the integration of advanced ICT technology. Consequently, it faces new cyber threats in the aviation sector, raising concerns about cybersecurity threats in the aviation industry. Typically, cyber threats have mainly targeted unauthorized access and administrator password theft for ground-based airline IT infrastructure and systems, malicious leaks, and theft of user information from airline users. Additionally, service denial attacks (DoS) that impair availability or disrupt system operations, and attacks that compromise the integrity of transmitted data, were common types of attacks. However, as in-flight network technology and services change, providing limited wireless network services, integrating and interconnecting in-flight systems based on TCP/IP, potential cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities are exposed. In other words, as wireless network services are easily accessible within the aircraft, with passengers having easy access to the provided wireless networks, potential cyber threats to aircraft systems are increasing. This study is based on verified vulnerabilities observed in actual aircraft. It aims to analyze potential cyber threats that could occur in-flight, intentionally or unintentionally compromising the resilience of in-flight systems and causing service denial attacks.

As the aviation industry gradually recovers from a downturn caused by the pandemic, airlines are increasingly focusing on launching various products. This is because passengers now perceive air travel not just as a means of transportation but as an integral part of their journey. Charging extra for emergency exit row seats, offering more space, reflects passengers' desire for a more comfortable travel experience. However, this focus on revenue generation overlooks the critical aspect of security in air transportation. Recent incidents, like a passenger opening an emergency exit on Asiana Airlines Flight OZ8124, highlight the inadequacies in current procedures for allocating emergency exit row seats. This article examines the definition of emergency exit row seats and reviews the current boarding standards for these seats in domestic airlines. It identifies four key issues: (1) the commercialization of emergency exit row seats, (2) inadequate briefing on emergency exit row seats, (3) insufficient procedures for assessing passengers' mental health, and (4) lack of regulations on alcohol consumption for passengers in emergency exit rows. Addressing these issues could lead to two significant outcomes: (1) reshaping public perception of emergency exit row seats, and (2) better preparation for emergencies through continuous monitoring and assessing passengers' mental health. This study reaffirms the importance of emergency exit row seats and the need to improve related procedures.