Earticle

We examine whether syndicate participation is reciprocal and also whether such reciprocity is beneficial to issuers using 1043 IPOs from January 1997 to June 2002. Reciprocal syndicates appear to make a lower level of price revision (lower information production), which lowers the amount of capital to be raised through going public, and to provide less analyst coverage by the lead underwriter. We interpret the lower price revision level as an intention to exert less marketing efforts and such intention is in part embodied in the form of less analyst coverage by the lead underwriter in the aftermarket. Also, reciprocal syndicates do not provide greater certification services in order to reduce underpricing. In addition, we find that reciprocal syndicates charge higher, or at least not lower, underwriting spreads than non-reciprocal syndicates. Evidence overall shows that reciprocity is not beneficial to issuers but rather it appears to be established and maintained for the benefit of underwriters.

This paper examines the determinants of the heated negotiation within the syndicate––i) between the lead underwriter and co-managers and ii) among co-managers––and how it affects IPOs. We find that the heated negotiation is associated with less compensation for co-managers. Our results overall suggest that the inferior co-managers’ bargaining position and superior lead underwriter bargaining power, together increasing a chance of an unfair initial profit sharing, lead to the heated negotiation. The heated negotiation between the lead underwriter and comanagers appears to increase the number of co-manager recommendations, and these recommendations increase when they are better compensated and the IPO size is large. We also consider other key underwriter services such information production, market making, and all-star analyst coverage. However, we find no significant results and these services are commonly not positively related to co-manager compensation, suggesting that the provision of key underwriter services is tightly linked to their corresponding compensation.

This paper examines the determinants of heated negotiation within the syndicate––i) between the lead underwriter and co-managers and ii) among co-managers––and how heated negotiation affects IPOs. We find that heated negotiation is positively related to underwriter compensation for the lead underwriter, the number of co-managers, and gross spread in dollars and negatively to underwriter compensation for co-managers and co-managers’ average reputation, The presence of co-manager all-star analysts is important for heated negotiation between the lead underwriter and co-managers but not a factor for that among co-managers. Heated negotiation appears to increase the number of market makers in the aftermarket and such result is more pronounced when there is heated negotiation among co-managers.

본 연구는 2012년 수요예측과 기업실사를 의무화한 제도 개선 이후 대표주관사에게 지급되는 보상에 영향을 미치는 요인을 확인하고자 2012년 2월부터 2014년 12월 사이에 발행된 일반 회사채 661건을 대상으로 실시하였다. 시장점유율을 기준으로 측정한 주관사의 평판은 수수료와 유의한 음의 관계를 보여 평판이 높은 주관사의 수수료가 더 작은 반면 수익률 스프레드와도 음의 관계를 보여 평판이 높은 주관사가 더 높은 가격에 회사채를 매출하고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 이처럼 평판이 높은 주관사는 더 나은 주관서비스를 제공하고 있지만 이에 대한 프리미엄을 청구하지는 못하고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 대표주관사가 발행기업의 채권은행일 때 대표주관수수료와 유의한 양(+)의 값을 보였는데 이는 발행사가 대표주관사의 트랙레코드 형성에 도움을 주고자 하는 호혜적인 행동의 결과라 볼 수 있다. 그러나 발행사는 총수수료를 상승시키면서까지 채권은행에게 대표주관수수료를 지급하지는 않았다. 복수주관 여부의 경우 모든 분석에서 통계적으로 유의한 결과를 보이지 않아 대표주관수수료나 기업이 지불하는 총 비용에 미치는 영향을 확인할 수 없었다. 국내 증권사는 제도 개선 이후에도 주로 낮은 수수료를 위주로 경쟁하고 있으며 대표주관이라는 트랙레코드를 쌓기 위해 노력하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

This paper analyzes the impact of underwriter’s reputation, syndicate structure and bank relationship on compensation of underwriter for 661 corporate bonds that was issued from Feb. 2012 to Dec. 2014 after the policy change that force to implement a book building and due diligence in 2012. I found that more prestigious underwriters issue bonds at lower interest rates, but they couldn’t charge higher fee. When the underwriter is also an creditor, the underwriting fee has shown ststistically positive effect with it. This is presumably the consequence of the mutually beneficial behavior of an issuing company to help them form the track record as representative underwriter. On the other hand, syndicate structure did not be the statistically significant factor in all analysis. Domestic securities are vying with their lower commissions and trying to keep up their track record as a representative underwriter.

본 연구는 신디케이트 구성의 결정요인을 실증적으로 분석한다. 1988-2010년 기간 중 미국 은행들이 해외 차입기업들에게 제공한 국제 신디케이트론을 분석 대상으로 한다. 본 연구의 실증 결과는 정보적 마찰 환경 하에서 차입기업의 위험이 증가할 때 신디케이트 구성이 주간 사은행으로 집중화되지만 신디케이트 내에서 위험 공유에 대한 보상이 적절하게 설계될 때 신디케이트 구성이 다각화될 수 있음을 제시한다. 이와 같은 실증결과는 주간사은행과 참여은행이 적극적으로 신디케이트에 참여하고 이에 대한 보상으로 높은 위험프리미엄을 금융계약 상에 설계함을 보여준다. 본 연구는 미국의 은 행이 해외의 차입기업에 제공하는 신디케이트론 금융계약을 분석하여 미국 내 신디케이트론 시장을 분석 대상으로 한 기존연구에서 공통적으로 제시되고 있는 신디케이트 구조의 집중화 에 반하는 결과를 제시한다.

This paper empirically investigates how syndicate compositions are determined in international corporate debt contracts. Using international syndicated loan contract data across 34 countries from 1988 to 2010, this paper provides findings that syndicate composition, measured by the proportional number of lead arrangers relative to participating banks in syndication, are significantly negatively affected by loan spreads after controlling for contract characteristics, country characteristics, and other factors. These evidences indicate that, under informational frictions, as the riskiness of a borrowing firm increases, the syndicate composition becomes more diversified in a way that the lead arrangers and the participating banks share credit risk in syndication. That is, the lead arrangers and participating banks cooperatively determine higher loan spread to align higher compensation for their strategic commitments and risk-sharing in syndication. From the investigation of international lending by U.S. banks, the empirical results of this paper provide new findings strongly supporting the diversification nature of syndicate composition in international syndicated corporate loan markets while contradicting the concentration nature of syndicate structure prevailingly documented in previous studies, which investigate domestic markets.

오늘날 Lloyd's Market은 인공위성, 허리케인 등 거의 모든 위험을 인수하면서 약 330년 이상을 세계의 보험시장을 주도하여 왔다. 로이즈는 1988년~1992년의 경영실적 악화로 누적적자 ￡80억를 기록하여 사상 최대의 위기에 직면하였으나, 최근 완전히 탈피한 것으로 판단된다. 이렇듯 Lloyd's Market이 위기에서 회생할 수 있었던 원동력은 약 330년간 축적된 언더라이팅 노하우 및 위험율 통계 등을 바탕으로 강력한 개혁안을 시행했기 때문이다. 일본의 손해보험사들은 로이즈 시장의 언더라이팅 노하우 습득 및 핵심인력 양성 등을 위해 Lloyd's Market에 투자하여 위험인수에 참여하고 있다. 본 연구는 Lloyd's Market의 특징과 최근 동향, 일본 손해보험사의 로이즈 진출 전략에 대해 살펴보고 그 시사점을 제시하였다.

Lloyd’s Market has been leading insurance market worldwide for more than 330 years, taking most of the risks such as satellites and hurricanes. Due to poor management performances from 1988 to 1992, Lloyd’s Market underwent an accumulated loss of ￡80 hundred million, which was the worst crisis ever. However, Lloyd’s Market has successfully escaped from the crisis recently. The driving forces of recovery are Underwriting Know-how which has been accumulated for over 330 years and its execution of innovative reform plans. Property and casualty insurance companies in Japan are now participating in risk-taking by investing in Lloyd’s Market in order to learn Underwriting Know-hows as well as to train qualified human resources. This study shows the specificity and recent trends of Lloyd’s Market, as well as entry strategies of property and casualty insurance companies in Japan for Lloyd’s Market.

The design of an information system for a business process can be implemented either in the object-oriented paradigm or in relational database management system as per the client’s choice. In object oriented paradigm, the design starts with abstraction of objects, classes, attributes, functional dependencies, interrelationships and use cases but in relational database management system (RDBMS) the abstractions may be in the form of entity, attributes, interrelationships, functional dependencies and functionalities. These abstracted view elements are analogous to each other with nomenclature change e.g. view element entity of a RDBMS is analogous to object/class of an Object Technology. The pragmatic practice of designing a relation or class/object of an information system is modeled with Unified Modeling Language (UML) by human intervention. Further, the structuring and grouping of an attributes for a class/object or entity in a design is made possible by the intuition of a designer, which may lead to the error discretions. This paper proposes a realizable methodology that accepts the attributes and the functional dependencies abstracted from the Software Requirements Specifications (SRS) and trims them using minimal cover of functional dependencies to the form of a dependency matrix. The representation is used to refine the functional dependencies that exist among the attributes of each class/entity and grouping them for a relation or object/class by using the normalization process. The procedure is automated to eliminate possible human errors discretions and the correctness and completeness is authenticated through the amalgamation of axiom in the methodology.

본 논문에서는 Sheehan이 자신 소유의 TIGER호(유람선)의 엔진고장에 따른 교체비용을 보험사에 청구한 사건과 관련하여 사고의 원인이 하나에 기인하지 않고 중첩되었을 경우, 보험자 책임 및 사고 발생 원인과 결과 사이의 인과관계 문제가 있는바 그 쟁점을 논하고자 한다. 특히 보험자 책임의 성부의 전제가 되는 해상보험에서의 해상위험, 즉 담보위험, 면책위험, 비담보위험으로 나눠지는 해상위험 중 하나의 문제로 손해가 발생한 경우나 그 원인이 명확한 경우에는 보험자의 책임이 명확하게 드러날 것이나, 위험이 다중·복합적으로 발생한 경우에는 그 인과관계 여부에 따라 보험자의 책임이 달라질 수 있다는 점에서 갈등 해결에 어려움을 겪을 수밖에 없다. 대상판결은 이 사건 선박의 우현엔진 손상 사고의 원인을 원고가 경보음이 울린 직후 우현 엔진의 시동을 끄지 않은 행위(담보위험)와 엔진 오일 쿨러에 있는 가스켓이 설계결함 때문에 엔진 오일이 단 몇 분 동안의 짧은 시간 동안 급격하고도 상당한 양이 배출된 것(면책위험) 두 가지로 보면서 면책위험담보 특약이 없다면 면책위험을 원인으로 담보위험이 발생하고 그 결과 손해가 발생한 경우, 보험자는 원칙적으로 보상책임을 부담하지 않게 된다고 판단하고 있다.

In this paper, in relation to the case in which Sheehan requested the insurance company for the replacement cost due to engine failure of his own TIGER (cruise ship), the insurer's responsibility and the cause and effect of the accident There is a causal relationship between the two, so I would like to discuss that issue. In particular, the insurer's responsibility if the damage is caused by one of the maritime risks divided into collateral risk, indemnity risk, and non-collateral risk, or the cause of which is clear. This will be clearly revealed, but in the case of multiple or complex risks, the insurer's responsibilities may vary depending on the causal relationship, which leads to difficulties in resolving the conflict. The target judgment is that the plaintiff did not turn off the starboard engine immediately after the alarm sounded (the risk of security) and the gasket on the engine oil cooler was designed for defects in the engine oil for only a few minutes. If there are two types of discharges (risk of indemnity) that are both sudden and significant during a short period of time, in principle, if there is a risk of indemnity as a cause of the risk of indemnity and damages are incurred as a result, the insurer in principle compensates. It is judged that it will not be held responsible.

Using unique information obtained from Korea regarding syndicates’ underwriting of initial public offerings (IPOs), this paper examines how syndicates are formed into syndicate structures, including fee distributions among syndicate members, and also investigates how they affect the IPO process, such as the underpricing of IPOs. Reciprocal participation among syndicates affects the formation of syndicates, and the formation strongly depends on the regulation of underwriting. Approximately 30% of the sample, which was hand-collected, is managed by sole syndicates in that the book manager of the IPO underwrites the entire shares and takes out the overall underwriting fee. The remaining 70% is mainly controlled by the book managers in that over 90% of the shares for an IPO are allocated to the book managers, and over 90% of the underwriting fees are distributed to the book managers. The syndicate structure of an IPO has little effect on underpricing, which strongly depends on underwriting regulation, market conditions during the IPO process, and price adjustment after book building.

We examine how syndicate structure affects loan pricing in international syndicated lending. Using extensive syndicated loan data across 103 countries from 1982 to 2012, we find thatboth measures of syndicate structure, the proportional number of lead arrangers, and the proportionof loan amount retained by lead arrangers in syndication, are significantly negativelyrelated to loan risk premiums after controlling for contract and country characteristics. Thesefindings indicate that, under informational frictions, as the riskiness of a borrower increases,the syndicate structure becomes more diversified in a way that lead arrangers and participatingbanks share the loan amount and the associated credit risk in syndication. Hence, syndicateparticipants collaboratively determine higher loan spreads to align higher compensation foractive commitments and greater risk sharing of participating banks in syndication. Our resultsoffer new evidence strongly supporting the diversified nature of syndicate structure but contradictingthe concentrated nature of syndicate structure prevailing in existing studies.

Using 1043 IPOs from January 1997 to June 2002, we examine whether syndicate participation is reciprocal and also whether such reciprocity is beneficial to issuers. Our empirical results show that reciprocal syndicates appear to make a lower level of price revision (lower information production), which lowers the amount of capital to be raised through going public, and that the lead underwriter in the reciprocal syndicate provides less analyst coverage. We interpret the lower price revision level as an intention to exert less marketing effort and such intention is, in part, embodied in the form of less analyst coverage by the lead underwriter in the aftermarket. In addition, in order to reduce underpricing, reciprocal syndicates do not provide greater certification services. In addition, we find that reciprocal syndicates charge higher, or at least not lower, underwriting spreads than non-reciprocal syndicates. Evidence overall shows that reciprocity is less beneficial to issuers but, rather, it appears to be established and maintained for the benefit of underwriters.

This paper examines how syndicates of initial public offerings (IPOs) are formed in the Korean market from the view of similarity-based associations by studying IPOs from 2002 and 2008. The results indicate that book managers are inclined to invite underwriters who have similar reputations and statuses as syndicate members, suggesting that similarity-based homophily among underwriters plays a role in forming the syndicates in the Korean IPO market. Furthermore, book managers with a high reputation and status are less likely to invite other underwriters whereas potential underwriters of high status are more likely to be invited in the syndicate. The syndicate formation of IPOs in the Korean market is also affected by existing ties among underwriters, the industry’s market volatility, and issuing firms’uncertainty.

Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model that explores the link between informational transparency and the structure of the lending syndicate. Focusing on the bank-based system, we analyze how information asymmetry between German borrowers and lenders affects the mandated arranger's decision for the size of loan syndicate. Following Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Sufi (2007), we exploit variation in the credit availability of borrowing firms to explain how information asymmetry affects the structure of syndicates. A lack of information transparency induces a mandated arranger to form smaller syndicates in order to enhance monitoring of the German borrowers. Takeover-related loans are associated with smaller size of syndicates, because German borrowers are sensitive to potential information leakage in the case of takeovers. By enhancing our understanding of the factors that improve the salability of debt claims in Germany, our research can contribute to the potential policy debate about the design of financial services that will promote and facilitate the economic development of Korea.

2000년대에 들어서 아시아지역의 신디케이트론 시장은 신속한 발전을 이루 어 왔으며 2007년 기준으로 일본과 호주지역을 제외한 신디케이트론 규모는 2,000억 달러에 육박하고 있다. 본 연구는 최근 들어 급격한 성장세를 보이고 있는 중국 신디케이트론 시장을 중심으로 상업차관단의 규모를 보다 심층적으 로 분석해 보고자 한다. 정보비대칭의 대용변수로 보다 다양한 종류의 신용등 급을 이용하였으며 신용등급이 존재하지 않은 중국기업들은 정보비대칭이 높 은 것으로 간주되어 신디케이트론 시장에서 적은수의 금융기관들로부터 차입 을 받을 수 있었다. 또한, 대주의 보호정도가 높을수록 차관단의 규모는 적어 지는 경향이 있음을 보여 주고 있다. 신디케이트론의 만기가 짧을수록 은행들 은 차주를 좀 더 자주 감시할 수 있는 유인이 발생하기 때문에 보다 많은 수 의 금융기관들이 차관단에 포함됨을 밝혀냈다. 본 논문은 정보비대칭성과 대주 보호(lender protection)와 같은 요인들이 중국에서 형성된 상업차관단의 규모에 영향을 미치고 있다는 결과를 제시함으로써 기존 연구를 한층 발전시켰다고 할 수 있다.

This paper examines how syndicate structure and risk spread affect maturity structure of international corporate loan. Syndicate structure is an organizational response to information asymmetry and the associated informational friction in the process of syndicate dealing. In a syndicated lending, the lead bank retains a fraction of the loan, but it acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Between the two competing hypotheses of this paper ? risk concentration hypothesis versus risk sharing hypothesis, all estimations support the risk concentration hypothesis. As the riskiness of borrowing firm increases, lead arrangers take more responsibility by increasing the share of the loan amounts and by decreasing the number of lead arrangers. Further, this paper provides the evidence that lending institution lengthens debt maturity as borrowing firm’s riskiness increases, supporting tradeoff hypothesis.

조직범죄는 다수인이 모여 조직적인 역할분담을 통해 계속적·반복적으로 범죄를 저지른다는 점에서 의도한 범죄가 보호하려는 법익을 불문하고 사회적으로 큰 폐해가 예상되고, 특히 폭력행위등처벌에관한법률(이하 ‘폭처법’이라 함)상 범죄단체의 경우 내재된 폭력성 때문에 그 위험성이 크다. 이 때문에 국내법 및 외국 법률에서도 조직범죄를 대처하기 위해 다양한 방안을 마련하고 있고, 나아가 UN에서는 초국가적인 조직범죄를 방지하기 위한 협약을 마련하여 시행하고 있다. 범죄단체의 개념 및 성립요건과 관련하여 우리 대법원은 형법상의 범죄단체보다는 폭처법상의 범죄단체, 소위 ‘조직폭력배’에 초점을 맞추어 이론을 발전시켜왔는데, 근래에 형법상의 범죄단체인 보이스피싱 범죄조직에 대해 폭처법상의 범죄단체와 동일한 기준을 적용한 듯한 판결을 내린 바 있다. 그러나, 수괴·간부·조직원의 위계질서를 구성요건으로 하고 있는 폭처법상의 범죄단체는 그 구성목적이 폭력범죄를 목적으로 하고 있어 수직적·권위적 의사결정구조를 가질 수 밖에 없고 내부적으로도 속칭 ‘줄빠따’로 대변되는 폭력적·강압적인 내부규율을 특징으로 삼고 있는 반면, 형법상의 범죄단체는 수평적·민주적 의사결정구조 또는 강제력이 약한 내부규율을 가지고 있는 경우에도 충분히 성립할 수 있다는 점에서 양자의 차이를 인정할 필요가 있다. 한편, 우리나라는 2000. 12.경 UN의 초국가적 조직범죄 방지협약에 가입한 이후 그 이행입법의 일환으로 형법 제114조를 개정하여 범죄단체에 이르지 못하는 범죄집단을 처벌할 수 있도록 규정함으로서 동 협약상 규정되어 있는 조직범죄단체의 개념을 상당 부분 도입한 것으로 볼 여지가 있는데, 이러한 형법상 ‘범죄집단’의 개념에 대한 논의가 활발히 이루어지지 않고 있다. 이에 범죄단체 및 범죄집단에 대한 각국의 규율체계, 위 협약상 규정된 조직범죄단체의 개념을 살펴본 뒤, 대법원의 판결들을 토대로 범죄단체의 성립요건 및폭처법상 범죄단체와 형법상 범죄단체의 차이점을 구별해보고, 개정 형법상 범죄집단의 도입취지 및 폭처법상 범죄집단에 대한 대법원의 태도를 토대로 위 협약과 조화적인 해석론을 통해 범죄집단의 개념 정립을 시도하였다.

Organized crime tends to be accompanied by considerable social harm, regardless of the type of the crime, since the persons are associated together through time, for a common purpose of engaging in a course of repeated crime and functions as a unit by individually given role. Particularly a Criminal Syndicate defined in 'Punishment of Violencs, ETC. ACT' involves greater risk because of the inhernet violence. Accordingly, domestic and foreign laws are providing various measures to cope with organized crime, and furthermore, the United Nations has established a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In relation to the concept and requirements of Criminal Syndicate, the Supreme Court has developed own theory mainly focusing on Criminal Syndicate defined in 'Punishment of Violencs, ETC. Act.' Recently, in two cases of voice phishing criminal organizations, the Supreme Court seems to apply the same criteria for Criminal Syndicate defined in 'Punishment of Violencs, ETC. Act.' However, the fact that Criminal Syndicates defined in 'Punishment of Violencs, ETC. Act' require more than three tiered hierarchy with intent to commit violent crime, which leads to hierarchial decision-making, and that they use physical violence to maintain strict discipline, makes a meaningful distinction between the Criminal Syndicate defined in 'Punishment of Violencs, ETC. Act' and 'Criminal Act.' Criminal Syndicates in 'Criminal Act' does not require hierarchy, that means Decision-making system thereof may be consensual. Neither they need physical violence to maintain strict discipline, but only minimal enforcement for the members to comply with rules therein. Since Korea adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on Dec. 2000, as part of the implementation legislation of the Treaty, Parliament amended Article 114 of the Criminal Ace to punish 'Criminal Group' that does not reach Criminal Syndicate. This makes us regard that Parliament adopted the definition of 'Organized criminal group' stipulated in UN Convention, but active debates on the definition or requirements of 'Criminal Group' are rarely seen in academia. After discussing the countermeasure of developed countries for organized crime and the definition of 'Organized criminal group' stipulated in UN Convention, this article attempts to extract definitions and requirements of 'Criminal Syndicates' and 'Criminal Groups' from the Supreme Court cases, and to define 'Criminal Groups' in revised Criminal Act in concert with Supreme court and UN Convention above.

보이스피싱 범죄는 예방과 근절을 위한 각종 노력에도 불구하고 오히려 범행 수법이 나날이 지능화·조직화되어 피해액과 피해자 계층이 확대되는 추세이다. 보이스피싱 범죄로 인한 피해를 줄이기 위해서는 국민 상대 홍보나 금융·통신제도 정비와 더불어 범행에 가담한 사람들에 대한 엄정한 형사처벌을 위한 노력도 병행되어야 하는데 그러한 형사법적 시도 중 하나가 보이스피싱 조직을 형법 제114조의 ‘범죄단체’로 의율하고 범죄수익금을 몰수·추징하는 것이다. 대법원은 2016. 5. 12. 선고 2016도122 판결에서 최초로 보이스피싱 조직을 범죄단체로 인정한 이후, 2017. 10. 26. 선고 2017도8600 판결에서 역시 이를 인정하면서 그와 관련된 각종 쟁점에 대하여 구체적이고 자세한 판시를 하였다. 기업형 조직범죄의 구조를 갖춘 대규모 보이스피싱 조직을 형법상 범죄단체로 의율함으로써 범죄수익 은닉의 규제 및 처벌 등에 관한 법률상 ‘중대범죄’인 범죄단체조직죄, 범죄단체가입죄 및 범죄단체활동죄의 성립을 인정하였고, 이에 따라 대포통장으로 금원을 송금받은 행위를 동법상 ‘가장행위’로 보아 별도로 자금세탁범죄로 처벌하고, 피고인들이 대상사건 범죄로 얻은 수익을 범죄단체조직죄 등으로 인한 범죄수익으로 보아 추징함으로써 엄정한 처벌과 철저한 범죄수익 환수가 이루어질 수 있도록 한 것으로 의미가 큰 판결이다. 이 글에서는 보이스피싱 조직의 범죄단체 의율 및 그와 관련된 여러 가지 법적 쟁점에 대하여 보다 심층적이고 구체적인 논의가 이루어진 2017. 10. 26. 선고 2017도8600 판결을 중심으로 보이스피싱 조직의 범죄단체 의율과 관련된 여러 가지 쟁점에 대해 판례가 제시하는 기준과 요건 등을 분석‧검토하였다. 더불어 범죄단체에 이르는 조직을 구성하였거나 그 조직원으로 활동하였다는 사실까지는 입증되지 않더라도 보이스피싱 범죄로 인한 이익을 박탈할 수 있도록 전기통신금융사기 피해 방지 및 피해금 환급에 관한 특별법 제15조의2 위반죄를 범죄수익 은닉의 규제 및 처벌 등에 관한 법률 제2조 제1호의 ‘중대범죄’에 포함하도록 법률을 개정하는 방안도 제안한다.

Despite various efforts to prevent and eliminate voice phishing crimes, not only the crime methods have become more advanced but the number and the range of victims has increased. In order to reduce the damages caused by voice phishing crimes, in addition to public relations efforts and financial/telecommunication system enhancements, the criminals should be strictly punished in the criminal legal system. One such legal attempt was to designate a voice phishing organization as a ‘Criminal Syndicate’ under Article 114 of the Criminal Act where the criminal proceeds could be confiscated or collected. On May 12, 2016, the Supreme Court first recognized a voice phishing organization as a criminal syndicate(Case No. 2016do122) and on October 26, 2017 the Supreme Court made detailed statements with respect to the issues related to it(Case No. 2017do8600). By recognizing these large-scale voice phishing organizations with corporate structures as criminal syndicates under the Criminal Act, the borrowed name bank accounts to transfer funds from criminal activities were recognized as money laundering under Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment. Further, the rulings were meaningful because the criminal proceeds was collected as it was recognized as criminal syndicate and therefore strict punishment and deprivation of proceeds were possible. This article examined the latter ruling(Case No. 2017do8600) which dealt with the related issues in detail. In order to be able to confiscate or collect criminal proceeds from voice phishing crimes even if the facts are not proven as a criminal syndicate, I propose revision of Article 2.1 of Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment which the ‘Serious Crime’ includes the violation of Article 15.2 of the Spcecial Act on the Prevention of Loss Caused by Telecommunications-Based Financial Fraud and Refund for Loss.

Witness immunity is a new strategy for defeating such special crimes as organized crime, drug cartel and corruption offence. These crimes are committed by plural persons who have a closed network, so that we can achieve great success in rooting out underlying evils with the aid of a person involved. Meanwhile, if the conspirators are not willing to talk, investigators could not help catching criminals red-handed or using highly intrusive surveillance techniques. These difficulties have designed some innovative devices for investigation, one of them is so called witness immunity. Nowadays, witness immunity is accepted as the criminal justice weapon for eradicating syndicate crimes by many advanced countries involving U.S.A., Germany, France and the United Kingdom. While U.S.A. take a step forward by implementing crime immunity, France and Germany assume a relatively prudent attitude to remain in punishment immunity. The United Kingdom is the forefront nation that equips itself with not only crime immunity but also punishment immunity. This paper offers the introduction witness immunity into South Korean criminal justice system, and designs the concrete proposal as follows. Firstly, the target shall be clearly and limitedly made such as organized crime, drug cartel and corruption offence. Secondly, the methods of immunity had better consist of crime immunity and punishment immunity, while evidence use immunity is recommended as the method of punishment immunity rather than transactional immunity. Thirdly, witness immunity shall be implemented by the prosecutors with the approval of judges. Lastly, we also need to make a full defensive preparation to minimize the side effects of witness immunity, the one of which is the new legislation to punish the obstructor of justice.

국제대출거래에서 주간사가 신인의무를 부담하는 수임자로 볼 수 있는지에 관하여 법원과 학자들 사이에 논란이 있다. 이러한 신인의무가 인정되는 신인관계를 정의하기 위하여 많은 법원과 학자들이 노력하였다. 그러나 아직까지 확정적인 개념으로 정의되지 못하고 있다. 국제대출거래에서 전문적인 당사자인 금융기관인 대주와 주간사 사이에 주간사의 신인의무를 인정할 수 있는지에 관하여 견해가 나뉜다. 저자는 주간사의 신인의무를 긍정하는 견해를 따른다. 국제대출거래에서 통상적으로 대주는 주간사를 신뢰하여 자체적인 실사를 수행하지 아니한다. 이에 따라 대주의 차주에 대한 신용분석은 주간사를 통하여 전달받은 정보를 기초로 이루어진다. 제공받은 정보에 오류가 있는 경우에 대주는 손해를 피할 수 없다. 이러한 이유로 대출설명서의 준비와 관련하여 UBAF 사건의 영국 법원은 주간사의 신인의무를 인정하였다. 국제대출거래에서 주간사의 신인의무가 인정되면 차주와 별개의 은행관계도 가질 수 없으며 차주에 관한 모든 정보를 개시하여야 하는 등 많은 불이익이 있다. 이에 따라 국제대출거래에서 주간사는 신인의무를 제한하기 위한 다양한 면책조항을 이용한다. 이러한 주간사의 신인의무에 대하여 한국법상 신인의무를 인정할 수 있는 직접적인 법적 근거가 없다. 그러나 영미법의 신인의무는 민법의 신의칙상 정보제공의무로 해석할 수 있다. 이러한 경우에 대주가 주간사로부터 수령한 정보에 허위가 있는 경우에 정보제공자인 주간사와 정보수령자인 대주 사이에 정보제공자의 일반불법행위책임을 물을 수 있다. 2012년 일본의 대법원 판례도 이러한 주간사의 정보제공의무를 인정하였다.

In an international syndicated loan arrangement, whether the arranger is to be treatedas a fiduciary of the syndicate has been a vexed issue for courts and academic commentators. Much judicial academic effort has been extended on searching for a definitive fiduciaryprinciple. However, the notion of fiduciary relationship still remains undissolved. In an international syndicated loan, lenders are all sophisticated financial institutions. Accordingly, it has been argued that there is no trust and confidence in arm’s lengthtransaction and there is no existence of fiduciary relationship between the arranger andparticipant banks. However, the writer is inclined to the view that the arranger owes thefiduciary duty to participant banks. Usually, each lender should have made its owninquiries and conducted its own due diligence about the borrower. In a syndicatearrangement, however, the participant is not afforded this opportunity to the same extentsince fees do not cover his expenses. His only assumption is that the arranger has donehis job. In UBAF Ltd. v. European American Banking Corporation, the arranger was heldas the fiduciary of the participant banks regarding the preparation of informationmemorandum. In the event that such relationship exists, the arranger can not have a bank relationshipwith the borrower and must make disclosure of information regarding the borroweracquired in the service in favor of participant banks. Accordingly, a prudent arranger maymitigate the risk of an adverse construction that the arranger is a fiduciary of participantbanks through the utilization of an appropriate contractual disclaimer. Under Korean law, there is no law which states the fiduciary duty. However, thefiduciary duty can be regarded as the duty to inform in good faith of the Civil Code. The arranger is subject to potential tort liability for misrepresentations or alleged omissionsin connection with the solicitation. In 2012, the Japanese Supreme Court held that thearranger owes the duty to inform to participant banks in the loan syndicate.