Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines the determinants of heated negotiation within the syndicate––i) between the lead underwriter and co-managers and ii) among co-managers––and how heated negotiation affects IPOs. We find that heated negotiation is positively related to underwriter compensation for the lead underwriter, the number of co-managers, and gross spread in dollars and negatively to underwriter compensation for co-managers and co-managers’ average reputation, The presence of co-manager all-star analysts is important for heated negotiation between the lead underwriter and co-managers but not a factor for that among co-managers. Heated negotiation appears to increase the number of market makers in the aftermarket and such result is more pronounced when there is heated negotiation among co-managers.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Data and Sample Characteristics
  2.1. Sample and data
  2.2. Descriptive Statistics
 3. Empirical Questions and Results
  3.1. Do IPOs with heated negotiation provide enhanced underwriter services?
  3.2. Empirical results
 4. Summary and Conclusions
 References
 Appendix

키워드

저자

• Jin Q. Jeon [ Division of Business and Economics Western Oregon University Monmouth, OR 97361 ]
• Jin S. Kim [ School of Business Administration Kyungbook National University Daegu, 702-701, South Korea ]
• Cheolwoo Lee [ School of Business Ferris State University ] Corresponding author.

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간행물

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• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330