Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines the determinants of the heated negotiation within the syndicate––i) between the lead underwriter and co-managers and ii) among co-managers––and how it affects IPOs. We find that the heated negotiation is associated with less compensation for co-managers. Our results overall suggest that the inferior co-managers’ bargaining position and superior lead underwriter bargaining power, together increasing a chance of an unfair initial profit sharing, lead to the heated negotiation. The heated negotiation between the lead underwriter and comanagers appears to increase the number of co-manager recommendations, and these recommendations increase when they are better compensated and the IPO size is large. We also consider other key underwriter services such information production, market making, and all-star analyst coverage. However, we find no significant results and these services are commonly not positively related to co-manager compensation, suggesting that the provision of key underwriter services is tightly linked to their corresponding compensation.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Key Variables, Data, and Sample Characteristics
  2.1. Construction of Heated Negotiation Variables
  2.2. Sample and data
  2.3. Descriptive Statistics
 3. Empirical Questions and Results
  3.1. Do IPOs with heated negotiation provide enhanced underwriter services?
  3.2. Empirical results
 4. Summary and Conclusions
 References
 Appendix

키워드

저자

• Jin Q Jeon [ Dongguk Business School Dongguk University-Seoul ]
• Jin S. Kim [ School of Business Administration Kyungpook National University ]
• Cheolwoo Lee [ School of Business Ferris State University ] Corresponding author

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  한국재무학회 학술대회

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  2006~2024

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