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전라도 지역 무신란과 관련하여 비교적 잘 알려진 다른 반란시도와 다르게, 남원·태인 지역 반란군의 임실 집결은 연구가 거의 이루어지지 않았다. 본 논문에서는 전라도 지역 무신란의 공백을 메우기 위해 이 반란 시도를 분석하여 반란가담자와 반란 계획, 시도를 정리하였다. 남원·태인 지역 반란군이 임실에 집결해 반란을 일으키려 했던 시도는 전라도 반란을 주관한 태인현감 박필현이 전라도 관군을 장악할 기회를 만들기 위해 계획된 반란 중 하나였다. 그러나 박필현과 송하는 서로 반란을 일으키는 동기가 달랐기 때문에 계획 단계부터 송하 등은 박필현과 다르게 할거를 고려하기도 했다. 반란 준비는 박필현을 통해 무신란에 가담한 송하가 반란가담자를 포섭하면서 이루어졌다. 먼저 송하는 서얼 처남 김익정을 통해 한익명을 끌어들였다. 이후 한익명이 위협과 회유를 병행하여 남원의 지주들을 끌어들였다. 이는 반란을 일으키기 위해서 노비를 군사로 동원할 수 있고 군량도 확보할 수 있는 지주가 필요했기 때문이었다. 반란을 위해 송하가 먼저 계획대로 영조 4년 3월 10일 무렵에 태인에서 임실로 이동해 그간 포섭한 반란군을 집결시키려 했으나 실패했다. 뒤늦게 3월 18일에 가담자들이 집결하기는 했으나, 미흡한 반란 준비와 반란 계획에 대한 의견 충돌 등의 문제가 있어 군사행동으로 이어지지 않았다. 결국, 기찰이 온다는 소식에 도망쳤다가 체포되면서 반란 시도는 실패하고 말았다. 이러한 입실 집결에 참여한 반란군의 성격을 분석해보면, 반란의 주동자들은 신분적으로 한미한 양반이거나 서얼이었으며, 경제적으로는 빈한했고 사상적으로 도술이나 도참, 풍수지리 등을 믿었다는 공통점이 있다. 반란가담자들은 주로 남원의 지주였는데, 정치적으로 당쟁과 별다른 관련이 없었고, 경제적으로 부유했으며, 사회적으로 신분은 향족으로 추정된다는 점이 공통적이다. 이상을 통해 볼 때 반란군은 양반을 중심으로 구성되어 있었으나 당쟁과는 별다른 연관이 없었으며, 서로 경제적·사회적으로 이질적인 집단으로 구성되어 있었음을 알 수 있다. 이러한 임실 집결의 특징은 세 가지로 요약된다. 첫째, 전라도 지역 외부에서 온 박필현에 의해 무신란의 일부로 계획되어 일어난 반란이다. 둘째, 전라도 지역 반란군은 집단의 구성이나 사상적 측면에서 다른 지역의 반란군과 성격이 달랐다. 셋째, 일정 지역을 점령하는 성과를 거두었던 충청도와 경상도 지역 무신란과 다르게 시도에만 그치고 말았다. 이상에서 무신란 당시에 남원·태인 지역의 반란군이 임실에 집결해서 반란을 일으키려 했던 시도와 반란군의 성격 및 사건의 특징을 정리하였다. 이 연구는 기존 연구에서 다루지 않은 새로운 사건을 밝혀 전라도 지역 무신란의 공백을 메우는 데 이바지했다는 의의가 있다.

Unlike other well-known rebellious attempts related to the Musin Rebellion in Jeolla Province, the research on the gathering of the rebels in the areas such as Namwon and Taein was rarely conducted. In this paper, this rebellious attempt was analyzed in order to fill the vacuum of Musin Rebllion in Jeolla Province, and its participants, their rebel plan and their attempts were summarized. The attempt to rise in revolt by gathering the rebels in Namwon and Taein was one of the rebellions designed to make a chance to take control of the army of Jeolla Province by Park Pil-hyeon, the governor of Taein who supervised the rebellion in Jeolla Province. However, as Park Pil-hyeon and Song Ha(宋賀) had different motives to rebel, Song Ha had considered holding his own ground from the planning stage. The rebellion was prepared when Song Ha, who participated in the Musin Rebellion via Park Pil-hyeon, won over the rebels to his side. Song Ha attracted Han Ik-myeong(韓益命) into rebellion via Kim Ik-Jeong(金益鼎), his brother-in-law. After that, Han Ik-myeon attracted the landowners in Namwon through threats and placation. It was designed to mobilize slaves as soldiers and to secure provisions. Song Ha moved to Imsil and tried to gather the rebels who he had won over around March 10th, in 1728 as planned. But he failed. Later on March 18th, the rebels gathered, but there were some problems such as insufficient preparation, and conflicts on rebel plans. Eventually they escaped on hearing that investigators were coming, but they were arrested. Their rebel attempt failed. For the rebels participating in Imsil gathering, the social status of the leaders were sons of concubines or poor yangbans(兩班), their economic status was poor, and they believed in Taoist magic(道術) or Docham(圖讖), or Feng-Shui(風水) theory. The participants in the rebels were mainly the landowners in Namwon, were not politically related with party strife(黨爭) and were economically rich, and their social status was assumed to be Hyangjok(鄕族). Like this, the rebels mainly consisted of Yangban and were not related with party strife. Also they were composed of economically and socially heterogeneous groups. This characteristics of Imsil gathering was summarized into three; First, it was the revolt which was designed as a part of Musin rebellion by Park Pil-hyeon, coming out of Jeolla Province. Second, the composition and thought of the rebels in Jeolla Province was different from that of those in other provinces. Third, unlike the Musin rebellion in Chungcheong Province and Gyeongsang Province which occupied some areas, the Musin rebellion in Jeolla Province ended up as an attempt. As above, the attempts to rise in revolt, in which the rebels in Namwon and Taein gathered in Imsil, the nature of the rebels and the characteristics of the incidents were summarized. This research has implications in that it revealed new events, which were not covered in previous studies, and contributed to filling the vacuum of Musin rebellion in Jeolla province.

This study focuses on the personal history and legend surrounding Koryô Period Military Officer Yi Ûimin as it was recorded in the Panyôkyôlchôn [Record of Traitors]. It engages with the contestation of the modern-day Yi family of the city of Chôngsôn in Kangwôn province (Chôngsônissi) who claim to be Yi Ûimin's descendants, and who also insist that Yi was a descendant of Vietnamese royalty. It seeks to reexamine the process of formation of the biographical narrative about this historical character and the creation of the contested story around him. It ultimately illuminates the historical relationship between Chosôn Korea and Vietnam. Yi Ûimin is a problematic historical figure who assassinated the Koryô King Ûichong. He was born to parents of low standing: his father was a salt seller and his mother was a Buddhist nun. Despite his modest roots, Yi Ûimin rose to occupy the highest authoritative position. Eliminated, unsurprisingly, by rival political factions, his legend has survived through the agi changsu-type story. The figure of Yi Ûimin remains at the core of the tuduri (tuduûl) faith (tuduri sinang) originating in Kyôngju, the ancient capital of Silla. The tuduri faith is a Goblin (tokkaebi) faith, and is related to the blacksmith faith (taejang changgi). The Tuduri faith is therefore directly connected to the iron industry developed in Silla, which also provided Yi Ûimin with the economic foundations for his movement toward the political center. Three generations of Yi Ûimin's family were annihilated following his involvement in the King's assassination. An examination of his family line has been difficult, and made possible only through oral stories passed down in the Yi family living in the city of Chôngsôn. The legend regarding his family identity--the fact that he was a descendant of Vietnamese royalty taking political asylum in the capital of Silla--has also been confirmed.

조선은 국가의 주도 하에 수 십 차례에 걸쳐 활자를 제작하였다. 한문을 공식적인 표기 수단 으로 사용했으므로, 이들 활자는 대부분 한자 활자이지만, 백성들을 교화하기 위해 편찬한 언해 본 등에 사용하기 위해 한글 활자도 일부 제작하였다. 종래 무신자, 임진자, 정유자로 인쇄한 언해본에 사용된 한글 활자가 어떤 재질로 만들어졌 는지에 대해서는 기록이 없었으므로, 그 판본을 바탕으로 막연히 목활자로 생각해왔다. 본고에서는 무신자와 임진자, 정유자로 인쇄한 언해본들의 인쇄 상태, 글자 형태 등을 자세 히 고찰하여, 무신자로 찍은 초기 언해본에서 금속활자인 무신자와 함께 한글 활자 역시 금속활 자가 사용되었음을 밝혔다. 1668년 주조된 무신자는 영조 때까지 많은 책을 인쇄하는데 사용되 었고, 이에 따라 나무로 보주한 활자가 많아졌는데, 한글 활자 역시 나무로 보주한 활자가 많아 졌음을 인본을 통해 밝혔다. 임진자와 정유자로 찍은 언해본의 한글 활자는 목활자가 주를 이루고 있지만, 무신자 인쇄본 에서부터 사용하던 금속활자도 목활자와 함께 사용하였다. 이는 인본들의 인쇄 상태와 한 면에 똑같은 글자가 등장하는 사례 등을 통해 확인할 수 있다. 한편 국립중앙박물관 소장 한글 금속활자 가운데는 무신자에서 임진자, 정유자로 언해본을 인쇄할 때 사용한 한글 금속활자들이 남아 있다. 여기에 사용한 활자들을 통틀어서 ‘무신자병용 한글 금속활자’로 칭하였다. 현재 남아 있는 활자들과 무신자, 임진자, 정유자의 인본에 사용한 특징적인 글자들을 비교하여, 실제 국립중앙박물관 소장 한글 금속활자들이 무신자, 임진자, 정유자 인쇄본을 찍을 때 사용한 활자들임을 밝혔다.

The Joseon produced dozens of different editions of movable types under the projects led by government. Most of the movable types featured Chinese characters which were the dynasty’s official writing system. However, some types featured Hangeul, the Korean alphabet, used for publishing “Korean” books to edify the masses. Without any record on the materials for making the movable Hangeul types used with the Musin-ja, Imjin-ja and Jeongyu-ja types, scholars assumed that they were wooden movable types on the basis of the books printed with them. In this study I carried out a close examination of the condition of the printing and the shape of the types used for the books printed with the Musin-ja, Imjin-ja and Jeongyu-ja types and concluded that the Hangeul types used in the early Hangeul books printed with the Musin-ja type were also movable metal types. The Musin-ja types were cast in 1669 and henceforth used to print a large quantity of books right up until the reign of King Yeongjo(r. 1724-1776). The intensive use of these types over such an extended period of time led to the additional casting of types-wooden movable types this time-to supplement the original edition. The books also show that the Hangeul types, too, came to be supplemented by an increasing number of wooden types. The Hangeul types used for Korean translations of the Chinese texts printed by the Imjin-ja and Jeongyu-ja types were largely wooden movable types. A closer examination of the condition of the printing in the books clearly reveals that a set of newly carved wooden Hangeul types were used along with the old metal types that had previously been used for the books printed with the Musin-ja type. Among the National Museum of Korea’s collection of Hangeul movable metal types are the Hangeul types used for the books printed with the Musin-ja, Imjin-ja and Jeongyu-ja types. In this study these types are termed as Musinja Byeongyong Hangeul Geumsokhwalja(Movable Metal Types of the Korean Alphabet Combined with the Musinja Type). This study, by comparing the remaining types with some of the characteristic types used for the books printed with the Musin-ja, Imjin-ja and Jeongyu-ja types, concludes that the types collected by the National Museum of Korea are the ones actually used for printing those books.

이 연구는 조선후기 금속활자인쇄 교정에 대한 전반적인 모습을 고찰하기 위해 기존의 연구 성과를 바탕으 로, 새로 발견된 무신자본 ｢明紀編年｣ 간행시의 교정을 중심으로 살펴본 것이다. ｢명기편년｣은 明의 흥망성쇠 를 簡要하게 기술한 중국 역사서로, 조선에서는 영조 때부터 강연되어 초학용으로 여러 차례 간행된바 있다. 본 ｢명기편년｣은 초견본으로 12권 6책이 온전하게 남아 있다. 이 교정쇄본의 교정표기 방식과 교정내용은 조선후기 다른 금속활자 교정쇄본과 유사한 모습이다. 가장 많은 교정은 좌우로 기울어진 글자(5,517회, 43.1%) 와 흐린 글자(4,540회, 35.4%)에 대해 이루어졌으며, 이 두 가지는 활자의 모양이 일정하지 않은 것이 주원인으 로 전체 교정에 78.5%를 차지하고 있다. 즉, 활자 규격의 정형화로 인쇄비용과 시간을 단축시킬 수 있음을 보여주는 것이며, 실제로 정조연간에 이를 개선하여 정리자활자를 주조하기도 하였다. 이 연구에서는 ｢명기편 년｣의 교정표기 방법과 교정내용별 교정횟수 등을 분석하고, 다른 교정쇄본의 교정 사례를 보완하여, 조선후기 중앙의 금속활자인쇄의 조판과 교정의 일반적인 모습을 유추하고자 하였다. 이를 통해 조선후기 금속활자인쇄 교정의 정교함과 이를 위해 쏟은 공력을 확인하였다.

This study put a focus on the proofreading of poems published within the newly found Mu-sin letter-style myeong gi pyeon nyeon (明紀編年) in order to study the proofreading practices for metal type printing in the late Joseon Dynasty based on the existing researches. myeong gi pyeon nyeon a Chinese history book that summarizes the ups and downs of the Ming Dynasty, began to be taught in the reign of Yeongjo of the Joseon period and was published multiple times for elementary students. This study looked into the first version of myeong gi pyeon nyeon which consists of 12 fascicles and 6 volumes in perfect condition. The marking and contents of proofreading in the proofread version seem similar to the proofread version of other metal type printings in the late Joseon period. Rightor left-leaning letters (5,517 times, 43.1%) and blurred letters (4,540 times, 35.4%) were most frequently pointed out, which are attributable to the irregular shapes of types. It makes up 78.5% of total number of proofreading. It means the regularization of type standard can save printing time. In fact, Jeongnija types were casted to fix the problem during the reign of Jeongjo of Joseon. This study aims to estimate the common practices of metal type setting and proofreading in the late Joseon period by analyzing the proofreading method and the frequency of each correction type based on myeong gi pyeon nyeon, and supplementing with the examples of other proofread publications. In the process, the exquisite quality of proofreading and elaborate efforts for metal type printing in the late Joseon period have been demonstrated.

무신란(戊申亂)은 영조 4년(1728)에 경기, 충청도, 전라도, 경상도 지역에서 영조의 왕위계승 정통성을 부정하며 일어난 반란이다. 본 논문은 무신란에 대한 조사와 처결이 기록된 「무신역옥추안(戊申逆獄推案)」을 주로 활용하여, 전라도 지역에서 일어난 무신란을 크게 반란군의 부안 평교 집결과 박필현의 태인 거병으로 나누어 살펴보았다. 반란군의 부안 평교 집결은 정세윤과 원만주가 포섭한 부안 인근 지역의 반란군이 3월 15일에 평교에 집결한 사건이다. 원래 이들은 3월 19일에 평교에 집결해 청주로 이동해 반란군과 합류할 계획이었다. 그런데 이인좌의 급한 연락을 받은 정세윤과 원만주가 먼저 청주로 이동한 뒤, 15일에 부안 평교에서 집결했다. 그러나 주동자의 부재와 악천후, 적은 규모 등으로 인해 해산했고, 일부만 청주로 이동해 반란에 가담했다. 집결의 주모자인 정세윤은 변산적과 밀접한 관련이 있는 인물인데, 기존의 연구에서 변산적은 흔히 ‘변산의 도적 무리’로 이해되었다. 그러나 정세윤의 행적과 실제로 반란에 가담한 자들을 분석해본 결과, 변산적은 ‘변산의 역적 무리’였다. 박필현의 태인 거병은 당시 태인 현감이던 박필현이 관군을 이끌고 태인을 출발하여, 3월 22일 새벽 전주성 서쪽 삼천까지 진출하여 전주성을 공략하려 했던 사건이다. 박필현은 반란군을 토벌한다는 명분으로 태인의 군사를 이끌고 전주성의 군사와 합류했다가, 결정적인 순간에 배신하여 전주성을 장악할 계획이었던 것으로 보인다. 그러나 태인 현감에서 파직되고, 부안과 나주의 반란군이 계획대로 오지 않자, 박필현은 태인의 관군만을 거느리고 전주성으로 향했다. 그는 전라감사 정사효에게 편지를 보내 포섭을 시도했으나, 전주영장 이경지가 편지를 받아들이지 않아 실패했다. 이에 바로 청주로 이동할 뜻을 밝히자, 박필현의 목적이 반란군 토벌이 아니라 반역이라는 사실을 알아차린 태인의 관군들이 도망쳐, 박필현의 태인 거병은 실패로 돌아갔다. 다음과 같은 몇가지 점에서 본 논문의 연구 의의가 있다. 첫째, 「무신역옥추안」에 나오는 관련자의 진술을 비교․검증하여, 전라도 지역 무신란의 전개과정을 파악했다. 둘째, 무신란의 전개과정에 있어 중요한 역할을 했으나, 기존 연구에서 자세히 다루지 못한 ‘정세윤’을 분석했다. 셋째, 무신란 당시의 ‘변산적’이 하층민으로 구성된 변산의 도적 무리라는 기존 견해와 달리, ‘변산의 역적 무리’임을 밝혔다.

Lee Sul-won’s household lived as one of the prestigious provincial noble families after their six generation's ancestors moved and nestled in Geochang County. Just two days before the outbreak of the Musin Rebellion, Lee Sul-won who was appointed as head of the local authorities encouraged punitive forces and local authorities to stage a decisive battle against the rebels. However, he was eventually faced with death as he refused to cooperate with the rebels who captured Geochang County on behalf of the vacant governorship. As the government army cracked down on the rebels in 15 days following the rebellion, his patriotic martyr was upheld and honored by the local community and the ruling power. The former sought to use his sacrifice as a proof of the absence of connection of Geochang County with the rebellion while and the latter intended to use it as a symbol of loyalty and an exemplary virtue. A number of tasks to honor Lee Sul-won were carried out with full-scale supports from both public and private sectors. The official funeral was held and was followed by installation of a merit, post-life promotion, loyalty announcement, preparation of achievements record, recruitment of descendents and finally enshrinement in 1735 (11th year of King Yeongjo). In response to an official report to the king and a joint special request for approval from both Noron-sect and Soron-sect, King Yeongjo gladly gave a permission to build a shrine to honor him. In 1738 (14th year of King Yeongjo) King Yeongjo bestowed an aekho titled 『Pochungsa』 on the day when Lee Sul-won was martyred following the delivery of Cheokaekso signed by 522 people and the shrine was completed with the support of the government. Yeonguidang was built in front of the shrine in 1743 (19th year of King Yeongjo), and Prime Minister Kim Jae-ro promoted Lee Sul-won to the second rank and proposed to hire his son as a government official in 1747 (Yeongjo 23). Later, the writings as to the honorable accomplishments of Lee Sul-won were prepared by Noron-sect bureaucrat scholars. The epitaph was written by Jehak Lee Gi-jin, a renowned writer comparable to Gweon Sang-ha, the title of the tomb by Prime Minister Yu Cheok-gi and the Hangjang was prepared by Hwang Gyeong-won from Noron-sect Cheong Myeong Dang. The inscriptions of both the inner and the outer monuments were also prepared by Noron-sect scholars following the relocation to Ungyang in 1777 (1st year of King Jeongjo). The inscrip tions of the inner and the outer monument were prepared by Hwang Seung-won, a cousin of Hwang Gyeong-won and Song Hwan-gi, the fifth generation decedent of Song Si-yeol, respectively and were written by Song Chi-gyu, the sixth generation decedent. What is notable here that honoring and enshrining Lee was carried out under the relationship with the Noron Junnon-sect figures at the time. Pochungsa served as the headquarters for Noron-sect figures along with Namgyeseowon in Yeoungnamudo. This can be confirmed by the local officials, central government officials, Yeongnam Noron-sect figures and the participants of community banquet led by Song Byeong-seon registered in Shimwonnok. The connections with the Noron-sect were also found in records prepared during the Japanese colonial period as well. Pochungsa ultimately provided the basis for a voluntary transformation of Yeongnam udo into Noron-sect, which led to increased exchanges with semiotic scholars and the expanded presence of Noron-sect among existing Confu cian academies.

Depending on how they coped with the Musin Revolt in 1728, clans in the Andong area could be regarded as ‘rebels’ or ‘loyal subjects.’ If they were judged based on their contact with the leaders before or during the early stage of the revolt, they became rebels, and if their raising of patriotic soldiers was spotlighted, they became ‘patriots’ and ‘loyal subjects.’ Decision between the two extreme judgments was largely influenced by the intention of political powers in those days, in particular, the king. The Noron Faction, which was in political confrontation with the Yeongnam Namin Faction, gave weight to the former. Considering that the Yeongnam Namin Faction aligned itself with the revolt, they condemned all the members of the faction as ‘the remnants of the insurgents.’ By blaming the Namin Faction, the Noron Faction tried to hold hegemony in the political situation and to establish a base of the faction in the Andong area. However, King Yeongjo who did not want the recurrence of disturbances like the Musin Revolt in 1728 and wished the maintenance of Tangpyeong (harmony and impartiality) state and King Jeongjo who needed the support of the right wing for gaining hegemony through the declaration of Imoeuri (the innocence of Crown Prince Sado) put dots on the latter. By doing so, they clarified to clans in Yeongnam, particularly in Andong that ‘Yeongnam is the Holy Land of Confucius and Mencius and the home of loyal subjects who raised patriotic soldiers in national disasters such as the Japanese invasion in 1592 and military revolts.’The kings’ perception and repeated declarations as such imbued local clans in the region with pride and identity as ‘loyal subjects.’ They came to have the pride and identity that they had raised patriotic soldiers to cope with national calamities at the risk of their life. Remembering the unceasing tradition of patriotic soldiers from the Japanese invasion in 1592 to Qing's invasion in 1627 and the Musin Revolt in 1728, they took it for the ground of their identity. In addition, they put up weapons used by patriotic soldiers in those battles as symbols representing their memories. When the kings and political powers had to choose between the contradictory memories of the Musin Revolt in 1728, they chose the memories ‘the Holy Land of Confucius and Mencius’ and ‘the home of loyal subjects.’ These memories provided another motive power for the rise of patriotic soldiers when the country fell in a national crisis at the end of the Yi Dynasty.

본 글은 영조대 초반 무신란의 발발이 미친 정치적인 영향을 『감란록』의 편찬 과정과 그 내용을 통해서 살펴보기 위해 작성되었다. 무신란은 영조의 정통성을 부정하였다는 점에서 대단히 충격적인 사건이었지만, 이것으로 인해 탕평을 지향하던 영조의 정국 운영 방식이 크게 바뀌지는 않았다. 무신란이 소론의 주도에 발생하였다고 해서 소론을 모두 내치고 노론으로 정권을 구성하게 되면 또 다른 변란의 가능성을 높일 수 있을 뿐 아니라, 소론의 동의하에 신임옥사를 번복함으로써 자신의 정통성을 제고하려던 계획에도 차질을 빚을 수 있었기 때문이다. 하지만 무신란의 주동자들과 같은 당색인 재조 소론을 계속 보호하기 위해서는 파상적인 공세를 해올 노론을 견제할 수 있는 정교한 정치적 논리가 필요하였다. 한편 재조 소론의 입장에서도 정치적 생명을 유지하기 위해서 같은 소론이 주도한 무신란을 자신들이 진압하면서 무신란의 주도 세력들과 자신들을 정치적으로 완전히 단절시켜야 할 필요성이 그 어느 때보다 높았다. 결국 무신란 진압 후에 영조와 재조 소론은 이러한 정치적 목적에 입각해서 무신란 진압의 기록인 『감란록』을 편찬하였다. 세부적인 내용에서 이견이 없었던 것은 아니지만 큰 틀에서 볼 때 영조와 재조 소론의 정치적 이해는 수렴될 수 있었기 때문에 나름 합의된 정치적 의리와 명분을 고스란히 담을 수 있었다. 크게 볼 때『감란록』에서 드러나는 정치적 명분은 세 가지로 정리할 수 있다. 첫째, 무신란은 김일경의 당여들이 주도하였고 재조 소론과는 무관하다. 둘째, 심유현의 흉언은 무함이며 무신란 진압은 하늘의 뜻이다. 셋째, 무신란의 근본은 김일경이지만 최초 기원은 붕당이다. 『감란록』에 담긴 이런 정치적 명분과 의리를 통해서 영조는 노론의 정치 공세에 적극적으로 대처하면서 탕평 정국을 이끌어가려고 노력하였고 재조 소론들 역시 영조 조정에 참여할 수 있는 명분을 획득할 수 있었다. 하지만 노론 측은 『감란록』의 정치적 명분에 동의하지 않았고 『감란록』의 편찬으로 영조의 혐의가 완전히 불식될지도 미지수였기 때문에, 정국의 변화에 따라 『감란록』의 위상은 흔들릴 수 있는 가능성을 이미 갖고 있었다.

Although Musin Revolt took placed by Soron who out of government in 1728 was a great shocking incident to King Yeongjo in that it denied the legitimacy as a successor of King Gyeongjong, King Yeongjo did not changed his political administrative style. this is because of his political circumstances of that period. First, in case of organizing one-party cabinet by Noron on behalf of Soron, the possibility of danger of rising another revolt could increased. Second, Soron was absolutely necessary for King Yeongjo in that only Soron could guarantee the legitimacy as a successor of King Gyeongjong, because they had been in charge of the King Gyeongjong's regime. Therefore King Yeongjo needed to design a sophisticated logic to protect Soron who in government from enormous political offence by Noron. Meanwhile Soron who in government also needed to political justification to be separated from Soron who out of government to remain King Yeongjo's cabinet. Because The Gamnannok was compiled to accomplish these two objects by Soron who in government as well as King Yeongjo, political justification filled in The Gamnannok can be classified by three typed discourse like below. First, Soron who in government had no connection with Musin Revolt. Second, the argument of Soron who out of government that King Yeongjo had connection with the death of King Gyeongjong was absolutely untrue. Third, Fundamental root of Musin Revolt could be traced back to the political party.

Hwanseong Ji-an (喚惺 志安, 1644–1729), a Buddhist monk of the late Joseon Dynasty, was exiled to Jeju Island and passed away there after being implicated in the Musin Rebellion (戊申亂, Yi In-jwa’s Rebellion) of 1728. Although he has long been regarded as a martyr within Korean Buddhism, the specific charges and circumstances of his involvement had remained unclear. This study examines the Musin Yeokok Chuan (戊申逆獄推案), a record of the rebellion’s investigation, which reveals that Ji-an was accused of being behind seditious anonymous letters discovered in Gonyang approximately three months after the rebellion was suppressed. He was arrested around January 1729 while suffering from beriberi, which had left him partially paralyzed ; his condition deteriorated into full paralysis during the investigation. Over the following two decades, his disciples worked to clear his name. They published his works, including Seonmun Ojong Gangyo (1749) and Hwanseong Sijip (1751), the latter of which included a biographical account, Hwanseong Hwasang Haengjang, that explicitly asserted his innocence. Their efforts culminated in the erection of the Stele of Great Master Hwanseong in 1762, inscribed by Minister Hong Gye-hee. The stele affirmed that Ji-an had been falsely accused and unjustly exiled, despite King Yeongjo’s prior attempt to pardon him, effectively restoring his honor. Today, Hwanseong Ji-an is remembered as a wrongfully persecuted figure and a martyr, revered as one of the founding patriarchs of modern Korean Buddhism. This study sheds new light on the long- ambiguous details of his alleged involvement in the Musin Rebellion.

This study aims to examine the historical context of the contradictory phenomenon of "criminal law reform" and the proliferation of "illegal measures" in the interrogation process during the reign of King Yeongjo(英祖). In particular, it focuses on the process by which the extraordinary criminal procedures(非常刑政) derived from the Musin rebellion(戊申亂) were established. Through his Tangpyeong(蕩平) policy and the Heumhyul(欽恤) criminal law reforms, King Yeongjo pursued the establishment of a king-centered order. However, the Musin Rebellion of 1728 was an unprecedented large-scale internal rebellion that required a strong government response. Even after the Musin rebellion, incidents involving the Musinyodang (戊申餘黨), who denied the legitimacy of King Yeongjo, continued. In these crisis situations, Yeongjo often used executions without formal sentencing, usually decided during his personal interrogations. He also used severe torture methods such as juri(周牢), which were effective in extracting confessions but led to an increase in interrogation deaths. Keywords : Musin Rebellion of 1728(戊申亂), Tangpyeong(蕩平), Heumhyul(欽恤), Musinyodang (戊申餘黨), Extraordinary Criminal Procedure(非常刑政) King Yeongjo found himself in a complex situation where he had to pursue his political goals while responding to the crime of treason. This led him to promote legal reforms while taking strong measures to protect his legitimacy. As a result, the criminal law reforms during Yeongjo's reign had a "transitional character," aiming to improve the criminal rights of the public while inevitably coexisting with illegal measures.

전라도 무신란은 그 성격이 정변인지 변란인지 논쟁거리이다. 최근에는 붕당 사이의 갈등으로 일어난 정변으로 보지만, 붕당과 무관했던 가난한 양반이나 향반 지주 등이 반란에 가담했다는 점에서 재고가 필요하다. 이 글에서는 ‘은닉대본’ 개념을 활용하여 반란군을 분석하고 전라도 무신란의 성격을 도출하였다. 전라도 무신란을 주동한 이들은 모두 전라도 바깥에서 온 이들로 전ㆍ현직 관리와 그 친인척, 다른 지역에서 온 양반들로 구분된다. 이 가운데 다른 지역에서 온 양반은 경기에서 온 빈한한 양반과 충청에서 온 남인 양반으로 나뉜다. 이들은 사회적ㆍ경제적ㆍ사상적으로 서로 이질적이었으므로 반란의 동기와 목적도 달랐다. 이는 유교를 내세우며 나라를 그대로 유지한 채 권력을 잡기 원하는 이들과 이단적 사상을 신봉하며 조선왕조를 부정하는 이들로 크게 구별된다. 전라도에서 반란에 가담했던 이들은 적극적으로 가담했던 토호와 빈한한 양반, 그리고 회유와 협박에 가담한 지역의 토호, 단순 가담자로 구분할 수 있다. 이들은 대부분 붕당과 무관했으며, 경제적으로 차이가 있어도 사상적으로는 풍수와 도참 및 점복을 신봉하는 경향이 있었다. 따라서 전라도 무신란의 성격은 이중적이다. 첫 번째는 외부의 붕당 사이 갈등 때문에 일어난 정치적 정변의 성격이다. 두 번째는 전라도 내외부의 저항이 조응해 표출된 변란의 성격이다. 그러므로 전라도 무신란은 지배층 내부의 분화와 차별, 피지배층의 불만이 담긴 은닉대본이 표출된 사건이며, 19세기 변란의 원형이 되었다고 할 수 있다.

Regarding the nature of the Musin Rebellion of Jeolla-do, there is a controversy over whether it is a political coup or a upheaval. Recently, it is seen as a political coup caused by the conflict between the bureaucratic factions. However, it needs to be reconsidered in that the poor yangban and landed proprietor participated in the rebellion despite being unrelated to the party strife. In this study, the concept of ‘hidden transcript’ was used to analyze rebels and derive the character of the Musin Rebellion in Jeolla-do. The people who led the rebellion of Jeolla-do are all from outside Jeolla-do and are divided into former and current officials, their relatives, and Yangban from other regions. Among them, Yangban from other regions are divided into poor Yangban from Gyeonggi-do and Namin yangban from Chungcheong-do. They were socially, economically, and ideologically heterogeneous, so the motives and objectives of the rebellion were also different. In other words, it is largely divided into those who want to hold power while maintaining the country as it is while advocating Confucianism, and those who believe in heretical ideas and deny the Chos?n Dynasty. Those who participated in this rebellion in Jeolla-do can be divided into Local magnates and poor aristocrats who actively participated, landlords who participated through conciliation and intimidation, and simple participants. Most of them had nothing to do with party strife, and despite economic differences, they tended to believe in geomancy and prophetic belief, and divination ideologically. Therefore, the character of the Musin Rebellion in Jeolla-do is double. The first is the nature of political coup caused by the party strife of the court. The second is the nature of the upheaval expressed by the combination of resistance from the inside and outside of Jeolla-do. In conclusion, it can be said that the Musin Rebellion in Jeolla-do was an incident in which a hidden script containing differentiation and discrimination within the ruling class and the dissatisfaction of the ruled was expressed, and became the prototype of the upheaval of the 19th century.

鄭希亮 반군은 경상우도 정희량의 사회・경제적 기반을 배경으로 조직되었지만 그 반군은 정희량과 아울러 호서의 李熊輔, 호남의 羅崇坤이 통솔하였다. 이는 호남과 호서 및 경상좌도의 인적 네트워크의 활용과 정변의 지역적 연대를 위한 목적이 개재되어 있었다. 정희량은 3월 19일 安陰縣 古縣에서 기병하고, 20일 본격적인 활동에 들어갔다. 정희량은 반군을 나라를 위기에서 구할 의병이라 칭하였으며, 이로 인해 안음현・거창현・함양군의 서리와 군교가 대거 참여하였으며, 초기에 인심도 그들의 편이었다. 정희량 난의 지역적 전개 과정에서 볼 때 3월 30일은 戰勢 전환의 결정적인 날이었다. 이러한 전세 전환에 기여한 인물이 운봉영장 孫命大와 진주진영군의 중군을 맡은 곤양군수 禹夏亨이었다. 그리고 정희량 반군의 전세 전환의 시기에 활약한 熊陽里 和同村의 延安李氏 인물들은 그 진압에서 적지 않은 기여를 하였다. 그들은 李昇原・李賁原・李鳳原・李震原・李一原・李長原・李遇時・李遇芳・李遇白・李遇泰・李遇光 등 이우방의 朞功之親이었다. 3월 23일 抗義殉節한 和村 李述原은 반군이 진압된 직후 4월 6일 거창 유림들이 도순무사 吳命恒에게 그 순절의 사실을 呈狀하는 것으로부터 현창되기 시작했다. 이후 이술원에 대한 현창은 揚武原從功臣 1등 녹훈, 영조의 致祭와 賜祭文, 旌閭, 司憲府執義 特贈, 祠宇 건립과 賜額, 褒忠祠의 重修, 사헌부대사헌과 이조판서의 加贈 등등의 양상을 보여준다. 특히 1863년 11월의 賜諡와 1874년 3월의 延諡는 그 현창사업의 정점이었다. 이 같은 현창의 문서를 수집・보전하여 『화촌실기』 편찬의 근거를 마련하는 한편으로 지속적인 褒忠祠의 정비를 통해 항의순절의 충절을 일상의 공간으로 끌어들여 구체화하였다. 이술원에 대한 다양한 현창사업은 조선 후기 웅양리 연안이씨 가문의 사회적 위상의 유지와 확대에 절대적인 조건이었다.

The Jeong Hui-Ryang rebels were organized against the backdrop of his socio-economic foundation. Jeong Hui-Ryang led the rebels with Lee Woo-Bo and Na Sung-Gon. This was related to the utilization of the human networks of Honam, Hoseo, and Gyeongsangjwado and the regional solidarity of the coup. Jeong Hui-Ryang enlisted in Ahneumhyun Gohyun on March 19th and started full-scale activities on the 20th. Jeong Hui-Ryang called the rebels Uibyeong. As a result, a large number of Seoli and Gungyo from Ahneumhyun, Geochanghyeon, and Hamyanggun participated. March 30 was the day when the war changed in the Jeong Hui-Ryang rebellion. Son Myeong-Dae, who are Unbong-Yeongjang, and U Ha-Hyun, who are Jinju-Jinyonggun, contributed to the change in the war situation. Since then, Ungyangli Hwadongchon's Lee Seung-Won?Lee Bun-Won?Lee Bong-Won?Lee Jin-Won?Lee Il-Won?Lee Jang-Won?Lee U-Si?Lee U-Bang?Lee U-Baeg?Lee U-Tae?Lee U-Gwang and others contributed greatly to suppressing the rebellion. They are close relatives of Lee Sul-Won, who was killed by the rebels. On March 23, Hwachon Lee Sul-Won was killed by the rebels. On April 3, the rebellion was suppressed, and on April 6, Geochang Yulim began to report the facts of Lee Sul-Won's Sunjeol to Dosunmusa O Myeong-Hang. After that, Yongjo gave Lee Sul-Won a Chije, and gave him Sajemun and Jeonglyeo. In addition, Lee Sul-Won was appointed to government posts such as Saheonbu-daesaheon and Ijo-panseo. The construction of the Sau and Saaeg, and the continuous repair of the Pochungsa are also noteworthy honoring policies. As such, the honoring policies for Lee Sul-Won shows various aspects. In particular, Sasi in November 1863 and Yeonsi in March 1874 were the pinnacles of the honoring policy. By collecting and preserving these honoring documents, the basis for compiling 'Hwachonsilgi' was prepared. In addition, through continuous maintenance of Pochungsa, Lee Sul-Won's Hanguisunjeol was incorporated into the everyday space. Various honoring policies for Lee Sul-Won were an absolute condition for the maintenance and expansion of the social status of the Ungyangli Yeonan Leessi family in the late Joseon Dynasty.

In 1728, Musin-ran(戊申亂) existed as an extension of the strife party(黨爭). It was Sajok(士族), or the core of the organization. A lot of opposition forces took part in the revolt. But it didn't happen as a result of the part strife of the main government, which was complicated by reasons of the local background. In the early Musin-ran period, preparing force was the radical people of Soron who were ostracized by politics after the king Yeongjo(英祖) ascending to the throne(in 1724). While main forces consisted of locals, since Kapsulwhanguk(甲戌換局in 1694) ruined Sajok, local Namin took part in Ran(亂). That is, in order to occupy Cheongju(淸州), the rebel army assembled from in Anseong(安城), in Cheongju, and in Geosan(槐山). These are Yangban classes who couldn't enter main politics. They were assumed to have threatened people about the initiative in local society were Jaeji-sajok class such as Yi Injwa(李麟佐), Shin Cheonyeong(申天永) and part of the military officials. When the rebel army sent a manifesto, Sajok with the movement of anti-noron(反老論) in Hoseo province(湖西地域) at Mokcheon(木川), Cheongan(靑安) and Jincheon(鎭川) took part in Ran. Although the rebel army occupied the Cheongju fortress,the rebel army didn't join the rebel army of Gyeongsang and Jeonla. They could advance to attack the capital by Anseong(安城) and Juksan(竹山), Because it was possible that the rebel army could win the people such as Sajoks, Ajeons, Nobis and Yumins went over to the rebel army's side in Cheongju and on the periphery of Cheongju. Although the rebel army in Yeongnam and in Honam didn't arrive, in order to advance on the capital, in Seoul, they advanced forward in Anseong and Juksan with assembled army 6jo in Hoseo on 21st March. And then the rebel army was defeated in the battle of Gajikomyeon, Anseong on 23rd March and in Norumok, Juksan on 24th March. Finally, the army raised the cause of justice by cooperating with the royal force in occupied Hoseo province with the rebel army. After the suppression of Musin-ran in which Hoseo province occupied Cheongju, Sajok's status in Hoseo as well as in Cheongju became permanent as the exclusive system of Noron through the thorough following-up of control in the Noron class. That is, during Musin-ran in 1728 the occupation of Cheongju was significant so that the position of Soron and Namin in Hoseo province weakened radically. It was a clear turning point between factious interests groups when the exclusive system of Noron was set in.

Musin Revolt(戊申亂) was the revolt which occurred in Gyungi, Chungchung-do, Jeolla-do and Gyungsang-do in the 1728. Some people think of its feature as a political revolt while others regard its feature as the one in which people from various class including plunderers participated. It can vary based on the feature of Byeonsan bandits(邊山賊) and their participation in Musin Revolt. Existing researches have regarded Byeonsan bandits as a group of thieves, but there is room for interpreting it as a group of traitors. In addition, there is a problem of historical facts prior to the interpretation. The major historical records of Byeonsan bandits were from the statements of the accused. But they may have made a false confession by torture in the Joseon Dynasty period. So this article reviewed major statements about Byeonsan bandits and confirmed whether a group of Byeonsan thieves really existed and whether it was related to Musin Revolt. And it revealed who the actual participants were when we assumed that the feature of Byeonsan bandits was the group of Byeonsan traitors. Early studies about Musin Revolt didn't refer to Byeonsan bandits. Since 1980s, studies have thought that groups of thieves were involved in the revolt or that groups of thieves were been in collusion with landed gentry. This point of view remains as it was, regardless of the viewpoint difference about the feature of Musin Revolt. Then were Byeonsan thieves real? According to the reports of Lee Gwang-deok, a Honam royal emissary, although there were rumors about Byeonsan thieves, in fact there were only petty thieves in Byeonsan. Actually, the statements of 3 Byeonsan thieves, who were arrested and questioned, showed that they didn't participate in preparing for the Revolt. Also the statements of other parties concerned showed that they just stated the things which they misknow. The statements about Jeong Pal-ryong(鄭八龍) known as the leader of Byeonsan bandits were not related to it. He seemed to refer to Jeong Hui-ryang from Gyeongsang-do or Jeong Se-yun from Gyeonggi. Therefore Byeonsan thieves were real, but it wasn't related to Musin Revolt. Through the discussion above, it became certain that Byeonsan bandits were a group of traitors. First of all, it was analyzed whether Kim Su-jong(金守宗) and Kim Su-hyeong(金守亨), known as landed gentry in collusion with Byeonsan bandits, were involved in the revolt. But, based on the statements of Go Eung-ryang and Gang Wi-jing, it was found that Kim Su-jong and Kim Su-hyeong were not related to the Musin Revolt. Lee Gwang-deok, the governor or Jeolla-do, reported that the traitors gathering in Pyunggyo and Song Ha clique involved in its preparation were Byeonsan traitors. Also the traitor forces gathering in Pyeonggyo were referred to as Byeonsan traitors in the government conference after Musin Revolt. Therefore Byeonsan bandits related to Musin Revolt were a group of traitors in Byeonsan and were the traitor forces gathering in Pyeonggyo and Song Ha clique involved in the preparation for the revolt. In conclusion, Byeonsan bandits should be regarded as groups of thieves in Byeonsan, and it is necessary to reconsider that the feature of Musin Revolt is defined based on this. It is thought that Byeonsan bandits were the traitors in Byeonsan and were landed gentry and merchants in Jeolla-do.

무신란(戊申亂)은 18세기 정치사에 있어 매우 중대한 사건이었다. 영조가 새로운 제도와 정책을 시행하는 계기가 되기도 했지만, 국왕의 정통성에 대한 의심이라는 요소를 내포한 위험한 사건이었기 때문이다. 이에 국왕은 실제 사건의 규모가 크지 않았음에도 불구하고 많은 공신을 녹훈하였고, 공식적인 이해의 틀을 담은 『감란록』(1729)과 『천의소감』(1755)을 간행했다. 국왕이 제시한 사건 이해에 대해 여러 방향의 반론이 있을 만한 상황이었지만, 이후 조선의 망국 이전까지는 『감란록』 등에 대한 전면적인 반론을 담은 문헌은 간행되지 않았다. 대신에 정치집단 혹은 가문이나 지역의 관점에서 나름의 의도를 갖고 『감란록』을 보완하는 문헌들이 나타났는데, 『남정일록』, 『무신창의록』, 『호남절의록』 등이 이에 해당한다. 이들 문헌은 국가에서 주도한 공식적인 기록처럼 보이지만, 실제로는 국가적으로 공인받지는 못했으며 특정 개인 혹은 집단의 공적을 강조 또는 과장한 흔적을 지니고 있다. 또 때로는 사실 여부가 의심스러운 진술을 포함하고 있기도 하다. 반론이라면 소극적인 반론인 셈이다. 조선 왕조가 끝나고 붕당의 의미가 약화된 시점에 이르면, 무신란은 허구화의 대상이 된다. 힘센 장사이자 큰 전공을 세운 장수로 알려진 공신 이만유의 행적을 다룬 전기를 편찬한다고 내세운 『사상당실록문집』이 그 대표적인 사례인데, 이 문헌에서는 『남정일록』과 같은 기존의 기록에서 각종 전공의 주체를 ‘이만유’로 바꾸는 등의 전통적인 방식을 활용하면서도 때로는 야담이나 소설적인 요소를 가미하였다. 이에 의하면 이만유는 어릴 때 천재성을 보이고 자라서는 이인(異人)을 만나 새로운 능력을 얻었으며 낮은 신분임에도 국왕의 예우를 받으며 출정하고 제갈량 같은 지략을 발휘하여 초인적인 공을 세우는 인물이 된다. 이 문헌이 간행되지 못하고 필사본으로 남은 것은 이러한 허구화가 아직 사회적으로 받아들여지기에는 한계가 있음을 보여주는 것이기는 하지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 이전에는 용인되기 어려웠을 허구화의 면모를 보이는 것은 분명히 새로운 변화라고 할 수 있다. 그렇지만 이러한 문헌이 많이 산출되지는 못했는데, 이는 무신란이 국왕이 없어진 시대의 새로운 관심사와 맞지 않는 부분이 있었기 때문으로 판단된다. 민족주의적인 요소가 강한 단군이나 동명왕, 드라마적 요소가 강한 장희빈이나 사도세자 등이 자주 문학의 소재가 되었던 것과는 다른 상황이었던 것이다.

이 글은 戊申字本 『老乞大諺解』 卷下의 漢音 교정을 고찰한 것으로, 한음 교정 전체 내역의 공개와 그 특성을 소개하는 것에 목적이 있다. 17세기 후반 인출된 무신자본 『노걸대언해』는 권하를 기준으로 크게 미정정본인 A″, 최종 정정본인 B″가 현전한다. 두 異本을 비교하면 전체 1,300건이 넘는 교정이 확인되는데, 이 중 한음의 교정이 1,100건을 넘어, 한음 교정이 당시 무신자본 『노걸대언해』를 교정할 때 가장 중점을 둔 부분이라 여겨진다. 무신자본 『노걸대언해』는 齒頭音과 正齒音의 혼동으로 인한 오류를 바로잡은 것이 대부분이며, 이는 일반적인 한글에 사용되지 않는 표기 방식이 원인이라 여겨진다. 이외에도 ‘ㅸ’과 ‘ㅱ’ 등의 표기를 혼동하여 오류가 발생한 부분이 B″에서 교정된 모습을 볼 수 있다. 한음 교정 내역을 살펴본 결과 무신자본 『노걸대언해』는 A″ > B > B″ 순서로 교정되었으며, 한음 교정의 경우 대개 B본에서 수정이 완료되고, 일부 누락된 부분이 B″에서 보완된 것임을 알 수 있다. 그러나 B″에서도 교정이 누락된 부분이 존재하여, 관련 연구 진행 시 주의할 필요가 있다.

1728년(영조 4) 남인과 소론과격파 세력이 일으킨 무신란에 가담한 지역은 충청도·경상도·전라도라고 알려져 있다. 그러나 반란군 한세홍은 반란군의 위세가 경기의 양성·진위·용인 사이에 대단하였다고 진술하였다. 이러한 진술을 근거로 『무신역옥추안』을 주자료로 하고 『영조실록』과 『승정원일기』 등을 보조자료로 활용해 반란 인물을 검토해 본 결과 경기 수원도호부 관할 8개 군현 출신의 무신란 반란군이 총 100명이나 확인되었다. 또한 수원도호부 출신으로 반란군 내 중요 요직을 맡아 반란을 이끈 인물도 19명이나 되었다. 즉, 무신란에 가담한 경기 반란군이 존재했던 것이다. 경기 반란군은 수원도호부 중에서도 양성·진위·용인현 3곳에 집중되었으며, 이 세 곳의 사족들이 중심이 되어 친인척을 끌어들여 반란에 동참했으며, 주변 양인이나 노비들도 반란에 가담시켰다. 이와 같은 경기 반란군 중에서 가장 핵심적인 인물은 소북 계열로 추정되는 수원부 양성현의 사족 정세윤이다. 그는 반란군의 부원수 역할을 하였는데, 반란군의 대원수였던 이인좌보다 이른 시기인 1725년부터 소론 과격파들과 반란을 모의하며 전국적으로 반란자금을 마련하고 반란군사를 모집하는데 큰 역할을 했다. 또한 청주성 점령을 결정했던 양성모임을 주도하였으며, 결국 청주성 전투에도 적극 가담해 성을 점령하는데 성공하였다. 정세윤은 청주성 점령 이후 부대를 3곳으로 나누어 서울로 진격할 때 죽산부대를 이끌기도 하였다. 본 논문에는 이상과 같이 무신란에서 그동안 밝혀지지 않았던 일군의 경기 반란군의 존재는 물론, 청주성 점령에서 핵심적인 역할을 했던 정세윤과 같은 경기 반란군의 위치를 재조명함으로써 무신란의 실체를 더욱 밝힐 수 있었다.

In 1728 (the 4th year of King Yeongjo's reign), Chungcheong, Gyeongsang, and Jeolla Provinces are known as regions that participated in the Musin Rebellion, which was initiated by the Namin and Junsoron factions. However, Han Se-hong, a leading figure of the rebellion, testified that the rebel forces wielded significant influence between Yangseong, Jinwi, and Yongin. Based on this testimony, and by examining the rebellious individuals using the ‘Musin Yeok-ok Chuan' (Records of the Musin Treason Case) as the primary source, and ‘Yeongjo Sillok' (Annals of King Yeongjo) and ‘Seungjeongwon Ilgi' (Diaries of the Royal Secre- tariat) as supplementary materials, a total of 100 Musin Rebellion rebels originating from 8 gun-hyeons (counties/districts) under the jurisdiction of Suwon Dohobuw in Gyeonggi Province were iden- tified. In addition, there were 19 people who were from Suwon Dohobu and led the rebellion by holding important positions in the insurrection. This clearly indicates the existence of Gyeonggi Province rebel forces during the Musin Rebellion. These Gyeonggi rebels were particularly concentrated in three areas within Suwon Dohobuw: Yangseong, Jinwi, and Yongin-hyeon. The local gentry (sajok) from these three areas formed the core, drawing in their relatives to participate in the rebellion, and also enlisted commoners (yangin) and slaves (nobi) from the surrounding areas. Among these Gyeonggi Province rebels, the most pivotal figure was Jeong Se-yun, a member of the sajok (gentry) from Yang- seong-hyeon, who is presumed to be affiliated with the Sobuk faction. He served as the Vice Commander of the rebel army. Even earlier than Yi In-jwa, who was the Grand Commander of the rebel army, from as early as 1725 (the 1st year of King Yeongjo's reign), Jeong Se-yun played a significant role in plotting the rebellion with radical members of the Soron faction, raising rebellion funds, and recruiting rebel soldiers nationwide. Furthermore, he spearheaded the Yangseong meeting that decided to capture Cheongju Fortress, and ultimately participated actively in the Battle of Cheongju Fortress, leading to its capture. Jeong Se-yun also led the Juksan unit when the troops, after the capture of Cheongju Fortress, divided into three forces to advance towards Hanyang (Seoul). Through this paper, by shedding new light on not only the previously unrevealed existence of a group of Gyeonggi Province rebels in the Musin Rebellion, but also the pivotal role of Gyeonggi rebels like Jeong Se-yun in the capture of Cheongju Fortress, the true nature of the Musin Rebellion could be further illuminated.

본 논문은 18세기 초 무신란(1728) 당시 경기 동남부 일대의 교통로 통제와 수어청의 군사적 대응체계를 고찰하였다. 먼저 반란 발발 이전 수어청의 경기 동남부 지역을 중심으로 남한산성과 한강 상류 방어 병력이 재편되었음을 추적하였다. 무신란기에는 반란 확산을 막기 위해 남한순무사의 지휘 아래 한강 수로의 나루터 기찰과 내륙 요해처 매복 등 다층적인 교통로 차단 작전이 전개되었다. 이를 통해 남한산성은 왕실 피난처(보장처)로서가 아니라, 도성 사수를 위한 병력 집결지이자 배후 사령부로서 기능하였다. 본고는 무신란기 수어청과 남한순무영의 실제 군사 운용 양상을 복원함으로써, 18세기 남한산성 방어 체계의 실효성과 그 군사･제도사적 의의를 재평가하였다.

This study examines the control of traffic routes in the southeastern Gyeonggi region and the military response system of the Sueocheong during the Musin Rebellion (1728) in the early 18th century. First, it tracks how the defense forces of Namhansanseong and the upper Han River were reorganized, centering on the southeastern Gyeonggi region, prior to the outbreak of the rebellion. During the Musin Rebellion, multi-layered traffic route blockade operations?including the surveillance of Han River ferries and ambushes at inland strategic points?were executed under the command of the Namhansunmusa to prevent the spread of the rebellion. Through these operations, Namhansanseong functioned not as a royal refuge, but as a troop assembly point and a rear headquarters for the defense of the capital. By reconstructing the actual military operations of the Sueocheong and Namhansunmuyoung during the Musin Rebellion, this paper reevaluates the effectiveness of the 18th-century Namhansanseong defense system and its significance in military and institutional history.

The local military system in the late Chosŏn period, anticipating large-scale conflicts, centered on the yeongjang system, which mobilized and commanded troops from multiple counties under a regional commander(營將), and the sogo-gun(束伍軍). While this response system was suitable under the international circumstances of the 17th century, it became inadequate in the 18th century when local counties were increasingly exposed to small-scale threats such as domestic bandits, rebel forces, or incursions by foreign ships. Furthermore, the fundamental issue of the Chosŏn dynasty's military system – the unity of soldiers and farmers with mobilization as needed – was resolved in the central military commands through the establishment of standing armies, but persisted in the provinces. Consequently, during the reign of King Sukjong, there was an attempt to organize and expand the iridae(吏奴隊), which consisted mainly of low-ranking local officials(衙前), government slaves(官奴), and other government employees residing near the county seats and closely connected to the local administration, making their mobilization easier. However, this was not easily achieved due to the varying conditions and resources of each county. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Musin Rebellion(戊申亂) in the early reign of King Yeongjo in the 18th century highlighted the convenience of the iridae, leading the court to reorganize the system and expand the operation of the iridae focusing on key areas. Moreover, throughout the 18th and into the 19th centuries, as other military registers became nominal, based on tax payment in lieu of service, or assigned to forced labor, the iridae became the realistically mobilizable force. This was evident in the response to events such as the Hong Gyeong-rae Rebellion, local uprisings, and the Donghak Peasant Revolution in the 19th century. In essence, the iridae, established in the 18th century, was regarded as the de facto mobilizable manpower in the provinces, utilized for local military needs and maintaining public order, and became the main force in the 19th century.