Earticle

2018년 4월 27일 대한민국 문재인 대통령과 북한 김정은 국무위원장이 만나 남북정상회 담을 개최하였고 이어 2018년 9월 19일 평양직할시에서 2018년 3차 남북정상회담이 열렸 으며 문재인 대통령과 김정은 국무위원장이 합의해 9.19 공동선언을 하였다. 9·19 군사분 야 남북합의서는 9.19 공동선언의 군사분야 부속합의서이다. 9.19 군사합의는 군비통제단계의 군사적신뢰구축과 운용적군비통제를 포함하고 있다. 군 사합의시 긍정적으로 평가하는 사람들과 부정적으로 평가하는 사람들이 대립하였으나 역사 상 운용적군비통제를 9.19 군사합의처럼 구체적으로 시행한 적이 없어서 전세계의 주목을 받았다. 그러나 9.19 군사합의 후 불과 2년도 되지 않아 북한이 남북공동연락사무소를 폭 파시키므로써 남북관계는 최악의 상태로 치닫고 있다. 이러한 시기에 9.19 군사합의 후부터 남북공동연락사무소 폭파, 서해공무원피격사건까지 북한의 군사행동을 분석한 후 북한의 군사행동을 유발시키는 핵심요인이 무엇인지 북한의 내부적요인과 외부적요인으로 구분하여 도출하고 도출된 요인을 고려하여 향후 북한 군사행동을 예측, 한반도에서의 군비통제 발전방향을 제시하였다.

2018 Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea on April 27 met Chairman Kim Jong Un, the president and North Korea is holding the inter-Korean summit, followed by 2018 on September 19, 2018 third in Pyeongyang.Moon Jae-in and inter-Korean summit was held at Kim Jong Un, the chairman and president the 9.19 Joint Declaration agreed. The September 19 Inter-Korean Agreement on the Military Sector is an annex to the Military Sector of the September 19 Joint Declaration. 9.19 The military agreement includes the building of military confidence in the arms control stage and the control of operational military expenditures. Those who positively evaluate military agreements and those who negatively evaluate military agreements were at odds, but they have never implemented operational military control as specifically as the September 19 military agreement in history, drawing attention from around the world. However, inter-Korean relations are at their worst, as North Korea detonated a joint liaison office just two years after the Sept. 19 military agreement. After analyzing North Korea's military actions from the September 19th military agreement to the recent bombing of the South-North Joint Liaison Office, the North Korean military action was predicted and the direction of development of arms control on the Korean Peninsula was suggested, considering the factors derived by dividing the key causes of the North's military action into internal and external causes.

This paper discusses automation of a small-scale hydraulic shovel and its trajectory control. To move an end-effect (grinder) along a desired trajectory, the controller uses PID(proportional-integral- defferential) control and internal pressure of hydraulic cylinder. To apply PID control in the present hydraulic system, the system model is derived physically and its system parameters are obtained by actual measurement. To show the effectiveness of the PID controller and propriety of system model, the computer simulations and experiments are performed. These results of the simulations and experiments indicate that the PID trajectory control of robotic deburring by hydraulic shovel is very effective.

한반도에서 평화통일의 기반을 구축하기 위해서는 비군사분야에 머물고 있는 남북교류협력 영역을 군사분야로 확대하여 군비통제를 적극 추진해야 할 것이다. 그동안 남북 간에 군비통제가 추진되지 못한 이유는 남북 간 신뢰구축의한계, ‚군비통제 자체의 기능적 한계, ƒ남북 간 제도ž구조적 한계, „국내ž외 환경적 한계 등 태생적 요인이 자리 잡고있기 때문이다. 첫째, 군비통제를 추진하기 위해 남북 고위급회담 수준의 정치적 대화가 선행되어야 하며, 협상 및 추진과정에서 ‘전략적 유연성’을 발휘해야 한다. 이를 위해 상황과 여건에 부합한 ‘신축적 상호주의’를 적용해야 한다. 둘째, 기존의 ‘선 신뢰구축, 후 군축’ 원칙에서 탈피하여 새로운 절충적 방법으로 ‘신뢰구축 및 군축의 동시추진’ 원칙을 모색해 나가야 한다. 즉, 군비통제의 낮은 수준이라 할 수 있는 군사적 신뢰구축과 합리적 충분성에 입각한 제한된 군축을병행하는 방안을 추진할 필요가 있다. 셋째, 국무총리실 직속으로 군비통제 전담기구를 설치하여 국가정책ž전략 차원에서 군비통제 문제를 적극적으로 추진해야 한다. 또한 남북 고위급회담이 성사되면 ‘남북 군비통제 공동추진위원회(가칭)’ 을 구성 운영할 필요가 있다. 넷째, 평화통일을 위한 군비통제의 필요성에 대한 국민적 공감 형성과 유리한 국제적 환경조성을 위하여 보다 능동적인 외교역량을 발휘해야 할 것이다. 특히 국제사회와 함께 북한의 핵문제를 해결해 나가고, 한미동맹과 한중협력관계의 균형을 어떻게 유지해 나갈 것인가를 더욱 고민해야 할 것이다.

It is required to expand area of inter-Korean economic cooperation, being limited to non-military field, to military field and then, to positively promote arms control in order to establish foundation for peaceful reunification in Korean peninsula. Reasons why arms control has not been promoted between South and North Korea in the meantime were such original factors as follows;  limit of confidence building between the South and the North, ‚ functional limit of arms control itself, ƒ institutionalžstructural limit between the South and the North, „ environmental limit at home and abroad. It is necessary to get out from existing frame and to seek a new paradigm in order to overcome above factors and to realize arms control between the South and the North. First, it is required to have prior political dialog at the South-North high-level talks in order to promote arms control and to exercise 'strategic flexibility' during negotiation and promotion process. For this, 'flexible reciprocity' has to be adopted in compliance with situation and conditions. Second, it is necessary to get out from existing principle of 'confidence building in advance and arms reduction later' but to seek the 'simultaneous driving principle of confidence building and arms reduction' as an eclectic approach. Namely, based on reasonable sufficiency, it is required to promote military confidence building and limited arms reduction in parallel, which is a lower level of arms control. Third, as an advisory body of Prime Minister's Office, it is necessary to install an organization exclusively responsible for arms control and to positively handle arms control issue from the standpoint of national policyžstrategy. If the South-North high-level talks take place, it is necessary to organize and operate 'South-North Joint Arms Control Promotion Board (tentative name)'. Fourth, it is required to exercise more active diplomatic competence in order to create national consensus on necessity of arms control for peaceful reunification and to form more favorable international environment. Especially, it is necessary to think about how to solve nuclear issue of North Korea together in collaboration with international society and how to maintain balance between ROK-US alliance and Sino-Korean cooperation relations.

2018년 9월 19일 체결된 ｢9.19 군사합의｣는 남북 간 ‘운용적 군비통제’에 대한 합의이다. 그러나 5년이 경과한 2023년 11월에 북한은 ｢9.19 군사합의｣의 전면파기를 선언했다. 본 연구의 목적은 ｢9.19 군사합의｣의 협상·이행·파기과정에서 작용한 남북한 군비통제의 한계 요인을 식별하는데 있다. 연구방법으로는 선행연구의 고찰을 통해 ‘남북한 군비통제의 실현조건’을 정립한 후, 이를 분석의 도구로 활용하여 ｢9.19 군사합의｣에서 작용한 한계요인을 도출하였다. 연구결과, ｢9.19 군사합의｣에서 작용한 군비통제 한계요인은 ①김정은 정권의 핵무력 증강 지속과 국제사회의 대응, ②동북아 및 글로벌 신냉전 구도 심화, ③남북 간 진정한 신뢰구축의 한계, ④남북 군사력의 비대칭으로 인한 구조적 한계, ⑤안보문제에 대한 찬반논의 심화 등이다. 향후, 대내외 안보상황이 호전되어 남북한 군비통제가 재개될 경우 한국은 ｢9.19 군사합의｣과 정에서 나타난 한계요인들을 사전에 최소화 시킨 후 협상에 임해야 할 것이다.

The ｢9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣signed on September 19, 2018, is an agreement on 'operational arms control'. However, five years later, in November 2023, North Korea declared the complete dismantlement of the ｢ 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣. The purpose of this study is to identify the limiting factors of arms control between the two Koreas that acted in the process of negotiating, implementing, and destroying of the ｢9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣. As a research method, 'conditions for realizing arms control between the two Koreas' were established through consideration of previous studies. And using this as a tool for analysis, the limiting factors that acted in the ｢9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣were derived. As a result of the study, the limitations of arms control in the ｢9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣include ①North Korea's nuclear arms buildup and the international community's response, ②the spread of a new cold war structure in Northeast Asia and the world, ③limitations in building true trust between the two Koreas, ④structural limitations due to asymmetry of military power, and ⑤intensifying discussions on security issues. In the future, if the internal and external security situation improves and arms control between the two Koreas resumes, South Korea will have to negotiate after minimizing the limitations shown in the ｢9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement｣in advance

본 논문의 연구목적은 1950년대 이래 한반도에서 있었던 남북한 간 평화체제 구축을 위한 제안들과 협상중 점을 과거와 ‘9.19 군사분야합의서’로 대변되는 현 문재인 정부의 조치들을 군비통제이론 측면에서 비교 분석하 여 남북한 간 군비통제 추진방안을 제시하는 것이다. 이를 위해 현재까지 정립된 이론을 비교 분석하여, 최적의 분석의 틀을 정립하였다. 과거는 주로 1990년 9월 제1차 남북고위급 회담부터 2008년 1월 노무현 정부말기까지 를 중점적으로 분석하였으며, 이를 현 문재인 정부에서 추진하고 있는 군비통제 정책과 비교·분석하였다. 그 결 과 나타난 특징은 유럽과는 달리 남북한 군비통제 정책은 군사적 신뢰구축이 정치적 신뢰구축과 동시 병행적으 로 추진된다는 것이었다. 이를 토대로 한반도 평화정착 과정에서 협의되어야 할 신뢰구축과 군비통제, 군축 추 진전략을 제시하였다. 중요한 점은 나아가면 갈수록 군비통제의 필요성은 증대될 것이며, 통일정책과 상호 보완 적으로 추진되어야 한다는 것이었다.

The purpose of this study is provide appropriate arms control measures between South and North Koreas by comparing and analyzing the former proposals and agreements in the past and the current Moon Government's approach representing the 9.19 military agreement. For this, I established the most appropriate framework for analysis through comparing and analyzing the arms control theories. The policies of the past governments and of the current Moon Jae-in government are analyzed. The most highlighted characteristic was that the arms control policies were projected by not from the military confidence, but political confidence building measures or both concurrently. In conclusion, I suggested the strategies of projecting confidence building measures and arms control or disarmament in the process of projecting the peace settlement. Nonetheless, the most important point is that the policies of arms control and unification should be pushed ahead complementally.

본 연구는 9.19 군사합의 이후 한반도의 군사적 긴장 해소 및 평화체제 구축을 위한 기본적 단계로서 재래 식 군비의 운용적 군비통제를 위한 실질적 방안을 논의하고자 한다. 현재 한반도의 전략적 상황에서 선결 과 제인 북한의 핵 문제가 본격적인 비핵화 단계로 진입하거나 상당 부분 진전이 된다면 재래식 군비조정에 대 한 조치들이 중요 의제로 등장할 것이다. 향후 남북한에 적용될 운용적 군비통제는 9.19 군사합의의 한계점 을 보완하고 한반도의 군사적 현실을 반영한 보다 진전된 방안들로 구체화 되어야 할 것이다. 특히 남북한의 비대칭적 군비상황과 이에 따른 비대칭적 위협 그리고 양측의 공세적 전략을 반영하여, 남북한이 서로에게 가하는 군사적 위협을 포기하면서 이를 거래하는 포괄적 방식인 “위협에 근거한 교환”이 운용적 군비통제의 방향으로 정립될 필요가 있다.

This study explores the practical measures of operational arms control in conventional armaments after the 9.19 military agreement between South and North Koreas, which constitutes the fundamental for soothing the military tension and building the peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula. Given the strategic situation of the peninsula confronting dense conventional armaments, the reconciliation of North Korean nuclear issues or the denuclearization naturally and markedly entail the next agenda, the inter-Korean adjustment of conventional armament. The operational arms control henceforth applied to the two Koreas should comprehend and embody enhanced options possible to compensate for the limitation of the 9.19 military agreement and meditate on the practical military condition of the peninsula. In the particular consideration of the asymmetrical military preparations, reciprocal asymmetrical threats, and aggressive strategic plans of the two Koreas, the orientation of future operational arms control measures has to give priority to “threat-based trade-off” method, which operates on the abandonment of the threats issued by each other and the following trade-off of these threats for arms control, with the comprehensive range instead of the adherence to the military balance of respective dimensions ground, maritime, and aerial.

본 논문은 제2차세계대전 말기의 핵무기 개 발과 1960년대 핵통제 인식공동체 (epistemic community)가 형성되는 과정을 분석하는 것으 로서, 분석의 단초는 엠마누엘 아들러(Emanuel Adler)의 미국 중심적, 정책결정자 중심적 해석 이나 로렌스 위트너(Lawrence Wittner)의 평화 운동 중심적인 해석에 대한 문제제기이다. 과학 자의 기본임무는 연구결과의 이용을 예측하고 탐구하는데 있는 것이 아니라 과학의 내적 논리 와 합리성에 따라 아직 밝혀지지 않은 부분을 발견해 내는데 있다. 하지만 종전후 과학자들은 핵물리학의 전쟁 이용에 대한 도덕적 책임감과 함께 핵전쟁 회피를 위한 사명감을 느끼면서 핵 과학기술의 이용을 일부 통제하려고 하였다. 서 구의 과학자들뿐만 아니라 소련의 과학자들은 핵 및 미사일 기술의 급속한 발전을 보면서, 당 시 핵무기 증강에 의존하는 억지전략의 한계를 깨닫고 핵전쟁 회피가 양진영의 공통된 이익임 을 인식하기 시작했다. 초기 핵통제 아이디어는 이런 배경 속에서 나왔으며, 1957년부터 개최된 퍼그와쉬 회의(Pugwash Conferences)는 동서진 영의 과학자들(운동가로서, 연구자로서, 또는 자문가로서)이 교류하는 장이 되었으며 장차 초국가적 인식공동체를 형성하는 기반이 되었 다. 따라서 제한적 핵실험금지조약, SALT 협상, ABM 제한 조약 등 일련의 초기 핵통제 과정은 미국 주도만으로 이루어진 것이 아니었으며, 단 순히 반핵평화운동에 끌려간 결과인 것만도 아 니었다. 즉, 핵통제는 억지전략과 평화운동의 <접합>이었으며, 핵통제 연구는 전략연구와 평화학이 만나는 중간지점이었다. 그 주된 역할 은 과학자들에 의해 수행되었다.

This paper investigates the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of nuclear arms control in the 1960s. The analysis begins with a critical perspective on the two previous studies: One is Emanuel Adler’s U.S.-centered and elitist account of the emergence of an arms control epistemic community during the Cold War, and the other is Lawrence Wittner’s proposition of peace movement-driven arms control agreements. In general, scientists’ duty is to discover unidentified aspects of the nature, following scientific rationality and inner logic, rather than to investigate them after forecasting the utility of research outcomes. Scientists after World War Two, however, were keenly aware of a moral responsibility for the subordination of science to the atrocious war and thus tried to control, in part, the use of scientific knowledge and technological outcomes in order to avoid possibility of a nuclear war in the years of escalating East-West arms race. Alarmed by rapid developments of nuclear and missile technology, Western and Soviet scientists recognized limitations of their own existent nuclear deterrence strategy and considered avoidance of a nuclear war a common interest. The idea of nuclear arms control, at the initial stage, emerged in this context. The Pugwash Conference, which was held in 1957 for the first time, offered opportunities for the scientists in the East and the West to meet together and eventually build a “transnational” epistemic community in regards to the nuclear arms control. It is fair to say that the nuclear arms control in the early stage--as observed in the negotiations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty--was neither an outcome of U.S. initiatives nor a direct result of the antinuclear peace movements alone. The nuclear arms control was a kind of concession to the expanding peace movements, reflecting the limits of the existent nuclear deterrence. The studies on the nuclear arms control were situated between strategic studies and peace studies. Scientists are a major player on that important conjuncture, as either academics, or practitioners, or movement activists.

북한은 2012년 12월 12일 장거리 미사일 발사실험과 2013년 2월 12일 제3차 핵실험을 단행한데 이어, 2013-키 리졸브 훈련을 앞두고 행한 선제 핵 기습 타격 등 폭언 실시와 그 이후의 개성공단 조업 중단사태 등 일련의 군사ㆍ정치적 도발과 위협을 야기하여 한반도의 안보상황을 극도의 위기상황으로까지 치닫게 하였다. 이에 따라 남북관계 개선을 통한 한반도 긴장완화와 평화체제 이행을 위한 신뢰구축 체제 정착 및 적극적인 군비통제 정책 추진에 따른 사전 배비 요구가 국내외적으로 크게 증대되고 있다. 여기에 필자는 군비통제의 이론적 고찰을 통해 국가안보와 군비통제의 관계를 규명해보고, 바람직한 지 역 군비통제 모델로서 유럽안보협력체를 분석 진단하여 동북아 지역안보협의체의 필요성을 제기하였다. 또한 한반도의 가능성 있는 신뢰구축 모델로 박근혜 정부가 추진하고 있는 동북아 평화협력 구상 및 한반도 신뢰 프로세스의 성격 규명을 통해 그 추진방향을 제시해 보면서, 남북한 군비통제 정책의 주요 추진 기조를 제시하였다. 결론적으로, 한반도 평화체제 이행을 위해 추진해야 할 남북한 군비통제 정책은 ①정치군사적 신뢰구축 에 따른 동북아 평화협력 구상 및 한반도 신뢰 프로세스 이행 등 실질적인 군비통제 여건의 사전 조성, ②한 반도 문제해결을 위한 남북한 당사자 협상에 앞서 한-미 간 긴밀한 사전 협력체제 구축, ③지역 안보협력체 등 국제 레짐의 최대 활용을 위한 정치ㆍ외교적 노력 경주, 그리고 ④남북 군사 공동위원회 재가동을 통한 군비통제 실질 논의 촉진 등 크게 4가지로 구분하여 추진되어야 할 필요가 있다.

North Korea still continued to give rise to a chain of political and military provocation including using a violent words as like ‘Pre-emtive Nuclear Surprise Strike’ and accident of stopping an operation in Kaesung industrial complex and ultimately drove a security situation of North East Asia to the worst crisis level after the long-range missile launching test in December of 2012 and the 3rd nuclear experiment in February. Owing to these accidents internal and external requirement for advance preparation for the establishment of confidence building system and the execution of arms control policy in order to make a detention mood and switch over to peace system in Korean Peninsular is increasing seriously. Here the writer tries to inquire into the relation between national security and arms control, proposed the necessity of regional security regime of Far East through the analysis about CSCE as a desirable regional arms control organization. The writer also tries to propose the main basis of arms control policy of Republic of Korea with proposal of its drive course through the inquiry into character of 'North East Asia Peace and Cooperation Intiative' and 'Confidence Building Process in Korean Peninsular' that is now carrying forward by Park Guen-Hae government. In conclusion, arms control policy of R.O.K. for the switching over to peace system in Korean Peninsular has to be completed as like following: At first, advanced preparation of arms control conditions including the establishment of political and military confidence building measures, at second, establishment of close cooperation relation between R.O.K. and U.S.A. prior to beginning of negotiation with North Korea, at third, exerting all possible political and military efforts in order to use international regime and at forth, facilitation of real discussion through reoperation of military common committee between two Koreas.

What makes the schemes to address Pyongyang’s nuclear program so ineffective? Aside from conventional explanations, two gray zone discourses are at play. First, the gray zone discourse of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been viable since 1991. Second, another gray zone discourse of nuclear arms control with North Korea has been gathering pace recently. Gray zone discourses blur the line between North Korea and the United States regarding who should be a targeted state. How are gray zone discourses at play in the long process of negotiations and talks? Who is the most likely to win if these gray zone discourses remain intact? These blurred discourses also help North Korea become a recognized nuclear power and a normal state in an international arena. Leaving the distorted mechanism unchecked can encourage a gray zone perpetrator to seize the initiative of tackling nuclear issues, allowing North Korea to achieve a final goal of nuclearization. As part of the efforts to make gray zone discourses unfunctional, three strategic and policy remedies need to be at the forefront: making black-and-white discourses, increasing leverage to North Korea, and establishing a zero-gray-zone strategy.

The weaponization and battlefieldization of outer space is becoming increasingly evident. China and the United States have obvious differences in their proposals for maintaining space security. China advocates a legally binding international treaty according to international law to limit outer space armament based on multilateralism with the framework of the United Nations at its core. The United States advocates establishing voluntary rule-based agreements within the allied system as rules for the international community to constrain space behavior. The contest between China and the United States over how to maintain space security is in actuality a competition between the two countries over what type of international space order to establish. In the foreseeable future, the outcome of the competition between the two countries could be that an international space order based on US rules prevails, partially absorbing China's rules.

address three major issues in this paper. First，acknowledging that there is a range of opinions in the U.S. regarding the strategies and prospects for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula， I try to offer what I consider to be a relatively balanced and pragmatic U.S. perspective on the matter. Second， I appraise the prospects for arms control and corfidence and security building measures(CSBMs) on the Korean Peninsula as ways to promote and institutionalize the peace process involving the two Koreas and the United States on the Korean Peninsula. Finally， 1 offer some thoughts on the impacts on peace on the Korean Peninsula of (a) the North Korean nuclear issue， (b) the U.S.-ROK alliance， and (c) the impact andfuture ofU.S.-China relations.

There is a growing debate in both Washington and Seoul that arms control may be the only remaining option in dealing with North Korea’s nukes. In review of the debate, this article makes two central arguments. First, arms control is more likely to become the US’s ‘third approach’ to North Korea’s nukes. As this study finds, there are intriguing resem-blances between today’s arms control debate on North Korea and the ‘classical arms con-trol’ theories that emerged when US-Soviet Union’s ‘uncontrolled’ nuclear rivalry was rapidly picking up in the 1950s and 1960s. Although historical and theoretical parallels can be porous, emerging new multipolar nuclear race with Russia, China, and new nuclear powers including North Korea is morphing US’s arms control paradigm back to the three priorities of classical arms control ? deterrence, escalation control, and crisis management ? that trumped all other concerns including nonproliferation/denuclearization. Second, while such shift may be inevitable, this study argues that there are more perils than solu-tions in seeking arms control approach to North Korea. Also, unlike arms control propo-nents, this article challenges the assumption that arms control has not been tried with North Korea.

Pressure policies to induce North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization failed to achieve measurable progress toward that objective. The consolidation of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously. The most appropriate mechanism for implementing such a strategy is arms control, defined here as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps that reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation. Detractors of arms control for North Korea argue that it would convey status as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and that it would require accepting some level of mutual deterrence. States would need to consider such criticisms as they weigh the risks and costs of pursuing arms control compared to alternatives such as containment and deterrence. An arms control-oriented roadmap would integrate parallel progress on establishing a durable peace regime and capping and then reducing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Monitoring and verifying compliance with this type of roadmap would require a hybrid approach drawing on both traditional safeguards-style methods and novel approaches designed to build confidence.

The main aim of the article is to explore the implementation of the 9/19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement and arms control, indispensable for the transition to an inter-Korean peace regime for the denuclearized Korean Peninsula and peaceful permanent coexistence of the two Koreas considering the unusual and unique division of the Korean Peninsula. It is to examine the challenges and direction of this arms control. The purpose of arms control on the Korean Peninsula is to maintain peace and promote peaceful reunification by resolving military tensions between the two Koreas. To achieve this, the two Koreas should develop arms control into a structural configuration that conforms to the efforts towards the peace treaty and the operational one that reduces military threats, such as the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs as well as massive conventional forces, based on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the military. Discussions on arms control and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will determine the pace of these discussions vis-a-vis North Korea’s denuclearization. The Panmunjom Declaration, announced on April 27, and the Military Agreement, on September 9 in 2018, are typical examples. South Korea’s military should preemptively prevent North Korean provocations and minimize damages in the event of a conflict with the implementation and verification of these agreements

Current nuclear arms control verification methods employ various cryptographic techniques to prevent classified data leakage. Enhancing these methods' accuracy through better data extraction from the cryptographic data is crucial. This study integrated machine learning with physical encryption, training four models for arms control verification. Additionally, we amassed a dataset encompassing most significant fraudulent scenarios via Monte Carlo simulations, representing the inaugural dataset tailored for arms control verification research. Machine learning-based arms control verification technology can automatically extract essential features from encrypted data and make real-time adjustments and optimizations based on new data, significantly enhancing the accuracy. Concurrently, by leveraging physical encryption, classified data is encrypted before electrically recording, reducing tampering and unauthorized access risks. By calculating the models' prediction accuracy, we assessed the performance of each model. The results indicate that the K-Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest, and Support Vector Machine models all exhibited highly accuracy and robust noise resilience. And the Logistic Regression model also demonstrated reliable performance indicators. Furthermore, the exceedingly low probability of successfully decrypting the physical encryption underscores its effectiveness in safeguarding confidential data. In summary, the machine learning-based verification method demonstrates superior accuracy and enhanced efficiency while effectively preventing unauthorized data access or manipulation.

Advancing the discrimination capability and robustness of verification methods within a zero-knowledge framework remains a central challenge in contemporary nuclear arms-control. Building upon our previously proposed hash-algorithm-based neutron activation analysis system, we present an integrated optimization of both the verification apparatus and the associated algorithm. On the hardware side, we develop a neutron moderator that delivers a higher-quality and operationally practical thermal-neutron beam. By independently characterizing the spatial distributions of neutrons and prompt gamma rays, we determine the system's optimal geometric configuration, thereby improving measurement fidelity at the source. On the algorithmic side, we propose a high-resolution difference-hash algorithm that incorporates a key-based encryption mechanism, substantially strengthening encrypted identification. Using previously established sample sets, we conduct simulated treaty-verification to evaluate system performance. The optimized apparatus and the new algorithm yield a marked gain in discrimination accuracy: under 1% noise, the system achieves an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve above 0.977-significantly higher than the 0.925 achieved by our earlier design. Moreover, the system preserves strong resistance to statistical analysis, brute-force reconstruction, and key-based security threats. Overall, the optimized system effectively prevents unauthorized access or tampering while substantially enhancing identification accuracy, establishing a robust pathway that couples physical protection with algorithmic encryption.

A number of gaps divide reality from perception concerning the kinetic energy ballistic missile defense and antisatellite (ASAT)weapons developed, tested, and possessed by the United States and China. This article explains the equivalence of these supposedly distinct classes of weaponry, and reviews the diplomatic history surrounding recent Chinese and US tests of them, particularly in the light of recent WikiLeaks revelations. The inadequacy of arms-control proposals that would address only the testing or use of these weapons as ASATs is discussed, and a more substantive proposal is offered that emerged in a recent meeting between Chinese and US arms-control analysts.

On September 15, 2010, North Korea proposed a military working-level talks to discuss cross-border dissemination of anti-North Korean leaflets by South Korean civic groups and disputes over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. This proposal expected to ease heightened military tension on the Korean peninsula which was caused by the Cheonan Incident in March 2010. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the talks will lead to confidence-building and arms control between the North and the South. North and South Korea launched a dialogue in the late 1980s, and adopted a “Basic Agreement” and Protocol on Non-aggression in 1992 which includes various measures for confidence-building and arms control. North Korea, however, refused to implement the Basic Agreement and the Protocol. In June 2000, the North and the South held first Summit Talks and launched military talks at various levels. Inter-Korean military talks produced many agreements to prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea and to cease propaganda activities near the DMZ. They also agreed on assuring free transit, allowing the use of the Internet and wired/wireless communications, and simplifying the customs process for the operation of Gaesung Industrial Complex. Despite these confidence-building measures between the two Koreas, there is no complete reconciliation and cooperation based on mutual trust and confidence between them. North Korean arms control proposals mainly deal with troop reduction measures, whereas South Korean proposals deal with political and military confidencebuilding, operational arms control and structural arms control measures in gradual and phased manner. North Korean proposals were political propaganda to withdraw US military forces stationed in South Korea and to hinder South Korea’s military modernization program. Moreover, a strategic disparity, ideological confrontation, and experience of war between the two Koreas, political status of the North Korean military, diplomatic isolation of the North, and the North Korean nuclear issue restricts opportunity of arms control dialogue between the North and the South. Inter-Korean arms control can be successful only if it is based on mutual trust and confidence. With a gradual and phased approach, North and South Korea must implement political and military confidence measures at the first phase, measures to reduce accidental armed clashes at the second phase, verifiable arms control measures at the third phase, and measures to institutionalize a peace regime on the Korean peninsula at the last phase. In order to implement these measures successfully, South Korea must exert every effort to reform and open the North Korea regime.

Constructivism maintains that the world is socially constructed by human practice, and seeks to explain how this construction takes place by stressing the importance of intersubjective meanings and understandings and the interaction between agent and structure. This article employs the norm as an intersubjective meaning built into domestic milieu in order to understand the constitutive process of the norm's impact. As an aggregate of the interaction between states and international institutions (regimes) in a certain time span, the concept of a “constitutive dynamism” between state and institution illuminates how the individual state's interest could be influenced and transformed. The Chinese perspective on the international ACD agenda diversified and significantly transformed into a more norm?oriented direction. The norm?bound belief spreads more and more among the ACD experts once the ACD regimes won “universal reality” which international society approved. The dynamism, which integrates the social structuring of international relations by reconstructing the state (agent) and the international system (structure), provides a tool for comparative analysis, which differs from existing rationalist approaches. This would make it possible for IR researchers to draw a more complete picture of the interaction in our interdependent world, which is now undergoing a sovereignty?blurring phenomenon.