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1985년 10월 통상법 301조 조사 개시 후 본격적으로 진행된 레이건 행정부와의 지적 재산권 협상에서 전두환 정부는 미국의 지적재산권 보호 요구를 상당 부분 수용하는 연 성 협상 전략을 취했다. 기존 연구는 체계 수준의 요인에 초점을 맞추며 강대국과의 협상에서 한국이 미국의 요구를 수용할 수밖에 없었다는 점을 강조한다. 또는 국내 정치 차원에서 전두환 정부의 권위주의적 특수성을 강조하며 전두환 정부는 정치적 생존을 위해 미국의 요구를 수용, 대외적 정당성을 부여해줄 수 있는 강대국과의 마찰을 피하는 것이 필연적이었다고 분 석한다. 본 연구는 퍼트남의 양면 게임이론에 기초하여, 한국 정부가 연성 협상 전략을 선택하 게 된 이유는 국제 정치와 국내 정치의 상호 작용의 맥락에서 이해되어야 한다고 주장한 다. 비슷한 시기 진행된 다른 통상 협상 분야와 마찬가지로 지적재산권 보호 협상에서도 하위 산업 부문에 따라 미국의 구체적인 요구 사항을 선별적으로 수용하거나 시차를 두 고 단계적으로 적용하는 원칙 협상의 가능성이 존재했다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 국내 이익 집단이 정책 연합을 형성하는 데 실패하고, 이들이 정책 결정 과정에 참여할 수 있는 창구가 제한적이었으며 협상 기구의 조정 능력이 부족한 동시에 레이건 행정부의 상승적 연 계가 작용함으로써 한국 정부는 윈셋의 크기를 축소시키지 못하게 되었고 결과적으로 연성 협상 전략이 선택되었다.

In Intellectual Property Rights(IPR) negotiation with the Reagan administration in the mid-1980s, Chun Doo-hwan administration adopted a soft negotiation strategy accommodating much of the U.S. demands on the protection of the IPR. Existing research focusing on systemic factors of international relations argue South Korea had no choice but to accept the demand of the Hegemon. The others, putting emphasis on the features of the authoritarian regime, assert that it was essential for the Chun administration to avoid any potential conflict with the United States to maintain external legitimacy for political survival. This study argues that Korea’s decision to adopt a soft negotiation strategy should be analyzed on the basis of interaction between international and domestic politics. As was the case in other U.S.-Korea trade negotiations, including agricultural products and automobiles, the Chun administration could accept the U.S. demands for IPR protection only on limited items selected by prioritizing; or accept the demands but schedule policy changes over an extended period of time. However, domestic interest groups’ failure to form a strong coalition; limited window of opportunity for interest groups to participate in the government’s decision-making process; lack of coordination capacity within the administration; and the Korean government’s rigid policy preferences as well as the U.S.’s synergistic linkage contributed to the failure in minimizing the size of Korea’s win-set and led to the unconditional acceptance of the U.S. demands.

본 연구는 서울 G20 정상회의 개최와 관련하여 많은 주목을 받고 있는 중견국가 역할론에 대한 낙관적 전망은 과연 적합한 것이며, 한국이 중견국가로서의 역할을 수행함으로써 국가이익을 확보할 수 있는 전략적 선택은 무엇인가라는 질문에 답하고자 하였다. 기존의 G20 정상회의와 관련한 연구들은 한국이 취해야할 국가전략에 대한 당위적 설명에 집중한 까닭에 ‘어떻게’ 그와 같은 목표들을 달성할 것인가에 대한 전략적 사고에 소홀한 경향이 있었다. 본 연구는 이러한 문제의식 하에 한국의 국익달성을 위한 외교 전략을 모색하고 있다. 이를 위해 먼저 G20의 성격을 규정하고, 이에 근거하여 중견국가 역할론과 G20 정상회의와 관련한 기존 연구들에서의 제안과 한계를 검토하며, 한국의 국가이익과 이의 달성을 위한 외교정책적 목표를 설정하고 이를 달성하기 위한 구체적 협상방안들을 제시하고 있다. 본고에서 제시하고 있는 한국의 협상전략으로서는 ‘대표자로서의 위치 활용, 후속 게임을 위한 준비, 세력화, 이슈의 다양화’ 등이 제시되고 있다. 이러한 논의의 전개에 있어 한국의 특수성에 주목하기 보다는 일반적 협상의 과정에서 광범위하게 적용될 수 있는 푸트남(Robert D. Putnam)의 투-레벨 게임을 변용한 투-페이스 게임의 논리를 적용하고 있음이 본 연구의 특징이라고 할 수 있다.

This article aims to answer following questions regarding the role of middle powers in G20 summit: Is the positive prediction regarding the role of Korea in G20 summit appropriate? And what strategies should Korea choose to secure its own national interest through actively performing the role of middle power? Existing studies regarding the G20 summit tend to focus on the 'desirable' national strategies of Korea and, as a result, pay relatively little attention to 'how' to achieve those strategic goals. In this vein, the authors search for diplomatic strategies for achieving Korea's national interests. This article defines the characteristics of G20 summit, explores the exiting studies regarding the role of middle power and G20 summit, attempts to set the national interests of Korea and suggests concrete negotiation strategies for achieving the diplomatic aims of Korea in G20 summit. This article proposes 'taking advantage of the status as a chairman of the summit, preparing for the next game, grouping and diversifying issues' as Korea's strategies. In line with this, this article focuses on general aspects of cooperation and negotiation rather than on the distinct characteristics of Korea by adopting the logic of two-face game which is an alternative form of Robert D. Putnam's two-level game.

Korea had many chances to acquire the required defense technology and to manufacture components by offset program. The number of available offset items and its proportion have been increasing sinse the revision of the relevant regulations in 2009. To make full advantage of these changes, it is important to implement offset negotiations strategically. Many organizations are proactive to participate in the offset negotiation process. In this research, we analyze the offset negotiation process with two-level game theory and derive some influence factors as they may affect the negotiator's. Based on the results, we propose some negotiation strategies to help offset negotiators make progress it favorably. As the conclusion, we propose that a systematic definition of the offset negotiation process should consist of four stages: planning, implementation, mediation, and agreement.

2002년 10월 2차 북핵위기가 발생한 이후 북핵문제 해결을 위해 7년여에 걸쳐 진행된 6자회담은 ‘합의와 파국’의 갈등적 과정을 보이며 아직 해결의 가시적 성과를 거두지 못하고 있다. 이에 본 연구는 6자회담의 치열한 협상과정과 ‘합의와 파국’의 반복적 결과의 원인 규명에 집중한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 국제체제적 요인과 국내적 요인들의 상호작용 속에서 국제협상의 과정과 결과를 분석하는 양면게임이론을 통해 2003년부터 2009년까지 전개된 북핵 6자회담을 연구한다. 양면게임이론은 국내외적 요인들에 의해 규정되는 북미 양국의 윈셋 사이즈의 변화가 6자회담의 갈등적 과정과 합의도출 실패의 결과를 결정했다고 주장한다. 연구결과 공화당 중심의 미의회와 부시정부의 신보수주의자들과 같은 국내적 요인들과 9.11 테러와 국제핵비확산 규범 등과 같은 국제체제적 요인들이 미국의 윈셋 사이즈를 축소시키며 대북 강경정책이 형성되었고 한편 북한도 부시정부의 압박과 자주권 확보를 강조하는 주체사상과 선군정치 등의 국내외 요인들이 윈셋 사이즈를 축소하여 대미 대항정책을 추구하게 하여 결국 6자회담의 갈등적 과정을 규정하였다는 것이 확인되었다. 이러한 북미의 작은 윈셋 사이즈는 부시정부의 중간선거 패배와 북한의 경제위기 등과 같은 양국의 국내적 요인들과 중국과 한국의 압박 및 설득 등과 같은 국제체제적 요인들에 의해 확대됨으로서 9.19 공동성명과 2.13합의 도출이 가능하였다. 하지만 이러한 합의는 미국 내부의 신보수주의자들의 개입과 일본의 압박 그리고 북한의 미사일 발사와 핵실험 등의 ‘위기촉발전술’이 양국의 윈 셋 사이즈를 급격히 축소시키면서 무력화되었으며 결국 파국의 상황이 재현된 것이다. 이런 측면에서 힘의 분배상태만을 강조하는 신현실주의나 국제제도의 역할만을 강조하는 신자유주의 이론들은 6자회담의 과정과 결과 설명에 한계가 확인되었고 반면에 국제체제적 요인과 국내적 요인들을 함께 고려하는 양면게임이론은 6자회담 과정과 결과의 설명에 보다 적실성이 있다고 평가할 수 있다.

The Six-Party Talks which has begun since 2003 in order to resolve the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis has gone through conflictual processes and suspended without achieving any substantial outcomes. This paper attempts to define major factors that determined such conflictual processes and unsuccessful outcome of the Six-Party Talks. For the purpose, this paper analyses the Six-Party Talks which had been held between 2003 and 2009 through the two-level game approach which emphasizes both domestic factors like "distribution of preferences and coalition among domestic actors," and "domestic political system" and international factors like "distribution of capabilities among states" and "role of international institutions. The results of the analysis show that processes of the Six-Party Talks had to be tough and conflictual because both North Korea and the U.S. maintained small size of "win-sets." That means both states did not have anything to yield to each other. Some domestic factors such as Republican dominated U.S. Congress and Neoconservatives in Bush Administration as well as some international factors like 9.11 terror and nuclear nonproliferation norms had played important role in reducing U.S. win-sets size against the North Korean nuclear weapon issues. In a similar vein, North Korea maintained small size of win-sets due to both some domestic factors like 'Juche' ideology and 'military first strategy' and international factors like negative reverberation effects of U.S. pressure on North Korea. The small size of win-sets of both states had been expanded because of loss of Republican Party in off-year election and roles of China and Korea. In that context, the Six-Party Talks eventually could lead to the '9.19 joint statement' and the '2.13 agreement' as a way to resolve North Korea nuclear problem. However, such widened win-sets size of both NK and U.S. had been drastically reduced again by some domestic and international factors such as interventions of 'Neocons', pressure of Japan, and North Korea's risk-taking behavior through nuclear weapon tests and launching missiles. As a result of the small size of win-sets in both countries, the Six-Party Talks finally collapsed and has no tentative plan to resume the negotiations. This case study confirms the validity of the two-level game approach's arguments which emphasize both international and domestic factors in explaining the tough and conflictual processes and unsuccessful outcomes of the Six-Party Talks.

최근 중러북이 국제사회의 위협으로 대두되면서 한미일 3국 안보협력체제 구축이 주요 과제로 부상하고 있다. 안보적 관점에서 한미일 3각 동맹 공고화를 위해 한일관계 회복 및 발전적 협력이 요구되지만, 내재적 으로는 양국 간 역사적 배경 아래 여러 갈등이 작용하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 이에 대한 해소 방안을 찾기 위 해 갈등 현안인 강제징용 피해자 문제의 ‘양면게임이론’ 대입과 기타 사안들의 ‘숙적관계’ 적용 가능성을 살 펴보았다. 분석 결과, 한일 갈등 현안은 양국 정부, 당사자, 각종 단체 및 여론이 복합 작용하고 있어 양면게임 이론 적용이 가능했다. 또한, 적대적 심리 상태에서 미해결 현안의 상당기간 존재, 경쟁성 및 위협성을 지닐 때 숙적관계로 발전할 우려성을 내포하고 있는 것으로 관찰된다. 분석을 통해 향후 한일 간 갈등 현안 해소 방안을 모색해 보았다.

Amid recent threats to international community posed by China, Russia, and North Korea, establishing a trilateral security alliance among the US, ROK, and Japan has emerged as a critical task. While strengthening this alliance is crucial for regional security, it requires addressing historical tensions and fostering constructive cooperation between ROK and Japan. However, internally, various conflicts are at play under the historical background between the two countries. In exploring solutions, we examined the applicability of ‘Two Level game theory’ to the issue of the forced labor victims, a key point of contention, and the potential for applying ‘Rivalry theory’ to other matters. The analysis suggests that the ROK-Japan conflict involves complex interactions among governments, stakeholders, and public opinion, allowing for the application of Two Level game theory. Additionally, in a hostile psychological state, it is observed that there is concern of developing rivalry relationship when there are long-standing unresolved issues, and competitiveness and threat. Through this analysis, we aim to explore future solutions for resolving conflicts between ROK and Japan.

When the second U.S.?North Korea Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam ended abruptly without a deal, critics and experts argued that U.S. President Trump, considering the domestic pressure, changed his goals and interests at the very last minute. To theoretically explain the negotiation process in Hanoi, this study analyzes the win-set structure of the United States and North Korea. This study also aims to examine the causes of the failure by comparing the agreement zones between the United States and North Korea’s win-sets before and after the summit. Two-level game theory explains how negotiating countries with conflicting interests achieve an agreement and what kinds of strategies the governments use to maximize their own national interests. The key assumption of the two-level game theory is the linkage between domestic politics and international affairs, and the interconnection was widely suggested by many scholars including Gabriel A. Almond, James N. Rosenau, and Bruce M. Russett. Building on to this literature, Putnam’s two-level game theory introduced the concept of a “win-set” and examined the international negotiation process thoroughly using this theoretical model. Based on the analysis of the two parties’ win-sets, this study finds that the United States intentionally ended the negotiation without a deal by contracting the size of its win-set. The United States shifted its interest from the original position, which is “trading partial (or symbolic) dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons with partial removal of economic sanctions,” to the new interest position including the abandonment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) referred to as “Yongbyon Plus Alpha” and the agreement on a roadmap to denuclearization.

In this article we elucidate the evolution of Hanoi’s foreign policy proactivism which has been understudied in the contemporary literature. In selective areas, why has Vietnam adopted a more proactive foreign policy than before? By means of ‘two-level game’ theory, official documents and research papers, and expert interviews, we analyze the foreign policy of Vietnam and compare it with that of Indonesia, ASEAN’s de facto leader, by examining the former’s role in the South China Sea issue and international economic integration strategy. In these aspects which Vietnam today has evinced its sectoral leadership, compared to Indonesia, the country has faced fewer constraints in domestic and international strategic environments to exert its diplomatic proactivism.

Since 2007, the European Union has developed a strategy towards Central Asia. Relations with the region have created an opportunity to focus on a wider spectrum of interests across different levels of EU foreign policy. This article examines the “two-level game” between EU member states (from Central Europe) and EU institutions in Brussels regarding economic interests versus values agenda with the focus on Kazakhstan. In this game, the EU’s member states focus on developing trade and economic relations while they let space for the EU’s institutions to discuss sensitive issues, such as democracy promotion and human rights dialogue. This is the case for the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) that prefer a pragmatic approach towards Kazakhstan as the most important country in the Central Asian region.

When, and under what kinds of circumstance the United States adopts a strategic trade policy? In reflecting the importance of the American trade policy in international economy, many scholars have examined changes of the American trade policies. However, these studies failed to present an agreed argument about the conditions for formation of the strategic trade policy, and their arguments have been tested only in the cases of high technology industries but not in the context of the non-high technology industries. In other words, absence of a theory agreed on a definition of a strategic trade policy, conditions for formation of the policy, and its application range limits the systemic development of approaches to strategic trade policy. In this regard, this paper presents a two-level game approach which emphasizes the co-determinant nature of domestic and international factors to explain formation of American strategic trade policy as an alternative approach. Therefore, in order to present a more appropriate explanation for strategic trade policy and to better understand changing nature of the American trade policy, it is necessary to assess not only the validity of the existing approaches but also the applicability of a two-level game approach for strategic trade policy by analyzing the arguments in the context of diverse industries. For the purpose, this paper evaluates assertions of strategic trade policy approaches with a comparative analysis of the American commercial aircraft trade policy and the automobile trade policy. As a result of the examination of the two case studies, the changes of market conditions such as large economies of scale, the rapid increase of learning effects, and interventions of European countries in the aircraft industry significantly affected change of the aircraft trade policy of the U.S. toward the European countries. However, unlike the arguments of the strategic trade policy theorists, U.S. domestic political and economic factors and the revisionist decision makers played more important roles in making strategic trade policy in the automobile industry. Furthermore, the post-cold war environment helped the U.S. government separate trade policy making from security considerations, and consequently the changed environment contributed, to some degree, for the government to adopt strategic trade policy in both the aircraft and automobile industries. In conclusion, the existing approaches that explain strategic trade policy by focusing on the changes of market conditions may not sufficiently explore significant influence of other factors such as a post-cold war environment, government's domestic political and economic preferences, and role of revisionists in making strategic trade policy in the United States. In that sense, the two-level game approach which focuses on the interactive features of international and domestic factors could be more appropriate in explaining the U.S. trade policy making.

The paper begins with a simple question of “why do international rivalries persist over time?” To explain the causes of rivalry persistence, the paper develops “a modified two-level game approach” and tests the hypotheses drawn from the approach for the case of the 2nd Greco-Turkish rivalry, 1958-2001. The approach postulates that the rivalry maintenance is the result of rival leaders’ efforts to maximize their interest -i.e., staying in power- subject to external constraint-i.e., great power interventions- and internal constraint -i.e., the challenges from hard-line veto groups. By applying this approach to the 2nd Greco-Turkish rivalry, the paper finds that the leaders of the rivalry maintained their hostile relations partly because the U.S. prevented the leaders from resolving the issues under contention on the battlefields by intervening in the two rivals’ military conflict with a threat to stop providing both military and political support and partly because the hard-line veto players within the rivals prevented the leaders from resolving the issues at the negotiation table by hinting of electoral punishment. Under these circumstances, the leaders of the Greco-Turkish rivalry found that maintaining the rivalry would best serve their interest. The findings offer a contribution toward an enhanced understanding of the maintenance process in international rivalries.

This paper provides a general overview of Korea’s free trade agreement (FTA) policy fromthe perspective of level I and II negotiations. This paper reviews Korea’s 10 FTAs signedbetween 2003 and 2013 through “two-leve”l game analysis. It analyzed Korea’s FTAnegotiations under the Five-Factor Model, and assessed the level of difficulty in each of theFTAs Korea has signed and ratified. This paper concludes that domestic political factors andthe government-led FTA experience are key driving factors as the country seeks to achievegreater levels of trade liberalization. Furthermore, there were both economic and institutionalachievements during the 10 years. In level II negotiation, Korea also reached a higher levelof democracy along with a more detailed form of domestic conflict management byimplementing the Act on Trade Treaty Conclusion Procedure and Implementation in order toconduct FTAs in a more legitimate and systematic way. With the help of both road maps,Korea certainly has created a new vision with specific action plans toward a globalizedworld. Since Korea’s goal of becoming “an advanced open trading economy” is still beingpursued, the country has no way but to adapt to the changing global economic environmentwith more thorough preparation and sophisticated strategies. It also has to have the capacityto provide democratic and systematic measures that deal with the domestic reactions thatresult from trade liberalization.

This study explores how Taiwanese domestic politics in the 1990s influenced China’s Taiwan policy in the early 2000s. To illustrate this, this paper applied Robert Putnam’s discussion of the linkage between domestic politics and international politics using the two-level game theory. Using a two-level analysis, this paper analyzes how Taiwanese social cleavages in the 1990s led to a change not only in its domestic politics but ultimately in China’s Taiwan policy. Taiwan’s social cleavages such as ethnicity and national identity have erupted throughout democratic transition in the 1990s.These social cleavages were also reflected in the political party system. As a result, political parties divided into two camps, and the unification or independence issues became the borderline between them. These points culminated in the 2000 “critical presidential election.” The 2000 Presidential election resulted in Taiwan’s strengthened bargaining power on the issue as well as its reduced win-set. The election also resulted in China’s bargaining power becoming relatively weak. In order to expand the possibility of consensus with Taiwan instead of using military threat, China expanded its win-set first and then interacted both with Taiwanese politicians from the Pan-blue camp and with Taiwanese businesspersons in China for the purposes of expanding Taiwan’s win-set.

본 논문에서는 푸트남이 제시한 투-레벨 게임의 한계를 지적하고 이의 대안으로서의 투-페이스 게임을 제시하고 있다.투-레벨 게임 이론에서는 국가를 분절된 행위자들의 집합으로 간주하고 있으며, 국제적 협상이 국가적 레벨과 국제적 레벨의 상호작용에 의하여 이루어지고 있다고 주장한다. 그러나 국제적 협상과정에 대한 분석의 대상을 국가적 레벨과 국제적 레벨로 구분하는 것은 이론의 적용가능성을 심각하게 제한하는 결과를 가져온다. 본 논문에서는 국가를 분절된 행위자로 파악한다면 굳이 분석의 대상을 국가를 단위로 하는 국가적 레벨과 국제적 레벨로 한정할 필요가 없다고 파악하며, 국가적 레벨과 국제적 레벨의 상호작용 개념이 내부 평면(internal face)과 외부 평면(external face)의 상호작용 개념, 즉 투-페이스 게임(Two-Face Game)으로 전환되어야 한다고 주장한다.이러한 논지를 바탕으로 푸트남의 투-레벨 게임 이론에 있어 핵심적 위치를 차지하고 있는 윈-셋(win-set) 개념과 비준이론에 대한 재검토를 시도하고 있으며, 이에 근거해 투-페이스 게임에서 적용 가능한 협상전략의 도출을 통해 이론의 개념적 확장과 적용 가능성의 증대를 꾀하고 있다.

Since Putnam suggested the theory of two-level games, many analysts have tried to apply the theory to international negotiations, proving that his conjecture was right. Though Putnam's two-level game theory is not a totally new one, it has attracted the attention of many scholars. As it has been proved, however, Putnam"s theory has some weak points. In view of these, this article aims to reconsider Putnam's conjecture by questioning some features of the theory to expand its reliability and adaptability to the international negotiations. In doing so, this article replaces Putnam's two-level with the two-face; internal face and external face. It is because that two-level has some limits in explaining simultaneous interaction of negotiations among many actors with regard to settling the negotiation level. This article also suggests some negotiation strategies which can be derived from the two-face game. To conclude, the two-face game analysis can provide a more proper analytical framework in dealing with the simultaneous interactions of negotiations among many actors.

2008년 쇠고기 협상이 사회문제로 크게 대두된 원인을 살펴보고 한국정부가 앞으로의 협상에서 정책실패를 반복하지 않기 위하여 어떻게 하는 것이 바람직한지를 Putnam의 양면게임이론을 적용하여 분석하였다. 승리집합(Win-set)의 틀을 토대로 한국정부 협상단의 대안들을 결정짓는데 영향을 끼친 요인을 분석하여 이러한 특징이 이번 협상에 어떻게 작용하였는지, 추가협상에 영향을 끼친 국내의 요인은 무엇이었는지 살펴보았다. 이에 대한 분석결과 정부가 4.18협상 전 국내적으로는 정권교체 및 총선으로 인하여 정부의 쇠고기 협상 진행에 국민의 선호에 대한 깊이 있는 관찰이 이루어지지 않았고, 국내 승리집합의 범위도 넓었다. 대외적으로는 미국정부의 FTA와 연계한 강도 높은 쇠고기 수입개방 압력 및 OIE 국제적 기준 준수라는 영향이 있었다. 또한 통상정책에 있어서는 자기손목잡기 전략과 표적의 이슈연계전략이 효과적인 것으로 나타났다.

This research explores how beef-trade agreement between Korea and U.S.A had been initially reached, rejected by general public, and supplemented in the later stage in 2008 by employing two-level game theoretic model. By focusing on the concept of "win-set," two-level game theoretic model helps us understand the dynamics of international bargaining process. In other words, the model developed in this research investigates what domestic factors in Korea affected the size of potential win-sets and tracks how these win-sets has evolved as domestic factors in Korea changed. The results reveal that 1) beef-trade agreement is considered to be constrained by more ultimate agenda, FTA by Korean authority, 2) beef-trade negotiation drew less attention due to more important political events in Korea such as presidential and national parliament elections before the agreement was initially reached, 3) the process of bargaining was accelerated by clarification of international (OIE) standards, and 4) the political mobilization of general public on this particular issue leads both parties to supplement its earlier agreement. This suggests that it is critical for the authority to contemplate how the win-sets would change as important domestic and international factors develops in order to better negotiate in other situations.

Two-level game model provides a useful framework in analyzing and explaining the linkage between international politics of negotiation and domestic politics of its ratification. However, two-level game model as elaborated by Robert Putnam and else has an inherent shortcoming that regards power relations between negotiating states as equal and given. By doing so, it misses the real processes and outcomes of international egotiations under power asymmetry. This study considers power symmetry/ asymmetry as an important variable in two-level game. It further figures out distinctive linkages between ‘negotiation’ and ‘ratification’ depending on power relations of negotiating states: choice-game dominant v.s. structural coercion game dominant. Finally it also attends to distinctive influences of political rationality and economic rationality on egotiating states’ sizes of win-set depending on power relations. After refining simple two-level game into an ‘interactive two-level game’ and a ‘unidirectional twolevel game’ according to power symmetry/asymmetry, this study verifies theoretical issues through the comparative analysis of the agricultural negotiations between the US, EC, and South Korea.

본 연구에서는 앞으로 있을 한 중 FTA협상 추진 전략을 중국의 낮은 수준의 FTA 체결 선(先)제의에 대한 우리나라의 최적 대응전략 측면에서 고찰하였다. 국제협상 분석 게임모델 중 비협조게임의 기본 모형인 죄수의 딜레마 게임을 기본 틀로 하여 Putnam의 2단계 게임 론을 활용하여 결론을 도출하였다. 향후 한 중 FTA 추진의 전략적 기본원칙은 정부가 주장하는 높은 관세양허 수준의 포괄적 FTA보다는 비록 경제적 효과가 다소 떨어지더라도 가능한 빠른 시일 내 '중간 수준'의 FTA(포괄적이나 전반적으로 낮은 관세양허 방안)를 시작하는 정책을 추진함이 바람직 할 것으로 결론지었다. 이러한 관점에서 한 중 양국이 상대국으로부터의 수입액 중 일정 비율, 가령 70-80%에 해당하는 품목에 대해 협상개시와 함께 관세를 내리는 조기수확 프로그램(EHP: Early Harvest Program)을 활용하는 전략도 한 방법이 될 것이다.

The study analyzes the optimum Korea-China FTA negotiations by utilizing the Putnam's two- level game theoretic approach. According to the Putnam's theory, the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level 1 negotiators. The size of the win-set depends also on the level 2 political institutions and the distribution of power, preferences, and possible conditions among Level 2 constituents. The basic principles for the successful future Korea-China FTA negotiations should be based on comprehensiveness, substantial liberalization and gradual liberalization with consideration of sensitive sectors. This study concludes that mid-level FTA strategy with comprehensive but low tariff reduction would be of best strategy for Korea. This study also suggests the utilization of the EHP(Early Harvest Program) for the successful Korea-China FTA negotiations.

한미동맹 관계는 60여 년을 유지해오면서 역사적으로 가장 안정적으로 유지해오고 있는 동맹 중 하나라고 할 수 있다. 그리고 이제 한미동맹은 군사 분야뿐만 아니라 정치·경제·사회·문화 등 여러 분야를 포괄하는 ‘포괄적·역동적·호혜적 동맹관계’로 발전하고 있고 미래에도 한반도와 동북아의 평화와 안정을 유지하는 데 기여할 것으로 전망되고 있다. 그러나 한국의 국력이 점차 증가되고 전시작전통제권의 전환까지 추진되고 있는 지금 미래 한국과 미국 간에 발생할 수 있는 다양한 갈등 요인이 여전히 존재하고 있는 것도 사실이다. 본 연구는 그러한 요인 중 상대적으로 많이 연구되고 있지 않은 미군기지반환과 관련 된 협상을 핵심적으로 논의하고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 퍼트남의 양면게임이론을 활용하여 한국이 주한미군기지 이전협상에서 사용할 수 있는 가장 중요한 전략적 방안은 미국의 전략을 분석하여 미국의 세계 전략에 기여하면서 이와 한국의 국익을 연계하는 방안이라는 점을 제시한다. 즉, 한미동맹에 대한 중요성과 주한미군의 필요성을 이미 잘 알고 있는 국민들의 인식을 바탕으로 한국 정부는 주한미군 기지 이전 협상 간 한국의 국익은 최대화 하고 피해는 최소화 할 수 있는 전략(Low-Risk and High Gain Strategy)을 추진할 필요가 있다는 것이다.

The ROK-U.S. alliance has been one of the most stable in history for more than 60 years. The alliance is now developing into a comprehensive, dynamic, and reciprocal alliance that encompasses not only military areas but also politics, economy, society, and culture, and is expected to contribute to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia in the future. However, it is true that there are still various possible conflicts between Korea and the United States in the future, as Korea’s national power is gradually increasing and the transition of wartime operational control is being pursued. This study aims to discuss at the core the negotiations regarding the return of U.S. military bases, which have not been studied relatively much among such factors. This study suggests that the most important strategic way for Korea to use in negotiating the relocation of U.S. bases in Korea by utilizing Putnam’s two-level game theory is to analyze U.S. strategies and link them to the U.S. global strategic dimension. In other words, based on the public’s awareness of the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the need for U.S. troops stationed in Korea, the Korean government needs to pursue a low-risk and high-gain strategy to maximize South Korea’s national interest and minimize damage.

본 연구는 사도섬 금광의 세계유산 등재를 둘러싼 한·일 간 유산 해석·전시 갈등을 양면게임 이론으로 분석하고, 국제협상과 국내정치의 상호작용 속에서 세계유산 제도가 양국의 승인지대 형성과 변화에 미친 영향을 규명하였다. 이를 위해 분석 시기를등재 이전, 등재 결정, 등재 이후의 3단계로 구분하고, ICOMOS와 세계유산위원회의‘전체 역사’ 반영 권고가 양국 협상과 국내 수용 과정에서 합의의 근거가 되거나 갈등의 쟁점으로 전환되는 양상을 추적하였다. 분석 결과, 한·일 양국의 승인 지대는 등재 이전과 이후에는 비중첩 상태이었고, 등재 결정 국면에서만 제한적으로 중첩되었다. 이는 지역경제, 국내정치적 효과, 국가 위상 등 등재에 따른 부수적 편익이 상승적연계로 작용하여 일본의 국내 승인 범위를 일시적으로 확대한 결과였다. 그러나 등재이후 강제노동 관련 용어, 서사 및 전시 쟁점이 다시 부상하면서 조건부 합의는 유지되지 못하였다. 특히 해석 권고의 구속력이 약하고 이행 평가와 제재의 연계도 충분하지 않아, 일본이 권고를 이행하지 않더라도 감수해야 할 부담은 제한적이었다. 또한 보존상태 심의도 물리적 보존 중심으로 설계되어 있고 갈등 이해당사국의 평가 참여 역시 제한되어, 세계유산위원회의 해석 권고가 일본 국내정치에서 긍정적 반향으로 이어지는 데 한계가 있었다. 이에 본 연구는 예비평가·등재신청 단계의 협의 절차 의무화, 이의제기 범위 확대, 이행 평가 시 이해당사국 의견 수렴, 해석 권고 반복 불이행시 위험에 처한 세계유산 목록 등재 검토와의 연동을 개선 방안으로 제안한다.

This study applies two-level game theory to the conflict between Korea and Japan over heritage interpretation and presentation surrounding the inscription of the Sado Island Gold Mines on the World Heritage List. It examines how the World Heritage system affected the formation and transformation of the two countries’ win-sets through the interaction between international negotiations and domestic politics. The analysis is organized into three stages: before the inscription, the inscription decision, and after the inscription. It traces how the recommendations of ICOMOS and the World Heritage Committee to “reflect the full history of the property” served as a basis for agreement or became a point of contention in the processes of bilateral negotiation and domestic acceptance. The findings indicate that the win-sets of Korea and Japan did not overlap before or after the inscription, while they overlapped only in a limited way during the inscription decision stage. This temporary overlap resulted from ancillary benefits associated with inscription, including regional economic gains, domestic political effects, and enhanced national prestige, which operated as synergistic linkages and temporarily widened Japan’s range of domestic approval. After the inscription, however, issues concerning terminology related to forced labor, narratives, and presentation resurfaced, and the conditional agreement could not be maintained. In particular, because recommendations related to interpretation had limited binding force and implementation review was not sufficiently linked to sanctions, Japan would incur only limited costs even if it failed to implement the recommendations. In addition, the state of conservation review process is designed primarily around physical conservation, and the participation of concerned parties in evaluation remains limited. This constrains the potential for the Committee’s recommendations related to interpretation to generate positive reverberation in Japan’s domestic politics. Accordingly, this study proposes institutional reforms, including making consultation procedures mandatory at the Preliminary Assessment and nomination stages, expanding the scope of the objection mechanism, soliciting opinions from concerned parties in implementation evaluations, and linking repeated noncompliance with recommendations related to interpretation to consideration for inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger.

이 논문은 영국과 EU의 탈퇴(브렉시트) 협상을 양면게임(Two-Level Game: TLG)의 시각에서 분석한다. 로버트 퍼트남(Robert Putnam)이 이론화한 TLG는 국내정치와 국제협상의 인과관계를 한 방향 혹은 쌍방향으로 보는 게 아니라, 두 과정이 ‘언제’ 그리고 ‘어떻게’ 연관되는지를 규명하는데 초점을 둔다. 그는 국가 간의 협상을 두 면으로 구분하여 설명한다. 제1면(혹은 레벨 I)은 국가대표자 간에 전개되는 국제적 게임으로, 제2면(혹은 레벨 II)은 국제협상에 영향을 줄 수 있는 이해 당사자들을 포함하는 국내적 게임으로 정의한다. 국내 여러 이해당사자의 승인(비준)을 받을 수 있는 국제 협상의 총 집합은 윈셋(win-set)으로 정의된다. 영국은 단일시장과 관세동맹에서의 탈퇴를 천명하여 일단 자국의 윈셋(win-set)을 의도적으로 축소했다. 영국을 제외한 EU27개국(EU27)도 경제적 이익보다 통합 유지를 우선으로 하여 협상 초기에는 마찬가지로 윈셋을 축소하려 할 것이다. 이런 이유로 영국과 EU27의 협상은 순탄치 않을 가능성이 매우 높다.

This paper aims at analyzing the Brexit negotiations from Robert Putnam's two-level game. Based on the official statements and press reports about the British, Member States of the European Union (EU) and the European institutions, each of the three's negotiating objectives and strategies were deduced. The British government intends to reduce its own win-sets (all sets of possible agreements at international level among government negotiators that can win approval at domestic level) to get the best deal from the Brexit negotiations that would be fraught in the months to come in 2017 and 2018. The EU27 (27 Member States of the EU, excluding the UK) would agree to common negotiating objectives and strategies, among other things, maintaining the integrity of the Union and is expected not to give grounds to the UK demands. EU27 is also expected to cut down on its win-sets at least in the initial negotiating stages.

남북관계는 “나라와 나라 사이의 일반적인 관계가 아닌 통일을 지향하는 과정에서 잠정적으로 형성되는 특수관계”라는 점을 감안할 때, 이를 고스란히 보여주는 것 중의 하나가 ‘금강산관광사업’이라고 할 수 있다. 이 사업은 남북 간의 화해와 교류협력을 상징적으로 보여주는 협력사업인 동시에 첨예한 남북 간의 갈등과 이해관계를 여실히 드러내는 표본이기도 하다. 이 사업은 2008년 7월 북한군 총격으로 관광객이 사망하는 사건이 발생하면서 중단되었다. 이 사업의 잠정 중단된 이후 남측이 북측에 요구하는 ‘3대 선결요건’ 즉, ‘진상규명’, ‘재발방지책 마련’, ‘관광객 신변안전보장의 제도적 장치 마련’ 등을 사업 재개의 핵심쟁점이었다면, 중단이 장기화되면서 각종 남북관계 현안이 연계되어 문제의 실마리 찾는 것이 더욱 어렵게 되었다. 본 연구는 금강산관광 사업의 중단과 재개를 둘러싸고 남한 사회에서 진행되고 있는 찬반양론은 왜 금강산관광사업의 재개가 어려운지, 이를 가로막는 장애요인이 무엇인지에 관해 부분적 설명과 해석에 머물 수밖에 없다는 문제의식을 갖고 ‘왜 이 사업의 재개가 어려운가’에 초점을 맞춰 분석을 시도한다. 본 연구는 기본적으로 이 사업의 재개문제는 남북관계와 국내정치의 관계라는 틀에서 접근해야 한다고 주장하고, 이를 양면게임(two-level game)의 논리를 통해 설명하려고 한다.

Considering North-South Korean relations is “not a normal relationship between two states but a special relationship formed in the course of promoting national reunification,” the Mount Kumgang tourism project is an exemplary case that demonstrate this relationship. The project is a symbolic project in a sense that demonstrates the north-south reconciliation and cooperation and at the same time reveals the concomitant conflict and cooperation between the two Koreas. The project was halted in July 2008 after a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean guard. Following the halt in the tourism project, the South has long adhered to the position that the North must accept the three major prerequisites: investigation of the truth of the case, establish prevention measures and create institutional measures to guarantee personal safety of tourists. However, with the prolonged delay in negotiation, the resumption is becoming ever more difficult as it is now linked to other various issues of inter-Korean relations. This article is part of an analysis that focus on the question of “why is the resumption of this program difficult?” as South Korean society remain divided between the pros and cons surrounding the halt and resumption of the Kumgang tourism project. This study attempts to identify the obstacles and even partially suggest explanation and interpretation of factors that hinder the resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism. This article argues that essentially the problem of resuming the tourism project must be approached under the framework of inter-Korean relations and domestic politics and describe this dynamic through the logic of two-level game.