Earticle

최근 전 세계적으로 유동성이 부족해지면서 플랜트 수출에 있어 금융조달의 중요성이 커지고 있다. 플랜트 수출은 장기간에 걸쳐 거액의 자금이 소요되는데 비해 수입국의 비상위험이 크고, 대수의 법칙이 작용하지 않아 민간 상업금융기관이 참여를 꺼리는 시장실패가 종종 발생한다. 이런 이유로 세계 각국은 플랜트 수출 지원을 위한 정책수단으로 공적수출신용을 이용하고 있으며, 선진국들은 WTO 보조금협정 및 OECD 공적수출신용협약 같은 국제 규범을 제정하여 수출신용이 보조금으로 남용되지 않도록 규제하고 있다. 이에 본고에서는 이들 국제 규범에 대한 분석을 바탕으로 대표적인 수출신용제도인 직접대출, 이자율지지, 수출보험 등의 특성을 분석하고, 미국과 유럽의 선진국들이 플랜트 수출 산업 육성을 위해 국제 규범의 틀 안에서 수출신용제도를 어떻게 활용하고 있는지를 연구하여, 우리나라 공적수출신용의 개선 방안을 제시한다.

With liquidity lacking throughout the world in recent years, the importance of financing has become more important in the export of plants. Demanding much fund, plant exports pose great political risk from importing countries. In short, the law of large numbers is not applicable in this sector so that commercial financial institutions are usually hesitant to participate, leading to market failure in often cases. To facilitate plant exports, many countries around the world use official export credit to grant policy support. As such, advanced countries have adopted the international rules such as WTO ASCM and OECD Arrangement for Officially Supported Export Credits to prevent these credits from being used as a form of subsidy. Upon analyzing these international rules on export credits, this paper 1) exams the advantages and disadvantages of the officially supported export credit programs including direct lending, export guarantee/insurance, interest rate support, etc., 2) investigates how advanced countries such as the U.S., Germany and France operate their programs within the scope of the WTO /OECD rules to support plant exports, and 3) compares those export credit programs of these advanced countries. By doing so, the paper suggests some of the implications as well as the ways to improve its system and operation for Korea.

본 연구는 정부의 수출지원이 중소기업의 수출에 미치는 효과를 수출모형을 기반으로 실증⋅분석하였다. 이러한 분석을 위해 2005～2008년 기간 동안 정부의 중소기업 수출지원금 자료, 전체산업을 대상으로 한 중소기업 수출통계와 기업의 재무제표자료를 통합한 패널자료를 구축하여 이 연구에 최초로 사용되었다. 정부의 수출지원 정책의 효과를 분석함에 있어서 대응적 사실의 문제를 조절하기 위해 DID 기법을 사용하였고 수출지원금의 내생성 문제를 완화하기 위하여 2단계 Tobit 모형을 활용하였다. 이 연구의 핵심적 추정결과를 보면, 우선 정부의 수출지원에 대한 추정계수는 전체기업을 대상으로 하거나 DID 표본 기업을 대상으로 추정하거나 관계없이 모든 모형에서 수출지원이 수출에 긍정적인 역할을 하고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 정부의 수출지원금의 추정계수가 모든 모형에서 양(+)의 부호로 통계적으로 유의하게 나타났다. 이는 정부의 수출지원이 중소기업의 수출에 긍정적인 효과를 미친다는 것을 시사한다. 다음으로, 정부의 수출지원금의 내생성과 표본선정 편의를 고려한 추정결과에서도 정부의 수출지원은 모든 모형에서 중소기업의 수출에 통계적으로 유의하게 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나 정부의 수출지원정책이 중소기업의 수출에 긍정적인 영향을 미치고 있음을 재확인할 수 있다. 마지막으로, 기업 업력과 종업원 1인당 연구개발투자에 대한 추정계수는 전체적으로 양(+)의 부호로 유의하게 나타났다. 이 결과는 기업 업력이 높아질수록 수출 인프라가 형성이 되기 쉽고 기술력이 누적되어 수출역량이 높아지는 것을 시사한다. 또한 근로자 1인당 연구개발비는 수출에 양의 부호로 통계적으로 유의한 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 중소기업의 수출지원 대상을 선정함에 있어서 기업의 업력과 연구개발비 등을 고려한다면 수출지원 정책의 효과를 더욱 제고할 수 있음 시사한다

This paper investigates export effects of government subsidy to Korean small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs) based on the export model. The paper employs a unique data set on government export subsidy to SMEs over the period 2004～2008 for listed and non-listed companies. Two characteristics of the distribution of export among SMEs and government subsidy create estimation problem. First, a large portion of small and medium sized firms does not export actually. Second, government export subsidy can be endogenous where government may subsidize the SMEs which are selected on the basis of their firm performance and export activities as well. Because of these two characteristics, ordinary least squares applied directly to the export model would yield imprecise and possibly inconsistent estimates of the effects of export subsidy and other factors on export for SMEs. For these reasons, the paper controls for the distributional problem of export and endogeneity of export subsidy using a Tobit procedure, and for counterfactuals between government subsidy and SME's exporting using the DID method. DID estimator can mitigate the selection bias caused by the counterfactual outcomes, using non-subsidized firms to evaluate what would have happen to subsidized firms if they had not been subsidized by the government The DID estimator, nevertheless, could have the potential endogeneity problem which may arise when the probability of being selected by government is correlated with error terms. Our empirical results show that estimated coefficients for export subsidy to SMEs are positively significant regardless of sample size, either all firms or the DID sample firms. This implies that government export subsidy should be positively associated with SMEs' exports. Next, estimated coefficients for firm age and R&D investment per worker are found to be significantly different from zero. This implies that export subsidy effects could be expanded when government should provide export subsidy to more R&D-investing and more experienced SMEs. In sum, our empirical findings suggest that the Korean government export subsidy policy should play an important role in promoting export by lowering manufacturing costs of the SMEs. In this context, the Korean subsidy policy seems to be partly successful to stimulate export of SMEs.

There has been a long-standing interest of developed countries as well as developing countries in the effectiveness and efficiency of government export promotion activities and their role in generating economic growth and jobs. This paper empirically examines effects of export promotion on employment over the period 2005-2008 for Korean listed and non-listed manufacturing firms. The paper employs the panel model of labor demand and controls for simultaneity of the exports and real wages using a two step Tobit-GLS procedure. Our empirical findings are as follows. First we find some evidence for employment effects of export promotion programs to small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) during the sample period after Korean financial crisis. This suggests that expansion of export promotion programs for SMEs can have positive effects on employment in Korea. Second, both company age and R&D expenditure per worker are positively associated with an increase in employment of SMEs. This implies that such factors could be used as criteria of selecting subsidized firms, which may enhance the employment effect of export promotion programs.

일회적 순차게임은 어떤 결정이 수출 보조금과 수출 할당제와 같은 보편적인 통상정책을 위해 어떻게 수립될 수 있는지 이해를 위한 유용한 이론이 되어 왔다. 본 연구는 만일 일련의 통상 정책 게임이 어떤 시장 불확실성을 가지고 한 기간 동안 반복되는 경우에 어떻게 통상 정책 변화에 영향을 받는 지를 토론하는 데 주목적이 있다. 직관적으로 어떤 정부는 장기 국내 사회 후생을 증진시키기 위해 직접 수출 장려 정책과 간접 수출 장려 정책 사이에서 수출 장려 정책의 선택을 강요받을 지도 모른다. 본 연구는 정부가 수출 보험 프로그램과 같은 수출 장려제도를 선택함으로 써 국내 사회 후생 수준을 개선시킬 수 있음을 보여준다. 이 과정에서 본 연구는 반복된 통상 정책 게임을 통해서 확보될 수 있는 예상 할인 사회 후생을 확인한다.

Under the GATT system, there was no definite regulation on domestic subsidy which had no direct relation with export, though it limited direct supports that might affect export, The reason of regulation is that it may result in unfairness for competing nations because the subsidy can change artificially the comparative advantage structure and may allow some products without comparative advantage to be exported. According to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the UR, the definition and countervailing measures on subsidy was modified for clarification. Under the WTO system, subsidies were classified based on their impact on trade and their specificity as banned, countervailable, and permitted subsidies. While the Organization does not allow the first two subsidies the last one allows subsidies on research and development, local development and environmental protection. As a result, export relative price and world income showed expected responses and the coefficients were generally significant. In case of the amount of R&D subsidy, however, there was no statistical significance. The empirical evidences imply that the R&D subsidy was not managed effectively. Therefore, it is needed to reform the subsidy system to improve its effectiveness in terms of resource allocation. And in the long run, subsidy needs to be limited within certain amount to collect for the market failure.

This paper explains the occurrence of export subsidy competition and a series of accusations by the exporters that follows it, and also examines the welfare implications of the WTO agreement that prohibits export subsidies for the countries concerned and the world as a whole. It is shown that the welfare of the exporter with low costs of production is higher when export subsidization is permitted than when it is prohibited. Furthermore, the world as a whole is better off when exporting countries subsidize their exports.

According to the influential model suggested by Brander and Spencer(1985),an increasing export subsidy can increase a market share of the firm inforeign markets and a social welfare of the country under the assumption ofneutral government. In this paper, using the concept of a politically realisticobjective function (PROF). I try to develop a policy decision model when thegovernment decision makers are corrupt. Within this particular setup, thetheoretical finding of the paper shows that a collusion equilibrium can existbetween policy makers and high cost firm. In this case, agricultural export canbe increased with an export subsidy, however, it is not socially beneficial.

Since the WTO began, export subsidies are primarily prohibited. This paper aims to investigate whether there exists a mechanism to lift national welfare through enhancing aggregate industry productivity where export subsidy can serve as an incentive. A scheme can be contrived not for increasing the total amount of exports quantitatively but for enhancing aggregate industry productivity qualitatively. According to Melitz (2003), access to trade liberalization should positively affect aggregate industry productivity. Theoretically, this paper showed that aggregate industry productivity can be enhanced through a tactic which arouses competition among firms for export subsidy. Notably, redistribution of collected taxes for rewarding more productive firms can encourage the entire industry. With redistribution, any dispute can be avoided because there is no realized market extortion. In the context of the world, it can be a case that a country might have an industry struggling from inefficient production. For example, the agricultural industry in Korea is relatively less robust to trade liberalization than other industries. In this case, export subsidy as an incentive scheme can be a solution for enhancing aggregate industry productivity.

We extend de Meza(1986), Mai and Hwang(1988) and Lee and Lee (2007) to consider the optimal export subsidy policy under the learning-by-doing and concave cost. Specifically, in the presence of learning-by-doing, we examine the relationship between the difference in marginal costs and the difference in optimal subsidies which depends on the nature of cost curve. The learning-by-doing effect serves to make cost difference larger. Moreover, the cost difference will be much larger if the cost curve of home firm is concave. Therefore, the government must provide higher subsidy to the low cost firm which stems from the learning-by-doing along with concave cost. This result may provide policy makers with useful information when implementing export subsidy policies. This implies that the more concave the cost curve, the higher the subsidy offered by the low-cost country.

중국은 1994년 관리변동환율제도로 이행하였으나 미달러화에 페그시킴으로써 달러당 8.27 ~ 8.28 위안대에 소폭 변동되는 실질적인 고정환율제도를 운용하고 있다. 실제가치에 비해 저평가된 환율은 자국상품의 수출가격경쟁력을 높여 수출보조금(export subsidy)이란 시비를 낳게 되고 이는 공정한 경쟁을 저해하는 조치로서 WTO 보조금 및 상계관세 협정은 이를 규제하고 있다. 이에 미국의 공정환율협회(FCA)를 중심으로 저평가된 중국 위안환율에 대한 비난 및 WTO에 제소하겠다는 주장이 강하게 제기되고 있다. 본 연구에서는 중국의 환율제도가 어떠한 특성을 지니고 있으며 어떤 점에서 수출보조금이라는 비난을 받고 있는지 논리적 근거를 분석하여 국제 통화질서규범에 대한 이해를 높이고자 한다.

The purpose of this paper is to study the China's exchange rate system and the rationale of alleged currency manipulation. China has pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar since 1994. Recently, as the dollar has weakened relative to the euro, yen and other currencies, there are much international pressures on the China requiring revaluation of yuan. Even more, U.S. manufacturers and Congress strongly criticized China for maintaining as artificial exchange rate with the dollar. Under the IMF Agreement, countries can choose their exchange rate system and are permitted to intervene in exchange rate market when such intervention is necessary to counter disorderly market conditions. But meanwhile, countries are not permitted to engage in protracted, large-scale intervention. results in a de facto subsidy to Chinese exporters. WTO Regulation also prohibits manipulation of exchange rate as export subsidy under SCM Agreement. This paper concludes that Chinese yuan is undervalued. But it seems to be difficult to judge Chinese exchange rate system as the prohibited export subsidy

To discuss an optimal trade policy, a game-theoretic model can be useful. Cooper-Riezman (1989) founded a one-shot game model to explain how a government chooses a trade policy, such as either export subsidy or export quota. This paper extends that model to a repeated version, a form that has not been attempted before. Repetition of the trade policy game raises interesting questions about how to maximize discounted national welfare under a condition of uncertainty. Surprisingly, a government actually can implement another policy instrument, such as export insurance subsidy, to improve discounted national welfare. It is hoped that this paper can contribute to explaining why export insurance subsidy is implemented despite the strengthened trend of free trade.

O presente trabalho visa a examiner os problemas da nova poliitca industrial e comercio exterior do Brasil para desenvolver a Zona de Processamento de Exportacoes (ZPE); e as implicacoes para ZPE do Acordo de OMC sobre Subsidios e Medidas Compensatorias (SMC) que se serve como de facto regulamentos e rege a subsidios de exportacao, na ausencia legal da referencia especifica a EPZ. O tema de inconsistencia teorica dos subsidios de exportacao com o regime da OMC constitui tanto o problematico multilateral como os instrumentos criticos na politica commercial e industrial do Brasil, dada a especificidade que satisfaca a contribuicao financeira publica e o beneficio para industrias ou empresas particulars, e ao meesmo tempo a compatibilidade pratica e justificada dos incentivos preferenciais ? fiscal, cambiaria e administrativa, com o regime nacional de investimento conforme a Lei nacional de promocao de inversoes para as regioes menos desenvoldidas. O trabalho examinou minuciosamente os elementos da politica de investimento sob a perspectiva de OMC/SMC, e vice?versa, tentando estabelecer o marco analitico que facilite a discussao academica no pos?ronda de Doha na OMC sobre subsidios. Considera?se que este marco analitico faria com que os estudos futuros sobre ZPE e seus modelos de desenvolvimento possa avancar ao nivel teorico mais rigoroso para determiner o delineamento dos subsidios proibidos e permitidos mais alem de tratamento especial e diferenciado, incluindo grandfathering na OMC; e ao nivel pratico mais comprensivel para empreender o novo modelo da politica industrial do Brasil em torno da ZPE. Como uma agenda de estudos no futuro, o estudo sugeriu a pesquisa sobre o papel de ZPE: no contexto da Cooperacao Sul?Sul entre os paises de BRICs no period da pos?crise financeira global e mudanca estrutural na composicao da economia regional e global no periodo da pos?ronda de Doha na OMC.

본 논문은 무역정책 이론에 대한 최근의 연구동향의 연장선에서 전략적 무역정책의 선구적 연구라 할 수 있는 Brander-Spencer(1985)의 모형을 정치경제학적 측면에서 확장하고자 한다. 즉 전략적 수출보조금 정책에 대한 로비의 효과를 분석한다. 시장구조의 불완전경쟁성 뿐만 아니라 로비라는 정치활동을 명시적으로 고려함으로써 전략적 무역정책의 내용을 확대하는 것이 본 연구의 목적이다. 정부와 관련 이해그룹 간 상호 정치적인 관계 속에서 결정되는 정치적 균형보조금은 정부가 자애로운 사회계획가의 역할을 할 때의 최적보조금 보다 높은 것으로 나타난다. 그러한 정치적 균형 보조금은 정치적 기여에 대한 정부의 가치평가가 높을수록 또 이해집단의 규모가 작을수록 커지고, 근로자의 숫자가 증가할수록 작아진다는 사실이 보여 진다. 또한 정치적 균형에서 이해그룹의 기여금은 균형보조금 정책으로 인해 발생하는 사회의 초과부담액에 비례하여 제공된다. 이외에도 본 연구에서는 서로 다른 정치적 조건을 가정한 몇 가지 시나리오 하에서 정치적 균형보조금을 도출한다.

This paper revisits the strategic export subsidy policy in a lobbying context. Its goal is to extend the analysis of Brander and Spencer's model(1985). When an industry special interest group lobbies the domestic government for an export policy, the politically sustainable equilibrium level of subsidy is higher than the optimal strategic level. Such a political equilibrium subsidy rises as the government?s valuation of political contributions increases; An increase in capital owners(workers) pushes down the politically optimal subsidy. In addition, it is shown that an organized interest group contributes an amount which is proportional to the excess burden imposed on society by the equilibrium subsidy policy to the domestic government. This paper also demonstrates that the politically-determined subsidies under various scenarios with different political conditions are always higher than the optimal subsidy.

The change in the economic environment, such as the global financial crisis or the progressively disappearing barriers and borders brought a great impact to most of SMEs. A large amount of research has found diverse results concerning government export subsidy and export performance. However, there is a small amount of empirical analysis between government export subsidy and export performances. This research explored the impact of current government export promotion and their strategies such as subsidy for trade exhibition and market pioneer group to SME export in Chung-nam Province based on the 2008 survey data. The results suggest that government export promotion and their strategies have a statistically significant effect on SMEs export. The results show that a one Korean Won increase in export subsidy for trade exhibition and market pioneer group is associated with almost a one thousand Korean Won increase in their export performances and these results support the research which was done by the European Commission in 2007. Thus, this research may provide good policy implications to government officers in the export promotion sector. However, even if the empirical analysis shows strong evidence, this study needs to develop further with an extended data set because it include only a three years data set. Thus, the obvious next step is to extend database to a national level or a longer time series data.

이 연구는 디자인기업에 대한 정부의 수출지원이 기업성과, 특히 생산과 노동생산성에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석하였다. 이를 위해, 이 연구는 2010년-2012년 기간 동안 디자인기업에 대한 정부의 수출지원 자료와 기업 재무자료를 결합하여 패널자료를 구축하였으며 정부의 수출지원의 내생성과 관측되지 않은 기업의 이질성을 고려하기 위해 2단계 프로빗/토빗-임의효과 모형을 활용하였다. 분석결과, 기업의 자본집약도와 수출의 확대가 생산성 향상과 기업경쟁력 제고에 핵심적인 요인이 될 수 있으며 이는 디자인을 통해 수출의 학습효과가 발생할 수 있음을 시사한다. 둘째, 정부의 디자인기업의 수출역량강화 지원 사업이 직접적으로 생산성 향상과 기업 경쟁력에 긍정적 영향을 미칠 뿐만 아니라 간접적으로 정부지원이 수출 촉진을 통해 생산성에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.

This paper empirically examines effects of export subsidy on design firm performance over the period 2008-2010 for Korean listed and non-listed manufacturing firms. The paper employs the panel model of productivity and controls for simultaneity of the design firms’exports and government subsidy using a two stage Tobit/Probit-GLS procedure. First, empirical results show that export per employee and capital intensity can have positive effect on firm performance, such as firm’s production and productivity, supporting learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Second, empirical results show that government financial assistance to design firms can directly affect their production and productivity and indirectly through encouraging exporting. This implies that expansion of export subsidy to design firms should have positive effects on total sales and productivity in Korea, enhancing firm performance and thus international competitiveness.

This paper examines whether or not export insurance subsidy provided by the Korea government has promoted Korea's export supply. Unlike previous studies on the effectiveness of export subsidy in export demand, the current paper examines the effectiveness of export subsidy in export supply. The current study starts from examining the stationarity nature of the concerned variables. The unit root tests show that all concerned variable are non-stationary. The estimation was conducted with the ordinary least square method using annual data over the period for the object of analysis ranging from 1990 to 2007. The empirical evidences show that export insurance system has not contributed to promotion export supply in Korea.