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최근 미국의 동아시아 재균형 정책과 중⋅러의 전략적 제휴가 맞부딪혀 양 진영 간 新냉전으로 비화되지 않을까 하는 우려가 커 지고 있는 가운데, 동아시아에서 동시에 진행 중인 해양분쟁이 심화되는 양상을 보임으로써 이 지역의 안정에 대한 암울한 전망을 던져주고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 비관론에 대한 반증으로서 과거 300년 이상 지속되어온 중⋅러 영토분쟁의 타결사례는 한 가닥 희망의 근거가 될 수도 있다는 점에서 되돌아볼 가치가 있다. 중⋅러 영토분쟁의 성공적 타결은 현재 영토갈등을 겪고 있는 국가들 에게 희망을 주는 사례로서 중요한 함의를 갖고 있다. 역사나 국제정치에서 필연은 없다. 비록 과거 역사로부터 주어진 환경(구조)에 의해 제약을 받기는 하지만, 결국 역사를 만들어가 는 것은 인간이기 때문이다. 국가의 지도자들은 주어진 국제정치 환경에 기계처럼 반응하는 존재가 아니라, 의지를 갖고 의도적으로 어떤 정책을 추진함으로써 암울한 현실을 변화시키는 힘을 가진 존재이다. 따라서 동아시아의 미래는 관련국가의 국민들이 어떤 지 도자들을 선택하느냐에도 크게 좌우된다. 국제정치의 현실은 늘 인간과 구조(혹은 의지와 결정론)의 양 극단이 아닌 양자의 상호작용 속에서 만들어지는 것이다. 중⋅러 영토분쟁의 타결사례가 보여주듯이 민족주의적 감정을 자극하고 선동을 일삼는 정치인들이 퇴출 되고 역사가 주는 교훈을 현실에 적용하는 비전과 역량을 갖춘 정치인들이 집권한다면 평화의 실현이 반드시 불가능한 것만은 아닐 것이다.

최근 미국의 동아시아 재균형 정책과 중⋅러의 전략적 제휴가 맞부딪혀 양 진영 간 新냉전 으로 비화되지 않을까 하는 우려가 커지고 있는 가운데, 동아시아에서 동시에 진행 중인 해 양분쟁이 심화되는 양상을 보임으로써 이 지역의 안정에 대한 암울한 전망을 던져주고 있 다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 비관론에 대한 반증으로서 과거 300년 이상 지속되어온 중⋅러 영 토분쟁의 타결사례는 한 가닥 희망의 근거가 될 수도 있다는 점에서 되돌아볼 가치가 있다. 중⋅러 영토분쟁의 성공적 타결은 현재 영토갈등을 겪고 있는 국가들에게 희망을 주는 사 례로서 중요한 함의를 갖고 있다. 역사나 국제정치에서 필연은 없다. 비록 과거 역사로부터 주어진 환경(구조)에 의해 제약 을 받기는 하지만, 결국 역사를 만들어가는 것은 인간이기 때문이다. 국가의 지도자들은 주 어진 국제정치 환경에 기계처럼 반응하는 존재가 아니라, 의지를 갖고 의도적으로 어떤 정 책을 추진함으로써 암울한 현실을 변화시키는 힘을 가진 존재이다. 따라서 동아시아의 미 래는 관련국가의 국민들이 어떤 지도자들을 선택하느냐에도 크게 좌우된다. 국제정치의 현 실은 늘 인간과 구조(혹은 의지와 결정론)의 양 극단이 아닌 양자의 상호작용 속에서 만들 어지는 것이다. 중⋅러 영토분쟁의 타결사례가 보여주듯이 민족주의적 감정을 자극하고 선 동을 일삼는 정치인들이 퇴출되고 역사가 주는 교훈을 현실에 적용하는 비전과 역량을 갖 춘 정치인들이 집권한다면 평화의 실현이 반드시 불가능한 것만은 아닐 것이다. * JPI정책포럼 서면발표자료

본 논문은 그동안 국내외적으로 제기되었던 한반도 중립화 혹은 중립화통일 방안을 역사적으로 검토하고, 찬성론과 반대론의 논리를 파악/비교한 후 찬반론의 오류를 지적하고, 그것이 통일한국의 국가전략으로서 갖는 의미, 현실성등을 논하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 4강의 이해가 첨예하게 대립하는 한반도의 지정학적 “운명”은 여전히 한반도 중립화안이 한국의 대전략(grand strategy)로서 유용한 것이라고 인식하는 논자들이 국내외적으로 구한말부터 현재까지 지속적으로 존재하게끔 만드는 근본적인 이유라고 할 수 있다. 구한말부터의 현재까지 제기된 한반도중립화에 관한 논쟁을 개략적으로 분석한 후 필자는 통일한국이 미국, 혹은 중국 등 어느 한 강대국에 대하여 편승정책을 취하는 것 이외에도, 국가전략으로서 점진적, 단계적, 한시적 (혹은 영구) 중립화안을 고려할 가치가 충분히 있다는 것을 강조한다.

그동안 국내외적으로 제기되었던 한반도 중립화 혹은 중립화통일 방안을 역사적으로 검토하고, 찬성론과 반대론의 논리를 파악/비교한 후 찬반론의 오류를 지적하고, 그것 이 통일한국의 국가전략으로서 갖는 의미, 현실성 등을 논하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 4 강의 이해가 첨예하게 대립하는 한반도의 지정학적 “운명”은 여전히 한반도중립화안 이 한국의 대전략(grand strategy)로서 유용한 것이라고 인식하는 논자들이 국내외적 으로 구한말부터 현재까지 지속적으로 존재하게끔 만드는 근본적인 이유라고 할 수 있다. 구한말부터의 현재까지 제기된 한반도중립화에 관한 논쟁을 개략적으로 분석 한 후 필자는 통일한국이 미국, 혹은 중국 등 어느 한 강대국에 대하여 편승정책을 취하는 것 이 외에도, 국가전략으로서 점진적, 단계적, 한시적 (혹은 영구) 중립화안을 고 려할 가치가 충분히 있다는 것을 강조한다.

This presentation tries (1) to examine the domestically and internationally raised debates on the neutralization of the Korean peninsula or reunification of the Korean peninsula via neutralization process in history; (2) to grasp and compare logics in pros and cons on these debates, pointing out the errors of the both logics; (3) to discuss the meaning and applicability of the neutralization as the reunified Korea's national grand strategy. Due to the Korean peninsula’s geopolitical “destiny” where the four major powers’ strategic interests intersect, the ideas on the neutralization of the Korean peninsula have incessantly attracted many thinkers both in Korea area and abroad since the late 19th century until today. This presenter, after briefly analyzing these debates, comes to conclude that seeking for the gradual, phased, and temporal (or permanent) neutrality status could be a Korea’s grand strategic alternative to its jumping on America's (or China’s) bandwagon.

This paper purports to provide a counterfactual analysis of a non-event during the Second Republic of Korea, that is, the aborted Korea-Japan Normalization. The author argues that without General Park Chung Hee’s military coup on May 16, 1961, the rapprochement between the two former enemies would have been possible during the Second Republic of Korea. The ongoing process of negotiations for diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan would have been accelerated and have reached the ultimate goal but for the military’s unconstitutional toppling down of the first democratic regime in South Korea. Many experts argue that President Park’s strong leadership or the U.S. pressure is the main reason for the achievement of Korea-Japan Normalization. However, based on counterfactual analysis, this paper concludes that Korea-Japan Normalization would have been achieved much earlier than the year of 1965 when the two states actually reached an agreement only after spending four years of tough bargaining after the coup in South Korea.

The purpose of this article is to urge political leaders, scholars, pundits and government officials to adjust South Korea’s short-term foreign policy goals “realistically” to the long-term grand strategy for neutralized reunification in the era of tumultuous changes in Northeast Asia where rising China, rebalancing America, nuclear North Korea, and the more assertive Japan (becoming normal state) loom large in the strategic landscapes. As the recently ongoing controversy on the prospective deployment of THAAD system in the South Korean soils indicates, it is high time for South Koreans to develop, exchange and discuss various ideas so that the long-time confrontation between North and South Korea may not spread strategic mistrust among all of the regional powers. Until now since the signing of military pact in 1953 South Korea has maintained a strong alliance relationship with the U.S. At the government level other options have never been seriously considered even in a brief interlude during the Second Republic of Korea (July 1960-May 1961) when some politicians and civilian activists promoted the idea of neutralized reunification of Korea. In today’s fluctuating situations in Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula is the epicenter of nuclear confrontation among great powers due to the North Korean nuclear issue and the controversial THAAD system. Whether or not the two Koreas conduct wise foreign policies is not just a matter of Koreans themselves but a matter of life and death for an emerging new world order.

The power struggle among the United States, China, Russia, and Japan surrounding the Korean peninsula has led some political leaders, scholars, pundits and government officials to get involved in debates on neutralization of the Korean peninsula since the late 19th century. This includes all the more complicated debates on the issue of the neutralized reunification of the two antagonistic Koreas raised intermittently since the forced division of the Korean peninsula in 1945. All the previous initiatives to neutralize the Korean peninsula, including the official US decision to reunify Korea via neutralization around the time of Armistice of the Korean War in 1953, have failed due to: (i) the lack of external consensus among the neighbors; and/or (ii) the lack of internal consensus between the two Koreas (or even among South Koreans) by themselves. This article highlights the necessity of the initial neutralization of South Korea alone (NSKA) absent in the previous discussions, and argues not only that NSKA would facilitate the process towards the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas via Austria-like permanent neutrality, but also that it is necessary to achieve NSKA first and maintain it for a considerable time before hurriedly pursuing a simultaneously neutralized reunification of the two Koreas. The permanent and upgradable NSKA (in a long-term process of the neutralized reunification of the Korean peninsula) at the initial stage would greatly reduce tensions in Northeast Asia, and would heighten the probability of reunification. This article intends to form an “epistemic community” for NSKA, which can be a startup towards a long-term process for Korean reunification and peaceful coexistence among the four major powers.

This article, with balance-of-fear theory, explains the puzzling triangular dynamics of Korea-Japan-U.S. relations in the early Cold War period. Glenn Snyder’s concept of “alliance security dilemma” associated with abandonment/entrapment fears among allies, though useful, is not enough for explaining alliance/alignment politics among states. This article additionally employs two more fears: fear of deterrence failure between enemies and fear of losing autonomy between allies. Each state’s main incentive for supporting (or increasing commitment to) the alignment partner(s) can be abandonment fear (or fear of deterrence failure) while each state’s main incentive for defecting from (or decreasing commitment to) the alignment partner(s) can be entrapment fear (or fear of losing autonomy). For instance, during the Cold War period the U.S. concern for Korea and Japan is mainly due to the former’s fear of deterrence failure ?the possibility of the Communist conquest of the Korean peninsula and Finlandization of Japan ? rather than the former’s fear of being abandoned by South Korea or Japan. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan’s concern for the United States is largely due to their abandonment fears regarding the United States. Japan played a game of balancing between fear of deterrence failure regarding South Korea and abandonment fear regarding the United States; South Korea played a game of balancing between abandonment fear regarding the United States and fear of losing autonomy regarding Japan. The mechanism of balance of fears of four kinds reasonably explains triangular dynamics in the early Cold War period and, arguably, has potential to be utilized for analyzing other states’ relations in general.

This study purports to analyze the dynamics of Korea-Japan-U.S. relations right after the Nixon Doctrine (1969-1971) and to define the nature of the Korea-Japan relations in the context of the macro-trends of continuously enlarged cooperation after 1965 Korea-Japan diplomatic Normalization. The reason for my efforts to redefine the nature of Korea-Japan relations especially during this period of 1969-1971 is that, in my view, Victor Cha's study overemphasizes the role of U.S. influence on Korea-Japan relations by solely focusing on the causal links between the U.S. disengagement policy and the so-called exceptionally cooperative Korea-Japan relations. According to the logic of Cha's 'quasi-alliance model,' the high level of cooperation in Korea-Japan relations is mainly caused by these two states' abandonment fears regarding the United States, which are traced to the indirect or unintended consequences of the U.S. disengagement policy. However, though we witness the increased cooperation in Korea-Japan relations in this period of 1969-1971, this does not constitute a particularly peculiar and new trend, but a part of consistently macro-trend of expanding cooperation in the whole period of 1965-1971 of Korea-Japan relations including this period of 1969-1971 which is overused by those who emphasize the importance of indirect effect of the U.S. disengagement. Of course, this study does not deny the fact that there is an advancement in Korea-Japan relations in this period of 1969-1971. However, there has been not only a continuation of expanding trade and political relations, but also a conflictive aspect, evidencing the mixture of cooperation/frictions at the same time in the history of the bilateral relations. This means that though we cannot ignore the U.S. factor in grasping the dynamics in Korea-Japan relations, we should also take into account not only the common interest (such as, economic cooperation), but also the fundamental conflict of interests traced back to historical animosity between the two states.

This essay purports to promote dialogue between mainstream international relations(IR) scholarship and critical theory. The author in support of theoretical pluralism emphasizes that IR scholarship can be enriched by paying attention to the complementary nature of Foucauldian approaches, Habermasian critiques, and scientific methods. Foucauldian approaches are well-suited for challenging ‘hegemonic’ideas but they have little to say about the future shape of IR due to Foucauldians’ lack of alternative vision for world politics and inability to present criteria as to how we choose and evaluate different discourses. However, questions of ethics, morality, or norms are ceaselessly raised in the IR analysis. Both Neorealist denial of the significant role of norms and Foucauldian critique of the situation of “from domination to domination”in IR take our attention away from normative concerns we have to take seriously in the era of globalization. In this juncture,Habermasian normative critique provides us with appropriate warnings This essay purports to promote dialogue between mainstream international relations(IR) scholarship and critical theory. The author in support of theoretical pluralism emphasizes that IR scholarship can be enriched by paying attention to the complementary nature of Foucauldian approaches, Habermasian critiques, and scientific methods. Foucauldian approaches are well-suited for challenging ‘hegemonic’ideas but they have little to say about the future shape of IR due to Foucauldians’ lack of alternative vision for world politics and inability to present criteria as to how we choose and evaluate different discourses. However, questions of ethics, morality, or norms are ceaselessly raised in the IR analysis. Both Neorealist denial of the significant role of norms and Foucauldian critique of the situation of “from domination to domination”in IR take our attention away from normative concerns we have to take seriously in the era of globalization. In this juncture,Habermasian normative critique provides us with appropriate warnings against either extreme positivism or intellectual nihilism. In terms of theoretical pluralism against over-simplification and dogmatism,Habermasian critique of Foucauldian approaches can be understood as a clue (or guide) to how to deal with different paradigms or discourses in IR.

The historic 2005 Sino-Russian Vladivostok Treaty brought an end to their territorial disputes that had lasted for three centuries. The fact itself that such a longtime historical dispute was settled at all is remarkable. During the Cold War, China and Russia were once on the verge of all-out war in March 1969 when they clashed on Zhenbao Island (Damasky Island) in the Ussuri River. Further clashes in August 1969 along the western section of the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang heightened tensions to the extent that the possibility of even a nuclear war was raised. All the more because such a thorny relationship did they experience, the Sino-Russian case is interesting and worthy of scholarly attention (as a clear counterevidence against Ron Hassner’s intractability thesis on “time and the entrenchment of territorial disputes”). This paper, by focusing on a successful case of resolution of Sino-Russian territorial conflicts, tries to get some hopeful suggestions for the ongoing territorial disputes in East Asian international relations, including Korea-Japan territorial disputes. The successful termination of the Sino-Russian territorial disputes itself is not only remarkable, but also is providing hopes for the states and people who are now suffering from territorial disputes. The story of Sino-Russian success in resolving territorial disputes seems to provide the following theoretical or policy implications; (1) The Sino-Russian case suggests that political leadership is very important and a negative bilateral history does not necessarily determine the future of the two countries in a negative way; (2) As Gorbachev demonstrates, unilateral concessions made by a willful political leader could redirect history; (3) Fairness represented by “fifty-fifty” principle is important in solving territorial issues; (4) “Fifty-fifty” principle should not be mechanically applied, but should be applied flexibly; (5) One paradox of Sino-Soviet case is that they were successful in resolving the territorial disputes rather because there are so many flashing points along their border, which made it possible for them to “give and take” more easily and more often than Korea-Japan case, for instance.

This article argues that we should take into account the role of historical animosity seriously in explaining Korea-Japan relations as the conventional wisdom (or psycho-historical approach) emphasizes. However, this argument does not rely on the idea that historical animosity is largely influenced by irrational emotionalism. Rather, the persistence of historical animosity is not only the result of emotionalism, but also more importantly the result of two states’ Realpolitik consideration and Korea’s resentment toward Japan regarding unresolved historical injustices. This article focuses on the intricately inseparable nature of Realism, morality and emotions. A recent view that historical animosity as a constant cannot explain the variations in Korea-Japan is not well-founded in the sense that it assumes historical animosity is purely irrational and emotional phenomenon. Rather, the historical animosity itself demonstrates the usefulness of Realism and its limitations in explaining state behaviors, as well as the importance of matters of justice many Realist scholars have usually ignored. In this context, subtle but positive changes in Japan regarding historical injustices since the 1990s should be noted.

This paper, from a teleological perspective, purports to analyze the effect of the multilateral security cooperation on the promotion of inclusive (and not exclusive) Korea-Japan security cooperation. First, this paper examines (in)appropriateness of carelessly employed historical analogies in the analysis of the current Korea-Japan relations. Second, it discusses the five historical perspectives of Korea-Japan relations which have different Implications for continuity and change in the long history of Korea-Japan relations. Third, it examines what drives multilateral cooperation involving Korea and Japan in the post-Cold War era. Fourth, it analyzes the long-term advantages of the multilateral security cooperation involving Korea and Japan over the latter two states‘ bilateral security cooperation, or "pseudo-alliance" relationship, or collective defense. And it argues that the multilateral security cooperation (involving China), rather than trilateral security cooperation (among Korea, Japan, and the United States), promotes historical reconciliation in East Asia and will be helpful in establishing peace and stability in the region. This paper emphasizes the significance and necessity of energetic promotion of multilateral security cooperation that makes it possible for Korea-Japan cooperation to be "inclusive" rather "exclusive" in its nature. Unless Korea and Japan expand the scope of their security cooperation through multilateral security regimes, it is highly likely to stimulate the operation of security dilemma mechanism, making enemies of Russia and China. We should pay more attention to this delicate situation in East Asia. In this paper it is also mentioned (and urged) that the United States should take a more positive role in promoting historical reconciliation among neighboring states in East Asia and that Japan should consider "the paradoxical logic of strategy" if it really wants to promote its national prestige and to be respected by the neighbors. However, the Koreans should be also reminded of the same thing. It is not wise to overreact to the extremely conservative forces in Japan who rationalize the Japanese colonial rule over Korea or insist on Japan‘s sovereignty over Dokdo island. Such overreaction could blind the Koreans to the fact that there are varieties of views in the pluralistic society of Japan. Focusing on the particular voice alone could strain Korea-Japan relations unnecessarily and lead to “lose-lose” situation rather than “win-win” situation. The framework of multilateral security cooperation like OSCEA (Organization for Security and Cooperation in East Asia) can be useful in building confidence and abating tension because multilateral security cooperation diminishes security dilemma among all the members while bilateral alliance or collective defense feeds the tension continuously in the end. Multilateral approach will lead to the progress in Korea-Japan relations without (or with less) crises repeated.

“War made the state, and the state made the war.”This powerful statement of Charles Tilly’s, which is based on the history of European experiences, if it turns out to be right in general, will lead us to believe war is a ‘necessary evil’for human progress and that war in the Third World is a good thing in the long run because it consolidates a state’s apparatuses necessary not only for keeping order in a country but also for managing people’s lives efficiently in a society. In a corollary of this logic, with regard to the failed states in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst argues that developing countries cannot accomplish in times of peace what war enabled European countries to do. This argument seems to be counterintuitive if we consider the devastating and tragic effects of war on human conditions during the war and thereafter. Then, should we prefer war to peace or vice versa? Through literature review including the recently added studies by Brian Downing, Thomas Ertman, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Miguel Angel Centeno, and Richard Boyd & Tak-Wing Ngo, this essay concludes that there is no general rule that wars play and will play the same positive role in state-making and state-consolidation in the Third World countries including Asian, Latin American and African countries as the past wars often did in Europe. Even the history of European experiences should be further scrutinized.

대부분의 전문가들은, 한일관계는 양국의 역사인식 차이에서 비롯하는 ‘역사적 적개심(historical animosity)’으로 인해 일반적인 국가관계와는 달리 매우 특이한 행태를 보이므로, 어떠한 국제정치이론으로도 양국관계를 체계적으로 설명하기 힘든 것으로 본다. 한일관계에 관한 기존의 연구는 이처럼 역사인식 차이 혹은 역사적 잔재의 부정적 효과에 초점을 맞추는 “역사파(다수파)”와 최근 미-한-일 삼각관계를 포함하는 주변국과의 역학관계에 초점을 맞추는 빅터 차(Victor Cha)로 대변되는“현실주의파(소수파)”로 양분된다. 하지만, 이러한 양분화현상 자체가 연구자들로 하여금 현실을 정확히 파악하는 것을 방해하고 있다. ‘역사적 적개심’은 단순히 비이성적인 감정의 표출을 뜻하는 것이 결코 아니며, 무정부상태의 국제정치현실에서 살아남으려는 국가의 현실주의적 고려(Realpolitik)와 불가분의 관계가 있다. 따라서, 기계적이고 분절적인 현실주의(discrete Realism) 시각에서 한일관계를 분석하는 것을 지양하고 이론적-경험적으로 좀 더 철저한 근거에 기초하여 분석하려면, “역사파”와“현실주의파”가 서로 양립 불가능한 시각이라고 가정해버리기보다는 발전적으로 결합될 수 있다는 인식이 선행되어야 한다. 이러한 양극화 현상을 극복하는 신중한 현실주의(discreet Realism) 시각을 견지하고, 한일관계의 변화와 지속성을‘사이클이 있는 화살과 같은 시간(time’s arrow with time’s cycle)’이라는 역사적 시각에서 해석할 때에 비로소 일관성 있고 체계적인 설명이 가능하다. 다시 말해, 전후 한일관계는‘되풀이되는 단기적 협력/ 갈등 속의 장기적 협력의 진전(long-term progress in cooperation despite ups-and-downs in short-term relationship)’이라고 특징지을 수 있다.

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