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Why do we dream things that are illogical? This article tries to give an answer to this question. Based on the un-Cartesian hypothesis (Hinzen, 2017), one might say that we speak, therefore we think like this. However, once this linguistic ability has been affected by some sorts of mental disability, one cannot think normally. Seeing that the illogical dreams and abnormal thoughts have similar contents, this article suggests that these two might be the results of one cause: the lack of regulation made by one’s world view. This world view regulates the highly productive linguistic construction building ability. When dreaming and during certain mental illnesses, this regulation does not seem to work properly, causing to freely produce structures which are illogical and abnormal, and this is the main reason why we dream illogical things and think abnormally. This article also suggests that phases (DP, CP, vP) are the crucial points which regulate the production. Children’s cognitive development process and the characteristics of lucid dreaming are in line with this view.

Taking the two-component theory of aspect, where Smith (1991) distinguishes grammatical aspect ((im)perfectivity) from lexical aspect (Aktionsart), I propose that intensionality of events (denoted by Korean possessive verbal nouns) arises from their lexical aspect that indicates what part of and how the internal temporal development of an event would unfold in time. Drawing on the asymmetric distribution in some extensional contexts including the genuine perception verb see, which has been known to select for events as its complements (Higginbotham 1983, 1985), I reveal that Korean possessive verbal nouns are characterized by their lexical aspect while English argument-taking derived nominals by their grammatical aspect. They should not be comprised into the same group of complex event nominals, contra Grimshaw (1990), Jung (1997) and Miyamoto (1999). I further claim that it is the intensional or hypothetical nature of the lexical aspect that leads Korean possessive verbal nouns to be interpreted as intensional. I provide a bare nominal structure for the intensionality of Korean possessive verbal nouns, to show that the intensionality of events can be encoded in the nominal syntax, though many of the traditional studies on intensionality have been directed to individuals and propositions.

Three anti-naturalistic thesis have prevailed 20th century value theories: Hume's famous "Is/Ought" gap thesis, which is essentially logical anti-naturalism, and Moore's semantical anti-naturalism and his metaphysical anti-naturalism. The naturalistic fallacy based on Moore's 'Open Question' argument ('OP' for short) is supposed to be an argument establishing the latter two claims. Or so we believed. In this paper, I will try to show that Moore's celebrated Open Question argument itself involves subtle form of logical fallacy and so that at least one major line of attack against naturalism, originated from Moore, is not so cogent as many seemed to assume. To show this, I first review and re-assess popular interpretations of Moore's OP argument and contemporary strategies to repute OP argument. Secondly, I reinterpret Moore's argument from my point of view, and try to show that there are at least two versions of OP argument, which I dubbed, 'formal version' and 'cognitive version' respectively, which look valid, but ultimately fail to be logically valid. Essentially I argue and try to show that OP argument involves an logical error in assuming 'identity substitution rule' to be valid in every context including intensional ones. Once the correct forms and steps of Moore's argument has been identified, I think, we can see the reason why most popular criticisms of Moore have not been successful for reducing the power of Moore's argument for so many years. Finally, I try to repute at least three possible objections against my way of viewing OP argument, which, I believe, mainly were inspired by post-Fregean semantical tradition. If I am not mistaken all these possible objections involve subtle errors and or self-centered projections. Or so do I claim.