Earticle

A typical model explaining pre-modern international relationships in East Asia is the tribute system in which Chinese emperors granted office titles to monarchs of surrounding states who in turn paid tribute to the Chinese throne. This model, which depends on the historical records of the state bestowing titles, cannot fully explain the international relationships centering on China for it fails to account for the internal conditions of the surrounding states. This study examines changes in the Tang bestowal of titles to determine the position and status of Silla and Parhae in the world order for which Tang hoped. The Tang bestowal of titles reflected its intended world order and its policy for implementing that order. The bestowed titles had to be changed if Tang intentions were not realized. Changes in Tang titles reflect Silla and Parhae responses to Tang policy; Tang upgraded titles when Silla and Parhae accepted Tang policies and downgraded them when they resisted.

Taking recourse to the Aristotelian theory of four causes and the distinction between substance and accidents, as well as to the concept of intellectual consciousness (lingjue 靈覺), Matteo Ricci (Li Madou 利瑪竇, 1552–1610) argued that the notions of taiji 太極 and li 理 as expounded by Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) cannot serve as the origin of existence, as their metaphysical equivalent God, does in Catholic Christianity. Taiji and li do not have consciousness and are moreover merely “accidents.” Unlike “substance,” an “accident” is something that is not essential for something to be what it is. Tasan Chŏng Yagyong 茶山 丁若鏞 (1762– 1836) follows Ricci in claiming that li is but an accident, and no more than the “formal cause” of each individual object. A “formal cause” is what something is or should be, as distinct from the “material cause” (that of which it is made), the “efficient cause” (that which gives it shape or motion), or the “final cause” (the goal for which it is intended). Ricci and Tasan did not acknowledge the role of li as the “principle, ground, cause or the reason for the existence and operation of qi 氣” (suoyi 所以) as held by Zhu Xi’s school of nature and principle. Like Ricci, Tasan also dismissed the concept of taiji as “the undifferentiated state before heaven and earth came to be divided.” However, Tasan diverged markedly from Ricci with respect to the critique of the tenet “Nature is in fact principle (Xing ji li 性卽理)”. Although Tasan and Ricci both separated xing 性 from li and deconstructed the meaning of xing from its connotation of original moral human nature, Tasan’s reconstructed xing is quite different from Ricci’s understanding “nothing other than the fundamental (ben 本) essence (ti 體) of each category of things.” Tasan’s unique contribution is his new definition of xing (K. sŏng) as the appetite or preference/proclivity [for the moral good] (K. kiho, C. shihao 嗜好), which is quite Mencian in its affirmation of the presence of an incipient tendency toward the good in human beings. That he mentions that this xing (K. sŏng), although divested of its a priori metaphysical connotations, is still mandated and bestowed by heaven as stated in the Zhongyong 中庸 [Doctrine of the Mean] further testifies to Tasan’s continued engagement with the classics.

Cho Namju’s 82-nyŏnsaeng Kim Chiyŏng is a 2016 bestselling Korean novel that has received international attention. Having achieved immense popularity in Korea, the novel has become a centerpiece of recent feminist discussions in Korea through its exposure of contradictions in and between the patriarchal regime and a neoliberal society. This article explores the tensions and contradictions of these two models of social organization and their uneasy alliance in this novel, particularly in the narrated experiences of young mothers.