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The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has spread rapidly around the world since it was first reported in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019. As of late July 2020, the global number of confirmed cases has surpassed eighteen million, with fatalities reaching 700,000. None of the five oceans or six continents remain free of COVID-19 diagnoses. The pandemic has brought about unprecedented sudden impacts on people's economic, social, and political life. International relations have been equally devastated by the pandemic, precipitating new discourse on world order in the post-COVID-19 era. After having examined five contending scenarios of future world order (walled cities and the new medieval age, Pax American II, Pax Sinica, Pax Universalis, and status quo of asymmetric us-china bipolarity), the article predicts that the status quo order is likely to continue in the post-coronavirus era. Fierce hegemonic rivalry between China and the US will pose a serious existential dilemma to South Korea. In order to cope with the challenge of the worsening status quo order, South Korea is required to seek a sagacious and resolute diplomacy backed up by a broad national consensus.

This article makes three JXlints about the post-COVID international JXllitical economy, the first of which is that the pandemic is fur from over. Rather, it is moving into a completEly different phase when developing countries, rather than advanced industrial states, will be its victims. The consequences include not only more severe public health risks, but also a wave of debt crises in both low-income and middle-income countries. The second JXlint is that the pandemic is likely to generate ideational changes. Despite populist backlashes, publics will demand that governments develop the capabilities to protect them, not only from health shocks but from economic ones as well. State capacity will come to the fore. Finally, looking at the US-China relationship, we should not count on a snapback under a Biden administration. Although we can expect a shift toward more multilateral approaches to the Asia-Pacific, Democrats have their own reasons to limit risks from China; the trade war-broadly conceived-will continue even if on new turf.

How is multilateralism and regionalism in East Asia coping with the COVID-19 pandemic and economic shocks? This article argues that East Asian countries have shown a high degree of convergence in their approach to the pandemic and the informal institutional arrangements of the region have shown quite a bit of resilience overall. There will be some adjustment to supply chains but not a drastic economic fragmentation. However, the region is also beset with increasing security tensions that are related to the US-China confrontations and hardening of governance in China and the US, in addition to Indo--Chinese tensions. The future will be shaped by this balance of continued resilience and securitization oa:urring at the same time.

CO\IlD-19 did not facilitate cooperation between the US and China but caused the bilateral relations to worsen further instead . US domestic politics, China's ·wolf wanior· diplomacy, and the pre-existing us-china rivalry are important contributing factors 1D the deterioration. Such deterioration amid the pandemic outbreak has pll!Sen1Ed a certain degree of security challenges in East Asia around Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and the Korean Peninsula. Regional players in East Asia, namely Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, must look for a balance point between the two great powers to optimize security and economic benefits. To create and maintain regional prosperity and stability, cooperation between the US and China is necessary, which can be achieved through effor3 of the two great powers and also of the ll!gional players.

The world is in turmoil. The corona-pandemic continues to take lives and disrupt daily lives across the globe. This happens agpinst a backdrop of a declining US and western-based world order and a resurgence of authoritarian rulers. In this essay, I discuss the inability of the international community to respond to the pandemic, especially as it relates to helping countries in armed conflict. At the end of March, the UN Secretary-General issued an urgent plea for a worldwide ceasefire to help communities cope with the pandemic. The plea was not met with adequate international support I moreover show that regimes across the globe have used the pandemic to restrict political and civil liberties. In sum, we risk emerging from the pandemic as a less democratic world.