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헝가리는 올해 공산주의로부터 시장경제로 평화적으로 전환된지 25주년을 맞이하였다. 또한 헝가리와 한국간의 국교수립 역시 올해로 25주년을 맞이하여 이 논문을 한국에서 출간하는 의미를 더해주고 있다. 경쟁정책은 전환기경제에서 독점적인 것은 아니지만 중요한 역할을 맡아왔다. 헝가리는 국가독점사업체들을 분해하여 민영화하는 과정에서 경쟁적인 시장환경을 창출 할 기회를 놓쳤으며, 이러한 상황은 헝가리 경쟁당국(GVH)이 심한갈등을 피하고 정치로부터의 독립성을유지하기 위해 민영화 과정에 대한 조사에 개입하지 않기로 결정함으로써 더욱 악화되었다. GVH는 체재전환을 위해서는 규칙의 변화 뿐 아니라 사고방식의 변화가 요구된다는 인식하에 전환기 초기에 소비자에 우호적인 경쟁법집행을 통해 그 평판과 경쟁에 대한 수용성을 높이고자 노력하였다. 그러나 형가리 국민들이 아직도 시장경제에 대해 매우 회의적이기 때문에 이러한 노력은 충분치 않았던 것으로 보인다. GVH는 업계의 경쟁법에 대한 인식이 매우 낮음을 알고 있었지만, 전환기 동안 카르텔 담당부서와 경쟁법 자율준수 캠페인의 부재로 통제경제의 담합관행을 극복 할 수 없었다. 전환기 경제의 경쟁당국은 카르텔을 적발하고, 정교한 조사를 실시하며, 업계의 경쟁에 대한 인식과 사회의 경쟁에 대한 수용성에 집중 할 수 있어야한다.

Hungary celebrated this year the 25th anniversary of the peaceful transition from communism to the market economy. Moreover, Hungary and South-Korea established diplomatic connection also 25 years ago which gives a further reason to write and publish this article in Korea. The competition policy hasnot got an exclusionary but a significant role in transition economies. Hungary missed the opportunity to create a competitive market environment through privatising de-concentrated state monopolies, which was worsened by the fact that the Hungarian Competition Authority (the GVH)decided to stay out of the investigation of the privatisation process to avoid strong conflicts and keep its independence from politics. The GVH recognised that the transition requires not only a change of rules but a change of mentality therefore the GVH tried to increase its reputation and the acceptance of competition through the competition enforcement in favour of the consumers in the early transition period. However, it seemed to be insufficient since the Hungarian population is still very sceptical about the market economy. Although the GVH sensed low competition law awareness from the business community, it couldn’t cope with the collusion habit of the command period in lack of cartel unit and competition compliance campaignduring the transition period. A competition authority of the transitional economy has to be able to detect cartels, carry out sophisticated investigations,and focus on the competition awareness of the business community and the acceptance of the competition by the society.

Recently, ‘policing family’ has been increasingly referenced as a way of understanding the actors involved and the relations among them. This paper looks at the policing family in relation to how new members acquire powers normally associated with the traditional police. Two examples are analysed in this study. One is the Community Safety Accreditation Scheme in the UK. The other is the rise of Special Investigative Officers in the Netherlands. Both developments give u valuable information on current trends in the privatisation of policing. The case in the Netherlands is perhaps a case of pluralisation but not necessarily wholesale privatisation of police powers, something that is perhaps more the case in the UK where, possibly for that reason, it attracts more controversy. The two cases of the UK and the Netherlands have meaningful implications for South Korea in which the discussion of privatisation of policing has begun recently.

This paper utilised and builds upon the critical junctures framework developed by Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008). That framework consists of three separate elements that must be identified in sequence in order for the researcher to be able to declare, with some degree of certainty, if an event constitutes a critical juncture. These three elements are crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change. The framework out here constitutes an even more rigorous approach to clearly identifying crisis, and ideational and radical policy changes. As Thelen (2003, 234) argues that few tools exist in political science to enable us make sense of institutional/policy change, a framework such as this should be of significant value. The framework is employed here in examining the economic debacles in Brazil in 1999 and in Argentina in 2001, to determine if there were critical junctures in their privatisation policies at the start of the 21 st century. Privatisation policy is examined as it constitutes a core tenet of conservative economic restructuring. A significant change in privatisation policy may be indicative of wider changes in macro-economic policy. Prior to the existence of this framework we would have had to wait for decades pass before we would be able to determine if a critical juncture had taken place.

The long-run financial performances of privatised firms have rarely been investigated. This study examines the financial and operational performance within the Pakistani cement industry utilising two decades of post-privatisation data. Broadly speaking, regression analyses confirm that long-term positive impacts of reforms and privatisation on profitability, output and investment are uncertain. After controlling for firm, industry and economic factors, our estimates show that privatised firms initially improved their profitability but recorded a statistically significant decline over a longer period. The sale efficiency, capacity utilisation, and leverage indicators, however, improved over a considerably long post-ownership change period.

생존배려와 관련된 체약강제가 이루어지는 서비스영역에서 당사자 일방(공급업자)에게 주어지는 일방적인 급부(계약내용)에 대한 결정권이 문제되는 경우가 발생하면서 체약강제가 이루어지는 서비스영역이 민영화가 되어 시장경제시스템에 따라 급부결정이 이루어져야 한다는 시각이 나타났다. 이에 본고는 계약자유의 원칙 및 체약강제에 대해 살펴보았다. 계약자유가 절대적으로 보호되어야 하는 가치는 아니라는 점이 프랑스민법 제1134조 제1항에 대한 다양한 해석론에서 도출된다. 요컨대 ‘계약에 의하는 것이 옳은 것이다’라는 정식은 그 자체적으로 한계를 가지고 있으며, 강행법규, 신의칙 등에 의한 제한을 받을 수 있으며 특히 생존배려의 영역 등에서 계약자유의 원칙은 인간의 존엄성이라는 기본권의 보호를 위해 제한될 수 있다. 그 제한이 체약강제를 통해 일률적인 모습으로 나타날 수도 있을 것이다. 개별적이고 구체적인 사안에서의 소비자 보호는 민법이나 소비자보호법 등에 의한 개별규정으로 해결해야 할 것이다. 민영화 초기에는 다양성이 확보되어 소비자후생이 증가하지만 결국 효율성과 영리를 위해 가격이 상승하여 결국 취약계층의 소비자에 대한 계약체결이 거부될 것이며 그 결과 그 자의 생존배려를 포기하는 결과를 낳을 수 있다. 더 나아가 체약강제는 복지 사각지대에 놓인 시민에 대한 보호적 기능을 담당하나 민영화는 그 사각지대에 대한 보호를 개별 행정을 통해 달성하게 한다. 그러나 복지 행정은 시간과 비용 등의 한계를 가지기 때문에 보호에 미흡할 수 있다. 생존은 인간의 존엄과 밀접한 관련성을 갖는다는 점에서 이미 침해가 된 이후에 회복할 수 있는 성격의 가치가 아니라는 점을 간과해서는 안 될 것이다. 요컨대 인간의 존엄과 가치가 계약자유의 원칙에 의해 간과되는 것이 용인된다면 이는 인간의 존엄과 가치를 잡을 수 없는 신기루에 지나지 않은 것으로 평가절하시킬 것이다. “효율성”에 초점을 맞추기 전에 효율성에 대한 포기가 “인간의 존엄성”에 대한 보호에 있다면 효율을 강조하는 민영화의 주장은 정당성을 잃게 될 것이다.

In the service area where contractual obligations related to survival considerations are enforced, the unilateral right to decide on the payment (contractual content) given to one of the parties (supplier) has become a problem, and a view has emerged that the service area where contractual obligations are enforced should be privatised and the payment decision should be made according to the market economy system. This article examines the principle of freedom of contract and contractual compulsion. Various interpretations of Article 1134(1) of the French Civil Code suggest that freedom of contract is not an absolute value to be protected. In short, the canon that “it is right to contract” has its own limits and may be subject to restrictions imposed by mandatory rules of law, principles of good faith, etc. The restrictions may be imposed in a uniform manner through contractual enforcement. Consumer protection in individual and specific cases will have to be addressed by individual regulations under civil law or consumer protection legislation. In the early stages of privatisation, diversity may increase consumer welfare, but eventually prices will rise in the interests of efficiency and profit, and vulnerable consumers will be denied contracts, resulting in the abandonment of their livelihoods. Furthermore, while contractual enforcement serves a protective function for citizens in the welfare blind spot, privatisation allows the protection of the blind spot to be achieved through individual administration. However, welfare administration has limitations such as time and money, which can make it inadequate. It should not be overlooked that survival is closely related to human dignity, which is not a value that can be restored after it has already been violated. In short, if human dignity is allowed to be overlooked by the principle of freedom of contract, it will devalue them as nothing more than an ungraspable mirage. If the abandonment of efficiency before focusing on “efficiency” is the protection of “human dignity”, then the argument for privatisation that emphasises efficiency will lose its legitimacy.

１．はじめに 日本では、1970年代の終わり頃から、「大きな政府」の不効率が問題視されるようになった。高度経済成長(1950年代~1973年)が終わると、高度経済成長の時代に膨らんだ福祉部門やインフラストラクチャ―部門が、政府財政を圧迫するようになった。いかにして費用をかけずに福祉やインフラストラクチャ―の整備·維持·管理を行うかが、緊急の課題となったのである。 ２．三公社の民営化 はじめに、中曽根康弘政権(1982~1987)が取り組んだのが、いわゆる三公社の民営化であった。三公社とは、①鉄道事業を行う日本国有鉄道、②電信電話事業を行う電電公社、③たばこ、塩、樟脳の専売事業を行う日本専売公社のことである。三公社の民営化は、その組織形態を民間の株式会社に変更して、政府の持株を民間の投資家に売却するということで行われた。 ②電信電話事業を例に説明すると、特殊法人であった電電公社は、1985年に日本電信電話株式会社(NTT)が設立されたことで解散し、その業務はNTTに引き継がれた(組織の民営化〔Organisationsprivatisierung〕)。この段階では、NTTは日本政府が全額出資する株式会社であり、政府が100％株主として、経営権を行使した。1987年以降、NTTの株式は、順次、民間に売却されていった(財産の民営化〔Vermoegensprivatisierung〕)。組織の民営化が行われた後も政府が株式を保有するのは、事業の継続性(Kontinuitaet)、平等性(Gleichheit)、適応性(Anpassung)といった「公共の利益(Gemeinwohl)」に反する経営が行われるのを、政府が株主権を行使することで防止するためである。規整改革(Regulatory Reform)の視点からみると、政府が100％株主となって経営権を行使するのは、政府の一部としての特殊法人に対して指図するのと、実質的に変わらない。しかし、NTTも、最初から民間の株式会社として設立されてきた他の電気通信事業者と同じように、市場の中の一事業者と位置づけられるべきであり、「公共の利益」を守るための政府の関与は必要最小限にとどめられるべきと考えられた。そこで、政府は徐々に保有株式を民間に売却して、その売却益を財政収入に充てていったのである。政府の持株比率が低下するにつれて、NTTの経営に対する政府の影響力は低下していく。最終的には、政府の持株比率は過半数を割りこみ、政府がNTTの経営に直接影響力を行使することはできなくなる。むろん、電気通信事業という、公益に関わる重要な事業を行う以上、政府がその事業に対して無関心でいることは許されない。しかし、公共の利益は、電気通信事業法に基づく監督権限を行使することで確保される。NTTは、「かつて特殊法人であったから」ではなく、「一つの電気通信事業者として」、他の電気通信事業者と同様に、電気通信事業法による業法規制を受けるのである(なお、NTTに関しては、2015年現在でも、日本政府が30％程度の株式を保有している)。 政府持株の売却が行われるか否かは、当該企業が、民間の投資家が魅力を感じるほど収益を上げているか否かに依存する。たとえば、①日本国有鉄道は、1987年、地域ごとのJR各社へと分割民営化が行われたが、経営状況の良いJR東日本(東京圏を管轄)、JR東海(東海道新幹線を管轄)についてはいち早く政府保有株式が民間に売却されたのに対して、経営状況が悪いJR北海道やJR四国の株式は、 ...

1. Preface From the late 1970's, inefficiency of “Big government” is an issue which cannot be ignored in Japan. As the time of rapid economic growth (1950’s~1973) came to an end, increase of the welfare and infrastructure section came to suppress government finance. Effective management of the welfare and infrastructure section is an urgent need. 2. Privatisation of Three Public Corporations Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982~1987) worked on privatisation of the so-called “Three Public Corporations”. The Three Public Corporations are (1)JNR (Japanese National Railways) which performed railway business, (2)Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation which performed telegraphic communication telephone business, and (3)Japan Monopoly Corporation which dealt with tobacco, salt, and camphor. The Three Public Corporations were privatised through change of their organizations to private companies and disposal of shares the government owned in each. I will discuss privatisation of the telecommunications as an example. In 1985, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation was dissolved, and its duties were succeeded by Nippon Telegram and Telephone Corporation (NTT) (Privatisation of Organisation). At this stage, NTT was a company wholly owned by the Japanese Government, and the government could use the right of management as 100% stockholder. After 1987, the stocks in NTT were sold on market sequentially (Privatisation of Property). The government holds stocks after the Privatisation of Organization is to use those stockholder's rights in to prevent management against "public interests" such as Continuity, Equality, and Adaptability. From a viewpoint of Regulatory Reform, it does not substantially change with directing the Public Corporation to use the right of management as the 100% stockholder. However, it was thought that NTT should be placed with the one company in the market in the same way as other telecommunications companies which had been established as private companies from the beginning, and the participation of the government in NTT’s management to keep "public interest" should be at a minimum. Therefore the government gradually sold stock holdings on the market and assigned the gain on the sale to a financial income. As ratio of shareholding of the government decreases, the influence of the government over NTT’s management decreases. When the ratio of shareholding of the government fell below the majority, the government could not use direct influence in the management of NTT. Of course, the government is not permitted to be indifferent to the telecommunications business because it is important in public interest. However, the public interest is secured by the government using regulatory powers based on the Telecommunications Business Law. NTT, not because it was a public corporation, but one telecommunications company, receives regulations of the Telecommunications Business Law (Note, NTT’s shares have been sold for the most part, but the government holds one third of the total as of 2015). Whether the sale of the government’s stock holdings is carried out depends on whether private investors feel charm on profit of the corporation. For example, JNR was divided and privatised to several Japan Railways companies (JR) operating in each area in April 1987, so stock holdings of the government were sold on market quickly in profitable companies such as JR East (operating in the Tokyo metropolitan area) and Central Japan Railway (operating the Tokaido Shinkansen), but those of Hokkaido Railway and Shikoku Railway Company, which are unstable in business, are not yet sold on market. As for the stocks of Japan Tobacco Co., Ltd. (JT) which was established through privatisation of Japan Monopoly Corporation in 1985, the government held stocks of the majority from a policy purpose for a long time. Recently, privatisation of postal services had attracted political attention. Prime Minister Ko...

La privatisation de la police est la tendance mondial depuis la etablissement d'Etat. En France, la jurisprudence est confirme ce principe d'interdiction de la privatisation de la police. Mais, les exceptions nombreuses existes. les legislateurs prevoiest beaucoup des lois exceptionnelles. Nous devons trouver la critere de terre qui admet l'Etat delege le pouvoir de police a la personne privee et qui ne l'admet pas l'Etat delege. D'abord, nous devons etablir nouvellement la notion de police. Deuxiemement, nous devons fixer la terre que l'Etat doit directement faire. Dernierment, l'Etat doit faire la fonction indetachqble de la fonction de l'Etat. Certes, si on dit plus, le legislateur doit prevoit la critere de delegaton de la fonction de l'Etat par la lois.

본 논문은 공공서비스와 영조물 이론의 원산지인 프랑스의 공기업 이론과 민영화 및 그 시사점에 관한 연구이다. 오늘날 국가는 시장경제질서를 규제하고 조정하는 중립자적 지위 뿐 아니라 직접 기업을 운영하는 기업가로서 경제주체의 지위도 가진다. 역사적으로 프랑스에서는 동원 전쟁인 1차 세계대전을 겪으면서 국가의 경제 간섭이 심화되었고, 민간을 대신하여 기업을 창설하면서 상공업적 공공서비스 이론도 함께 발전하였다. 프랑스 공기업의 구조는 상공업 활동에 종사하는 영조물법인 또는 과반수 이상의 공공자본으로 구성된 주식회사 형태인데, 이중에서 상공업적 영조물법인은 이후 2차 세계대전 이후에는 국유화된 회사들의 지위를 결정하기 위해 사용되기도 하였다. 한편 공기업이 수행하는 사업은 가스, 전기, 철도와 같이 상공업적 공공서비스와 관계된 것일 수도 있지만 금융, 보험, 자동차와 같이 공공서비스와는 무관한 경우도 존재한다. 이때 상공업적 공공서비스를 수행하는 공기업의 이용관계는 원칙적으로 사법관계(私法關係)의 성질을 가지므로 민사법원의 관할에 속한다. 다만 이 경우에도 공공서비스의 기본원칙(평등의 원칙, 계속성의 원칙, 적응의 원칙)을 준수하여야 하며, 개별 법령에서 행정권한의 위임 또는 위탁을 받은 경우에 한하여 행정청으로서 행정처분을 발할 수 있다. 이러한 공기업이 민영화되면 특허기업이 되고, 양자(兩者)는 조직변경을 통한 경영 주체의 차이에 불과하다. 오늘날 우리나라 행정법학에서 공기업과 민영화의 문제는 비교적 최근에 등장한 주제로, 과거 오토마이어의 영조물과 국고(Fiskus) 이론의 영향에서 아직 벗어나지 못한 채 여전히 미완성의 단계에 있다. 또한 공기업과 민영화에 관한 불완전한 입법으로 말미암아 이들의 개념 정립의 문제에서부터 법적지위와 법률관계에 이르기까지 상당부분을 행정법 이론에 의존하고 있다. 이러한 점에서 본 논문에서 살펴보게 될 프랑스의 상공업적 공공서비스와 공기업 이론은 우리나라 공기업 법제를 분석하는데 상당히 유용한 이정표가 될 것이다.

Ces etudes portent sur la theorie de l’entreprise publique et la privatisation en France, le pays d’origine de la theorie du service public. Aujourd'hui, l'Etat a une position neutre dans la regulation et la coordination de l'ordre economique du marche, mais aussi un acteur economique en tant qu'entrepreneur qui dirige directement l’entreprise. Historiquement, l’ingerence economique de l'Etat s’etait accrue en France durant la Premiere Guerre mondiale, qui est une guerre de mobilisation, et la theorie du service public commercial et industriel a ete developpee ainsi que la creation d’entreprises a la place du secteur prive. La forme structurelle de l'entreprise publique francaise est un etablissement public exercant des activites commerciales et industrielles ou une societe constituee de plus de la moitie du capital public. Par la suite, l’etablissement public a caractere industriel et commercial a ete utilise pour determiner le statut des societes nationalisees avant et apres la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En meme temps, les projets realises par des entreprises publiques peuvent etre lies a des services publics commerciaux et industriels tels que le gaz, l’electricite et les chemins de fer, mais certains cas n’ont aucun rapport avec des services publics tels que la finance, les assurances et l’automobile. La relation legale d’utilisation des entreprises publiques fournissant des services publics commerciaux et industriels est soumise a la juridiction des affaires civiles, car elle a, en principe, la nature des relations judiciaires. Cependant, il est necessaire de respecter les principes de base du service public dans ce cas precis. Si ces entreprises publiques sont privatisees, elles deviennent des compagnies a charte. Dans ces deux cas, il n’y a qu’une difference dans les entites de gestion resultant du changement organisationnel. La question des entreprises publiques et de la privatisation dans le droit administratif en Coree du Sud est aujourd'hui un sujet relativement recent, encore inacheve et reste encore sous influence de la theorie de l’etablissement public d'Otto Mayer et de Fiscus, qui ont ete jadis en vogue en Allemagne. En outre, la legislation sur l’entreprise publique et la privatisation etant incomplete, elle repose en grande partie sur la theorie du droit administratif, allant du probleme de la definition de concepts en passant par le statut juridique, jusqu’aux relations juridiques. A cet egard, la theorie francaise des services commerciaux et publics et de l’entreprise publique, dont nous avons deja discute, constituera un jalon tres utile pour l'analyse de la legislation des entreprises publiques en Coree du Sud.

본 연구는 새로운 노동당을 표방하는 영국 정부가 1997년부터 시행해온 파트너십에 의한 지방정부 사회서비스 전달체계 개혁을 분석하여 우리나라 지방자치단체의 사회서비스 전달체계 개편에 있어 고려해야 할 사항들을 지적해 보고자 한다. 이를 위해 먼저, 전통적인 사회서비스 전달체계의 주요 형태들의 특성과 함께 한계점을 살펴본 뒤, 영국 노동당 정부의 파트너십 정책이 등장하게 된 배경을 영국 복지국가의 발달과정을 통해 살펴본다. 또한 1997년 노동당 정부가 집권한 이후 지방정부 사회서비스 전달체계 개혁의 내용을 살펴보고, 정책적 함의를 도출한다. 파트너십체계에 의한 영국의 지방정부 사회서비스 전달체계 개혁에서의 시사점으로는, 파트너십 관계가 무엇인지에 대한 사회저변의 공감대가 형성되어야 하며, 파트너십 구축정책은 장기적으로 추진되어야 하며, 법적정비와 제도적 보완장치 구축 등을 들 수 있다.

This study focuses on reforms of the Labor government's local social service delivery system in Britain which started with the slogan of 'social partnership' in 1997, and on the suggestions for Korean local authorities’ social service delivery system. For these purposes, methods and transitions of the British social service delivery systems and?Labor’s reform policies are scrutinized in detail. And then, this study presents some suggestions with the evaluations of the British case. The 1997 Labor Government in Britain was elected to power on a pledge to put partnership at the heart of its strategy for modernizing public services. Partnerships are a risk-sharing relationship based upon an agreed aspiration between the public and private (including voluntary) sectors to bring about a desired public policy outcome. For this purpose, the Labor government is moving from an optimistic to a realistic view of partnership, with simple exhortations replaced by a full array of sanctions, incentives and threats. Some suggestions for implementing a partnership policy, are as follows: (1) the definitions and practice of partnership should be shared by the stakeholders; (2) The partnership building policy has to be driven forward in the long term view; (3) In order to build the genuine partnership in the local government, revisions of rules and laws and support systems are required; and (4) The Government Offices for the Regions should be provided with a pump-priming fund to reward joint commissioning by groups of local authorities.