Earticle

(1) Patent troll refers to (2) non-practicing entities that (3) stack up patents or buy patent rights from other patent right holders to create a patent wall (4) with which they claim excessive license fee or compensation for damages against companies or exercise patent rights to file infringement litigation. Trolls have both sides of coins and bring positive effect and negative effect. There are many controversial issues about trolls. This Paper describes what are patent trolls and how to regulate patent trolls. In order to solve problems of patent trolls I'll examine the U.S approaches and then research the regulation tools and strategies for the patent troll issues in Korea. I'll suggest some improvement measurements for the legal framework and policy for example restriction on joinder or injunction. There is discussion about restricting the injunction, the best weapon of patent trolls applying the four test of eBay case. According to the principles of equity admitting the preliminary (or permanent) injunction should be determined by the following four elements: (1) whether the damage causes irreparable harm or not, (2) whether there are other adequate remedies or not, (3) considering balance of hardship between the parties, and (4) the injunction causes harm to public interest. This is similar to the provision of preliminary injunction requirements (the Clause 2, Article 300 of Civil Execution Act). Therefore the bargaining power by automatical preliminary injunction can not be enjoined in Korea. The necessity of reserve to prevent significant damage or imminent danger should be strictly limited to forbid patent troll's abusive behaviors. There is an opinion which prevents trolls from exercising the injunction right and give them only monetary compensations. However, it is not consist with the nature of exclusive right. It is a better idea to use compulsive license in the Antitrust law rather than liability rule. The problems joining unrelated defendants in the same action are serious in patent trolls' litigation in U.S. Someone states that the defendants can not be joined simply because the same patent is infringed and the number of defendants per litigation should be limited. In patent litigations the American Invent Act is amended to prevent patent trolls' strategies of multiple defendants joinder. It amends the permissive joinder rule that defendants can not be joined if they don't arise out of the same facts and transactions. The court also prevents the trolls' joinder in some cases. I consider this is useful to remove trolls' negative effect of bad behaviors. If patent trolls' patents are the standard essential patents (SEPs), the injunction by trolls can be illegal in the Antitrust law because they break the commitment of FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) license term. It may be dominant position abuse if tolls refuse to license even to the willing licensee.

In this study "Non-Practicing Patent Holder" or "Non-Practicing Entity" is defined as an entity or person who has a patent but does not practice the patent. Non-Practicing Patent Holders include individual inventors, universities, research institutes, or even companies which do not manufacture the patented product any more. Also, "Patent Transaction Entity" or "Patent Transaction Expert", instead of contemptuous word "Patent Troll", is defined as an entity which is engaged in the license business with patent portfolio procured mostly from third parties. Non-Practicing Patent Holder obviously includes Patent Transaction Entity. Considering the diversity of each Non-Practicing Patent Holder with respect to the procurement of patents and the enforcement of those patents, the legal or practical boundary of Non-Practicing Patent Holder or Patent Transaction Entity is not so clear and it makes manufacturers difficult to respond to the various Non-Practicing Patent Holder's activities. Then, this study analyzes empirically the value of patents owned by Non-Practicing Patent Holders to figure out if Non-Practicing Patent Holders' licensing activities are really blameful. For this purpose, all the patents proposed in the USITC litigation are listed first. And, those patents were divided into two groups, one patent group of 1,121 patents presented by manufacturing entities ("Manufacturer's Patent Group") and the other patent group of 125 patents presented by Non-Practicing Patent Holders ("Non-Practicing Patent Holder's Patent Group"). Secondly, several factors such as the number of claims, the number of backward citations, the number of forward citations, the effective duration of each patent after the date of litigation, the number of family patents, and the number of patents filed by inventors of each patent were selected to compare the value of those two patent groups. Such empirical analysis shows that there were no statistically significant differences with the value 0.05 between Manufacturer's Patent Group and Non-Practicing Patent Holder's Patent Group in the number of claims, the number of forward citations and the number of patents filed by inventor of each patent. However, there were statistically significant differences with the value 0.05 between two groups in the number of backward citations, the effective duration of patent after litigation and the number of family patents. The analysis shows that the value of the Non-Practicing Patent Holder's Patent Group is better than the Manufacturer's Patent Group in the number of backward citations and the number of family patents, while the Manufacturer's Patent Group is better than the Non-Practicing Patent Holder's Patent Group in the effective duration of patent after litigation. According to the results of empirical analysis in this study, it is found that Non-Practicing Patent Holder's patents are not trivial and even slightly better than the patents of manufacturing entities in some factors for empirical analysis.

Knowledge economy now governs every aspect of our lives. Knowledge is the basic currency of this knowledge economy. Equipped with exclusive rights, intellectual properties (IP) are now destined to play the crucial role in this knowledge economy. In this respect, non-practicing entities (NPEs) are deemed to be the legitimate players of this new economy. The 1st-generation NPEs are characterized as entities independent of the manufacturers, hereas the 2nd-generation NPEs and defensive NPEs (i.e., patent aggregators) are heavily influenced by the manufactures, for the manufacturers now play the role of the investors or members of the NPEs. NPEs are here to stay!Despite the resistance form the IT industry in the US, the Senate has recently passed the bill which is essentially benign to the NPEs. In addition, Chief Judge Rader of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit has recently declared that his Court will judge the patents not by the nature of the patent holders but by their quality. In every respect, there is no sign that the rights of the patentees are to be significantly eroded in the near future. It then is manifest that this country as a whole should jump onto the wagon and strive to efficiently generate IP, to protect IP in the major industrial countries, and to utilize IP to its full value.

최근 지식재산권법뿐만 아니라 경쟁법 영역에서 특허침해 소송을 통하여 고액의 수익을 얻는 것을 주된 사업 내용으로 하는 회사가 문제가 되고 있으며, 이들을 지칭하는 표현으로 특허괴물(patent troll)이 사용되기도 한다. 또한 이 용어가 이미 부정적 의미를 함축하고 있다는 점에서, 이들의 행태나 사업운영 방식에 초점을 맞추어 NPE(non-practicing entity)나 PAE(patent assertion entity)에 해당하는 특허관리전문회사라는 표현이 사용되기도 하며, 가치중립적 개념이라는 점에서 논의 전개에 있어서 보다 타당할 것이다. 특허관리전문회사는 특허침해 주장이나 과도한 실시료 요구 등으로 인한 부정적 인상이 강하지만, 또한 특허 시장의 활성화와 같은 긍정적인 효과가 존재한다는 점에서, 상반되는 효과의 형량을 통하여 평가가 이루어져야 한다. 경쟁정책적으로도 긍정적 기능과 부정적 기능이 모두 고려되어야 한다. 특허관리전문회사의 규제에 있어서 독점규제법의 적용 가능성의 검토는 우선 법체계적인 관점에서 접근이 이루어져야 한다. 특히 특허법과 독점규제법의 관계 정립은 여전히 중요한 선행하는 과제가 될 것이다. 즉 법 제59조에 의하여 특허관리전문회사의 행태가 특허권 남용이 되어 독점규제법의 적용 가능성이 주어지는 경우에, 비로소 독점규제법상 규제 가능성이 구체화 된다. 이를 전제로 독점규제법상 각 위반 유형에 포섭될 수 있는지에 관한 논의가 실질적인 의미를 갖게 될 것이다. 독점규제법상 모든 위반 유형이 특허관리전문회사와 관련될 수 있다. 즉 단독행위 규제로서 시장지배적 지위남용행위와 불공정거래행위 규제 가능성이 각각 검토되어야 하며, 특히 불공정거래행위는 경쟁제한성뿐만 아니라 경쟁 수단이나 거래 내용에서의 불공정성도 위법성 판단기준으로 하기 때문에, 이러한 관점에서 규제 가능성이 심도 있게 논의되어야 한다. 또한 표준화 기구나 특허 풀의 활동과 관련하여 공동행위로서의 규제 가능성에도 주의를 기울일 필요가 있다.

Recently, the activities of companies have tried for high returns by actions for infringement could become at issues in intellectual property law as well as competition law. These companies are sometimes called patent troll. But as the term patent troll has already implies a negative sense, the patent management company that represented for the use of these behaviors and business operations with a focus on NPE (non-practicing entity) and PAE (patent assertion entity), will be valid in the discussion for the development from the concept of a value-neutral point. Generally these companies have all the negative effects and positive effects, as vitalization of patent market. So from the point of competition policy, it must be considered the both effects. In the review of the applicability of the monopoly regulations act a priority access should be made in a systematic point of view, regarding the relations between patent law and competition law. In this respect the interpretation of article 59 in monopoly regulations act will be very important. So all violation types in monopoly regulation act may be related to activities of NPEs or PAEs. In field of single conduct regulation, it must be reviewed abuses of market dominant position and unfair trade practices of NPEs of PAEs, because the latter has the unfairness as the illegality standard, it will play a special role in monopoly regulation act. And in cartel regulation, there will be also a need to pay attention to the activities of standardization bodies and patent pools.

최근 지식재산권법뿐만 아니라 경쟁법 영역에서 특허침해 소송을 통하여 고액의 수익을 얻는 것을 주된 사업 내용으로 하는 회사가 문제가 되고 있으며, 이들을 지칭하는 표현으로 특허괴물(patent troll)이 사용되기도 한다. 또한 이 용어가 이미 부정적 의미를 함축하고 있다는 점에서, 이들의 행태나 사업운영 방식에 초점을 맞추어 NPE(non-practicing entity)나 PAE(patent assertion entity)에 해당하는 특허관리전문회사라는 표현이 사용되기도 하며, 가치중립적 개념이라는 점에서 논의 전개에 있어서 보다 타당할 것이다. 특허관리전문회사는 특허침해 주장이나 과도한 실시료 요구 등으로 인한 부정적 인상이 강하지만, 또한 특허 시장의 활성화와 같은 긍정적인 효과가 존재한다는 점에서, 상반되는 효과의 형량을 통하여 평가가 이루어져야 한다. 경쟁정책적으로도 긍정적 기능과 부정적 기능이 모두 고려되어야 한다. 특허관리전문회사의 규제에 있어서 독점규제법의 적용 가능성의 검토는 우선 법체계적인 관점에서 접근이 이루어져야 한다. 특히 특허법과 독점규제법의 관계 정립은 여전히 중요한 선행하는 과제가 될 것이다. 즉 법 제59조에 의하여 특허관리전문회사의 행태가 특허권 남용이 되어 독점규제법의 적용 가능성이 주어지는 경우에, 비로소 독점규제법상 규제 가능성이 구체화 된다. 이를 전제로 독점규제법상 각 위반 유형에 포섭될 수 있는지에 관한 논의가 실질적인 의미를 갖게 될 것이다. 독점규제법상 모든 위반 유형이 특허관리전문회사와 관련될 수 있다. 즉 단독행위 규제로서 시장지배적 지위남용행위와 불공정거래행위 규제 가능성이 각각 검토되어야 하며, 특히 불공정거래행위는 경쟁제한성뿐만 아니라 경쟁 수단이나 거래 내용에서의 불공정성도 위법성 판단기준으로 하기 때문에, 이러한 관점에서 규제 가능성이 심도 있게 논의되어야 한다. 또한 표준화 기구나 특허 풀의 활동과 관련하여 공동행위로서의 규제 가능성에도 주의를 기울일 필요가 있다.

Recently, the activities of companies have tried for high returns by actions for infringement could become at issues in intellectual property law as well as competition law. These companies are sometimes called patent troll. But as the term patent troll has already implies a negative sense, the patent management company that represented for the use of these behaviors and business operations with a focus on NPE (non-practicing entity) and PAE (patent assertion entity), will be valid in the discussion for the development from the concept of a value-neutral point. Generally these companies have all the negative effects and positive effects, as vitalization of patent market. So from the point of competition policy, it must be considered the both effects. In the review of the applicability of the monopoly regulations act a priority access should be made in a systematic point of view, regarding the relations between patent law and competition law. In this respect the interpretation of article 59 in monopoly regulations act will be very important. So all violation types in monopoly regulation act may be related to activities of NPEs or PAEs. In field of single conduct regulation, it must be reviewed abuses of market dominant position and unfair trade practices of NPEs of PAEs, because the latter has the unfairness as the illegality standard, it will play a special role in monopoly regulation act. And in cartel regulation, there will be also a need to pay attention to the activities of standardization bodies and patent pools.