Earticle

플랫폼 공개에 따른 네트워크를 활용한 시장선점우위 효과를 계속 유지하려는 기업들의 전략적 노력에 대한 관심이 커지고 있다. 그들은 시장의 협조적 이해관계자를 네트워크에 묶어두기 위해서 잠금 효과를 극대화하는 것에 전략적 주안점을 두고 있다. 이렇듯 플랫폼 공개 경향에서 플랫폼 리더가 참여시장에서 가능한 많은 협조적 이해관계자인 제3의 개발업체를 가능한 많이 확보할 수 있도록 하는 것이 중요하다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 플랫폼 리더십 전략을 거래비용과 네트워크 외부성 관점에서 해석하고자 한다. 먼저, 거래비용 관점에서는 플랫폼의 공개로 인해 자산이 특수하지 않고 공통화 되었을 때는 거래의 내부화로 인해서 얻을 수 있는 거래비용이 감소하거나 효율적이지 않을 수 있다. 다시 말해서 플랫폼을 공개하면 오히려 시장에서의 협조적 이해관계자의 참여를 확대시키고 거래빈도를 높여서 더 많은 가치를 창출할 수 있는 것이다. 다음으로 네트워크 외부성 관점에서는 플랫폼이 공개되어짐에 따라 소스공개를 하여 호환성을 높이고 그 결과 고객 잠금 효과가 낮아지게 된다. 낮은 잠금 효과는 낮은 교체비용을 가져오는데 이와는 상반된 결과가 나올 수도 있다.

According to platform openness, most companies have been interested in strategic utilization of networks to retain early-mover advantage. They are focusing on maximizing lock-in effects to make complementors stay in relevant of systems. It is important for platform leaders to secure as many complementors as possible under platform openness. If complementors should pay expenses to use a platform in the market with strong networking effect by buyers and suppliers, they should compare these expenses with possible switching costs. When the switching costs are somewhat low and positive to profitability, they should switch a platform. Therefore it is important to maximize lock-in effect to retain cooperative stakeholders. Switching costs would be increased by insufficient compatibility and multiple standards. The big issue is who will be the market leader to guarantee compatibility. The value of a platform would be decided by the number of customers and suppliers using the platform. Therefore, in this research, I try to interpret platform leadership in the perspectives of transaction costs and network externality.

The growth and success of game platforms depend substantially on complementors’ strategies and survival. Drawing on organizational ecology, this study conceptualizes game platforms as ecosystems in which platform owners and complementors are mutually interdependent yet competitively constrained. We examine how increasing complementor density, driven by platform growth, affects complementor mortality and how complementors respond through niche strategies. Specifically, we distinguish between two niche strategies?genre niche and platform niche?and argue that their survival implications differ between platform entry and post-entry growth. Using game industry data from 1977 to 2014, including 1,736 game developers, 46,932 game titles, and 31 platform manufacturers, we conduct survival analyses. The results show that higher complementor density within a platform increases complementor mortality. They also indicate that genre specialization improves survival at platform entry by helping complementors build a clear identity and concentrate limited resources. After entry, platform specialization becomes more beneficial because it strengthens ties with platform owners and enables access to platform-specific resources. These findings show that network effects may intensify competition among complementors rather than simply enhance platform value. The study suggests that platform owners should adjust openness and retention strategies across stages of platform growth.