Earticle

초록

영어

In July, 2008, there are totally 1,593 listed companies in China. About 70% of these listed companies are the state owned listed companies, and the rest are collective or private owned listed companies. The core element that decides the efficiency and the competitive power of listed company is the corporate governance. This thesis considers the real state and reform direction of the corporate governance centering around the ‘tunneling’ of the heavy stockholders of listed companies. The methods of tunneling is considered around the 1) heavy stockholder's enforced occupying and using funds of the listed company, 2) payment guarantee on loan to the heavy stockholder by the listed company, 3) property transfer through related party transactions between the listed company and the heavy stockholder, and etc. And it also analyzed the background and the reasons why tunneling behavior have become common in China using 1) the listed company's stake structure characteristic of 'heavy stockholder's overwhelming amount of stake possession and 2)the concept of ‘potential rule’ established in the process of listing(IPO) between the existing company(mother company) and the listed company. Lastly, corporate governance reform measures by Chinese government to regulate tunneling and protect small stockholders and further assignments are considered.

목차

1. 머리말
 2. 중국의 기업지배구조에 대한 인식과 제도
 3. 중국에서 대주주 수탈(洶空) 행위의 실태와 원인
  3.1 이론적 인식
  3.2 주요 방식과 사례
  3.3 제도적 배경과 환경 요인
  3.4 중국 특유의 심층 원인
 4. 중국정부의 기업지배구조 개혁
  4.1 개혁추진 내용과 성과
  4.2 대주주의 점용자금 상환 정책
 5. 맺음말
 참고문헌
 Abstract

키워드

저자

• 서석훙 [ Seo, Seok-Heung | 부경대학교 경제학부 교수 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  동북아 문화연구 [Journal of North-east Asian Cultures]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1598-3692

• 수록기간

  2001~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 910 DDC 950