Earticle

초록

영어

This paper deals with the improvement of corporate governance system by emphasizing the enhancement of efficiency through the protection of minority shareholders󰡑rights and management monitoring. Some issues on the current corporate governance system such as management monitoring by the board of directors, the markets and institutional investors are criticized and policy options for the improvement are proposed as follows. First, the ex ante controlling mechanism should be strengthened by securing the independence and quality of outside directors. At the same time, ex post controlling system such as judicial remedy should be established, if shareholders󰡑rights are damaged. For that purpose, it is desirable to introduce class action suits. Second, the conditions of remedial procedures for damages should be eased to some considerable extent as they are still believed to be unrealistic. Third, the function of management monitoring by institutional investors as the dominant outside shareholders should be strengthened because most of firms are dominated by a single family and faced with restrictions of self-control. Fourth, management discipline such as hostile takeover should be activated as it performs a complementary function for internal governance system. Finally, illegal transactions between the firms under the same control should be prohibited definitely as they enable to divert resources inefficiently from one to another.

목차

Ⅰ. 서 론
 Ⅱ. 기업지배구조의 이론과 실제
  1. 대리문제와 거래비용
  2. 경영진 통제 메커니즘
 Ⅲ. 기업지배구조와 관련된 문제
  1. 사외이사의 기능 미흡
  2. 투자자 보호 장치 미흡
  3. 감사제도의 혼란
  4. 기관투자가의 역할 한계
  5. 기업 지배권 시장 부진
 Ⅳ. 정책 방향
 참고문헌
 Abstract

저자

• 이두환 [ Du-Whan Lee | 국제문제조사연구소 연구실장 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한독사회과학논총 [Zeitschrift der Koreanisch-Deutschen Gesellschaft für Sozialwissenschaften]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1229-537X

• 수록기간

  1991~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 305 DDC 300