Earticle

초록

영어

Beyond the articles of association and shareholders' meeting resolutions, closely held companies commonly rely on shareholders' agreements to establish private ordering in corporate governance. Delineating the legal effect of these agreements bears directly on the balance between shareholder autonomy and the company's independent legal personality, and thus stands as a central issue urgently in need of clarification under Chinese company law. Existing scholarship has recognized the dual nature of shareholders' agreements as both contractual and organizational instruments. Yet considerable controversy remains over whether such agreements can bind the company and non-signatory shareholders, and over how they should be reconciled with the articles of association and shareholders' meeting resolutions. A systematic body of judicial rules has yet to emerge. Focusing on the 2023 revision of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China and on Article 12 of the Supreme People's Court's 2025 Draft Judicial Interpretation of the Company Law for Public Consultation, this article systematically examines the legal effect of shareholders' agreements by combining doctrinal and typological analysis from both contractual and organizational perspectives. First, it traces the legislative and judicial development of shareholders' agreements under Chinese company law, highlighting how the legislature's attitude has shifted from relative neglect in earlier amendments to substantive recognition in the 2023 revision. Second, it analyzes the rule structure established by Article 12 of the Draft Judicial Interpretation, under which shareholders' agreements do not, in principle, bind the company, yet may take effect against it in three exceptional circumstances. It further examines how the three pathways for such transformation of effect, namely unanimous written consent of all shareholders, explicit statutory authorization, and ratification by a company resolution, reflect an attempt to balance shareholder autonomy with corporate formalism. Finally, turning to the unresolved questions of the organizational effect of shareholders' agreements, their conflicts with the articles of association, and the coordination of their legal effect with shareholders' meeting resolutions, the article argues that typological rules should replace simplistic approaches based on blanket priority. It proposes a Chinese approach centered on a “transformation mechanism” that combines substantive and procedural legitimacy: the former activating directors' fiduciary duties and ensuring consistency with corporate interests, the latter ensuring the flow of information and preventing shareholder oppression. Such a mechanism may help reconcile the rigidity of organizational order with the value of contractual efficiency.

중국어

公司章程与股东会决议之外，以股东协议建构公司治理私序已成为封闭型公司普遍的商业实践，其效力边界的划定直接关涉股东意思自治与公司法人独立性之间的平衡，是中国公司法适用中亟待回应的核心难题。既有研究虽已揭示股东协议兼具合同性与组织性的双重属性，但对于协议能否约束公司及未签字股东、与公司章程和股东会决议如何协调等问题聚讼盈庭，尚未形成体系性的裁判规则。本文以2023年修订的《公司法》及最高人民法院2025年《关于适用中国公司法若干问题的解释（征求意见稿）》第12条为中心，采用规范分析与类型化分析相结合的方法，从合同法与组织法的双重视角对股东协议的效力展开系统研究。论文首先梳理股东协议在中国公司法上的立法与司法演进脉络，揭示中国立法从历次修订的“冷处理”到2023年“实质性承认”的态度转变；其次解读司法解释征求意见稿第12条确立的“股东协议原则上不约束公司、三种例外情形下对公司发生效力”的规则结构，阐明全体股东一致书面同意、法律明确规定、公司决议追认三条效力转化路径所体现的意思自治与公司形式主义之平衡；最后聚焦股东协议组织法效力的认定、股东协议与公司章程冲突的解决以及与股东会决议的效力协调等未决争议，主张以类型化规则取代“一概优先”的简单化处理，并提出以兼顾实体正当性（激活董事信义义务、符合公司利益）与程序正当性（保证信息流通、防止股东压迫）的“转化机制”作为化解组织秩序刚性与契约效率价值之张力的中国方案。

목차

摘要
I．中国公司法上股东协议的立法和司法演进
II．最高人民法院《征求意见稿》中股东协议的规定解读
III．针对股东协议仍然存在的未决争议问题
IV．结语
參考文獻
ABSTRACT

키워드

저자

• 王艳梅 [ 왕염매 | 吉林大学法学院教授，法学博士 ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  원광법학 [Journal of Law research]

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1598-429X

• eISSN

  2508-4526

• 수록기간

  1962~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 360 DDC 340