Earticle

초록

영어

From a firm perspective, technological progress makes it hard to grasp high-skilled technical work such as innovation activities. Due to the difficulty in understanding, incentive structures motivating innovation need to incorporate the knowledge gap concern. This paper shows that rewarding early failure could not be a marked property for incentive structure implementing exploration if we consider the knowledge gap issue. However, the optimal incentive scheme inducing exploration does not reward unsuccessful long-term results. In addition, we find that pursuing exploring innovation becomes a more attractive option as the knowledge gap increases.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. The Optimal Contract
3.1 Implementation of Exploitation
3.2 Implementation of Exploration
4. The Optimal Contract with Time-consuming Verification
4.1 Implementation of Exploitation with Time-consuming Verification
4.2 Implementation of Exploration with Time-consuming Verification
5. Impact of Informational Frictions on the Principal’s Choice
5.1 Principal’s Choice with Shirking Possibility
5.2 Without Shirking Possibility
6. Conclusion
References

저자

• Myungkoo Song

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330