Kyumin Cho, Hyeong Joon Kim, Seongjae Mun, Seung Hun Han
언어
영어(ENG)
URL
https://www.earticle.net/Article/A402136
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원문정보
초록
영어
We investigate whether the alignment of chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders wealth influences decisions on engaging in stakeholder-oriented activities. CEOs maximizing their own utility are more likely to engage in such activities when they are not strongly aligned with shareholders wealth. Empirically, firms with CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to the firm value are less likely to engage in external activities (communities, environments, and human rights). We find that this negative effect is mitigated after the conflict of interests between shareholders and stakeholders is reduced by the constituency statutes. Furthermore, after an exogenous reduction in the alignment of CEO and shareholders wealth, we find that firms that were prone to overinvestment before this exogenous reduction are more likely to engage stakeholder-oriented activities. Overall, our analysis suggests that strong alignment of CEO and shareholders wealth effectively prevents overinvestment in stakeholderoriented activities that might be motivated by agency problems.
목차
Highlights Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Theoretical prediction 2.1. The simple model 2.2. Numerical example and empirical prediction 3. Data and sample selection 4. Empirical evidence 4.1. Baseline regression 4.2. Evidence from CEO turnover 4.3. Evidence from the adoption of Constituency Statutes 4.4. Evidence from the adoption of FAS 123R 5. Robustness tests 5.1. Additional test for CEO characteristics and governance effects 5.2. Alternative measurement 6. Conclusion Acknowledgements References
키워드
Stakeholder orientationCorporate social responsibilityRisk-aversionAgency problem
저자
Kyumin Cho [ School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291, Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea ]
Hyeong Joon Kim [ School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291, Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea ]
Seongjae Mun [ School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291, Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea ]
Seung Hun Han [ School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291, Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea ]