Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines whether control block transactions, a dominant form of takeovers in emerging markets, is efficient in a neo-classical sense. Based on a large sample of control block transactions in Korea, we find that a key factor behind a takeover is financial distress in the target, not just for the initial takeover, but also for a series of subsequent takeovers. We also find that new equities are issued by the target during the control transfer process, the proceeds of which are used as capital infusions to the distressed target. Moreover, creditor banks effectively mediate control transfers between outgoing and incoming controlling shareholders, potentially with a lag. Despite this restructuring process, target’s financial distress is further exacerbated as control block changes hands, especially multiple times.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Data and Variables
2.1. Data
2.2 Variables
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
3.2 Determinants of the Number of Being a Target
3.3 Determinants of Takeover Types
3.4 Determinants of Being a Seller
4. Estimates of Takeovers’ Effect on Financial Distress
4.1 Financial Distress After the Takeover
4.2. Robustness Checks
5. Conclusions
References

키워드

저자

• Euna Cho [ Economic Research Institute, The Bank of Korea, Seoul, Korea ]
• Woojin Kim [ Professor of Finance at Seoul National University Business School, Seoul, Korea. ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330