Earticle

초록

영어

We examine how agency conflict distorts the resource allocation in a business group with special attention to the incentives of the controlling shareholder. Specifically, we analyze whether the controlling shareholder’s wealth in each affiliate systematically affects the amount of corporate giving in that affiliate. We find that the affiliate in which a controlling shareholder has more (less) her own equity stake makes less (more) corporate giving. This result indicates that a controlling shareholder, pursing her own interest, intends to raise her reputation through corporate philanthropy with bearing less cost to her. This interpretation is also supported by other results including the relation between corporate giving and firm’s financial performance, effect of corporate governance on this relation, and result with the sub-sample of firms with family CEO’s. Generally, our findings are consistent with the exploitation hypothesis of corporate giving.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Sample selection and Data
2.1 Data
2.2 CSV variable and corporate philanthropy
2.3 Control variables
3. Empirical evidence
3.1 Descriptive statistics
3.2 Regression analysis
4. Robustness tests
4.1 FEVD approach
4.2 Reverse causality
5. Conclusions
References
Appendix A.

키워드

저자

• Joon Chae [ Graduate School of Business, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea ]
• Eun Jung Lee [ Hanyang University, Ansan, Korea. ]
• Yu Kyung Lee [ Graduate School of Business, Seoul National University ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330