Earticle

초록

영어

This study documents the danger of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure. Exploiting the 2013 rule change in Korea, we find that its restrictive coverage, confined to board members with total annual pay exceeding 500 million Korean won, led a large fraction of family executives to evade disclosure through deregistration (i.e., stepping down from the board). We also find that such evasion is mostly carried out by family executives in firms with high executive-to-worker pay ratios. If the original pay level is close to the threshold, we find that family executives choose pay-cuts over deregistration, as their preferred means of evasion.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Executive Compensation Disclosure Policy in Korea
3. Hypotheses Development
4. Data
4.1 Definition of Variables
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
5. Results
5.1 Is Evasive Behavior Pervasive?
5.2 Family vs. Non-Family Executives
5.3 Different Types of Evasion Strategies
5.4 Family vs. Non-Family Executives (Falsification Test and Difference-in-Differences)
5.5 Executive-to-Worker Pay Ratio and Disclosure Evasion
5.6 Level of Executive Compensation and Pay-Cuts
6. Conclusion
References

키워드

저자

• Jinhyeok Ra [ Korea University Business School ]
• Woochan Kim [ Professor of Finance, Korea University Business School; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ] Corresponding author

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• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

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  2006~2024

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  KDC 325 DDC 330