We examine the value of information sharing in the context of supplier-buyer relationships after controlling for trading partners’ opportunism. Given that trading partners’ opportunism is not randomly chosen, we explicitly incorporate their self-selection process into our estimation procedure by employing Heckman’s self-selection model. According to our analysis, firms that have built safeguards via mutual trust, commitments and information sharing experience less opportunistic risk in supplierbuyer relationships. Our findings also suggest that information sharing has a positive impact on firm performance after controlling for opportunism. Further, firms that are less exposed to trading partners’ opportunistic risk have achieved a higher performance than others that are more exposed. Importantly, higher performance for those firms with less opportunistic risk is driven by safeguards in supplier-buyer relationships as well as information sharing. Our findings can be applied for systems analysts to design information systems of supplier-buyer transactions.
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Theory and Hypotheses 2.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 2.2 Consequence of information sharing and opportunism in supplier-buyer relationships 2.3 Trust, mutual commitments and information sharing as safeguards against opportunism 3. Empirical Strategy 3.1 The performance equation 3.2 The performance equation after accounting for self-selection 4. Methodology and Measurements 5. Results 5.1 The performance and the selection equations 5.2 Additional results 6. Concluding Remarks References
한국EA학회는 전사적 관점의 아키텍처 개념 및 원칙을 국내 민간기업 및 정부기관에 적용 확산시키고, EA 및 관련 분야의 연구, 전문인력의 양성 및 정책적 건의 등을 통해 기업 및 정부기관의 경쟁력 및 생산성을 향상시키고, 우리나라 지식 기반 산업 등의 고도화를 도모하는 것을 목적으로 합니다.