Earticle

초록

영어

We consider a patent signaling model for startup financing where an entrepreneur signals his type by acquiring patents and investors have coarse information about the entrepreneur’s true success probability. By invoking an extension of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion adapted to our model, we obtain the least-cost perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which a high-type entrepreneur may receive a lower equity share despite acquiring a higher patent level than in the benchmark, where investors do not face coarse information. This implies that coarse information faced by investors may lead to less effective patent signaling than in the benchmark.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Model
2.1 Startup Financing
2.2 Payoffs to Agents
3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
3.1 Separating PBE
3.2 Pooling PBE
4. Refinements of PBEs
5. Main Implications
6. Conclusions
References

키워드

저자

• Guangsug Hahn [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH ]
• Joon Yeop Kwon [ School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, Korea ] Corresponding author

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간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330