This study examines whether there are agency conflicts within firms that issue preferred stocks, and whether agency conflicts affect to tax avoidance levels of the firm. Firms with preferred stocks have agency problems because they can consolidate managers’ rights compared to firms with only common stocks. This paper studies the degree of tax avoidance of firms that issue preferred stocks and finds that because of the existence of differentiated voting rights in the firm, the degree of tax avoidance is reduced.
목차
Abstract Introduction Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Empirical Method Data and Descriptive Statistics Empirical Results Summary and Conclusion References
키워드
Tax AvoidanceAgency ProblemsPreferred Stock
저자
Jinho Jeong [ Division of Business Administration, College of Global Business Korea University Sejong Campus, Korea ]
Corresponding author
Yonghyun Kwon [ Division of Business Administration, College of Global Business Korea University Sejong Campus, Korea ]