Earticle

초록

영어

We analyze the medical treatment choices and the demand for health insurance in a theoretical setting. Experiencing health losses, individuals may select from no, low, or high levels of medical treatment. High level treatment is interpreted as a bundling of low level treatment and additional treatment. Insurance against bundled risks implies that it covers against high level treatment only. Insurance is assumed to be actuarially fair.We find that the low-wealth individuals tend to select no treatment and purchase no insurance. The mediumwealth individuals select low treatment and purchase partial insurance. The high-wealth individuals select high treatment and purchase full insurance. The relation between wealth and coverage is not necessarily monotonic. We apply the findings to microinsurance and discuss the theoretical implications of microinsurance.

목차

Abstracts
 I. Introduction
 II. Literature Review
 III. The model: risk bundling
  III.1. Treatment under no insurance
  III.2. Treatment and insurance against unbundled risks
  III.3. Treatment and insurance against bundled risks
  III.4. On the zero profit adjustment
 IV. Microinsurance: an application
 V. Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Jimin Hong [ Department of Business Administration Catholic University of Korea ]
• S. Hun Seog [ Seoul National University Business School ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330