Earticle

초록

영어

This paper examines the effects of employee and executive stock ownership, particularly focusing on initial returns and long-term returns, on the stock market performances of Chinese firms. We used IPO and stock market data of 1,370 IPO firms that went public through Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2015. We find that the initial returns and long-term returns are lower for firms with both employee and executive stock ownership, than those without prior to and subsequent to IPOs. However, long-term CARs are higher for firms with executive stock ownership around the IPOs. Our results basically contradict the results of other studies for the case of ESOPs, which support insiders' motives for positive effect on prodcutivity, compensation stock market. For the case of executive ownership around the IPOs, the hypothesis of Lowry and Murphy (2006) who propose that top managers can influence offer prices for higher underpricing. Our results reject a general view of ESOP and executive as a tool to control asymmetric information and improve productivity with higher stock market returns.

목차

Abstract
 Ⅰ. Introduction
 Ⅱ. Literature Review
  1. IPO and Market Returns
  2. Governance, Ownership and IPO Markets
  3. ESOP, Executive Ownership and Firm Performance
 Ⅲ. Hypotheses and Test Models
  1. The Effects of ESOP and Executive Stocks on Initial Returns
  2. The Effects of ESOP and Executive Stocks on Long-term Returns
  3. Empirical Test Models
 Ⅳ. Empirical Tests
  1. Data
  2. Correlation Analysis
  3. Group Mean Tests
  4. Regression Analyses
 Ⅴ. Conclusion
 References

키워드

저자

• Tae-Ho Yang [ School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, South Korea ]
• Sung-Hwan Kim [ School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, South Korea ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330