Earticle

초록

영어

We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Data
 3. Empirical models and results
  3.1 Univariate tests
  3.2 Levels of compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
  3.3 Performance-contingent compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
  3.4 Robustness tests
 4. Conclusion
 5. REFERENCES

키워드

저자

• Hohyun Kim [ School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ]
• Seung Hun Han [ School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) ] Corresponding author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330