Earticle

초록

영어

We investigate whether co-opted boards increase future stock price crash risk. Co-opted directors appointed after the CEO assume office tend to have allegiance to the CEO, attenuating board monitoring roles. Using a sample of firms for the period 1996-2014, we find robust evidence that board co-option is positively associated with stock crash risk, suggesting that weak monitoring induced by co-opted directors facilitates managerial bad news hoarding activities. Further analyses show that the impact of co-option on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO has higher career concerns, as measured by product market competition and age, indicating that the CEO who has greater preferences for bad news hoarding is more likely to exploit opportunities relating to attenuated board monitoring to promote their personal benefits. Overall, our findings suggest that board co-option appears to decrease the effectiveness of board monitoring and the role of board monitoring is particularly important when the CEO has stronger incentives to hoard bad news.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
 3. Research Design
  3.1 Construction of Sample
  3.2. Variables
 4. Empirical Analysis
  4.1 Descriptive Statistics
  4.2. Main regression analysis: Effect of co-opted boards on stock price crash
  4.3. Endogeneity
  4.4. Additional Evidence: Co-opted Boards, Managerial Career Concerns, and Stock Price Crash Risk
 5. Conclusions
 References
 Appendix A. Variable Definitions

키워드

저자

• Chaehyun Kim [ School of Business Administration Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology ]
• Junyoup Lee [ School of Business Administration Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology ]
• Sanggeum Woo [ School of Business Administration Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology ]

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  한국재무학회 학술대회

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  2006~2024

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  KDC 325 DDC 330