We examine how the introduction of credit default swap (CDS) trading on the debt of individual firms affects corporate payout policy. We find that firms increase payouts to shareholders after the introduction of CDS trading on their debt. This suggests that CDS-referenced firms determine payout policy in response to decreased creditor monitoring rather than apply more conservative policies to avoid renegotiations with tougher CDS-insured creditors. Moreover, the increase in payouts after CDS introduction is more pronounced in firms with smaller institutional ownership and greater bank debt dependency. Finally, we show that firms tend to repurchase stocks rather than increase dividends when they increase payouts after the introduction of CDS trading. (JEL G32, G35)
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 2.1 CDS and Corporate Policy 2.2 Institutional Ownership and Corporate Governance 2.3 Bank Monitoring 2.4 Choice between Dividends and Stock Repurchases 3. Data and Empirical Methods 3.1 Data 3.2 Methodology 4. Empirical Results 4.1 Sample Statistics 4.2 Effects of CDS Trading on Total Payouts 4.3 Dividends vs. Stock Repurchases 4.4 Endogeneity Tests 5. Concluding Remarks References