Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines whether there is any difference in the stock price impact of the appointment or dismissal of outside directors for Korean firms depending on the quality of corporate governance structure. Using the event study and t-test methods, we found several interesting empirical results as follows. First, the appointment effect of outside directors on stock prices was negative just until a few days after the event date, but afterwards stock prices rebounded. The appointment of new directors has no significant effect on stock prices, but the reappointment of old directs has a significantly positive effect. Second, the announcement effect was differential depending upon the quality of corporate governance structure. So, the effect was significantly negative for Korean firms with inferior governance structure. Third, the dismissal effect of outside directors on stock prices was not significant, and the regular dismissal had no impact, either. However, the dismissal during the term of office negatively affected stock prices. In particular, firms with poorer corporate governance showed much larger drop in stock prices, possibly due to the information asymmetry problem. To conclude, Korean firms with inferior corporate governance have faced negative stock price impacts from both appointment and dismissal of outside directors. Therefore, it implies that they should take preemptive measures to improve corporate governance structure. In addition, firms with sound corporate governance should also retain independent outside directors in consecutive terms.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론
 Ⅱ. 기존연구의 검토
 Ⅲ. 가설의 설정
 Ⅳ. 연구자료 및 연구방법론
 Ⅴ. 실증분석 결과
 Ⅵ. 요약 및 결론
 참고문헌
 Abstract
 [부록]

키워드

저자

• 김동순 [ Dong-Soon Kim | 중앙대학교 경영학부 교수 ] 제1저자
• 노승재 [ Sung-Jae Rowe | 아침기술경영연구원장 ] 교신저자

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  생산성연구: 국제융합학술지 [Productivity Research: An International Interdisciplinary Journal]

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  1225-3553

• 수록기간

  1987~2025

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330