Earticle

초록

영어

After the Cold War, there are two major trends of the nuclear security structure on the Korean Peninsula: Firstly, North Korea has tried to replace the peninsula "one-way nuclear deterrent" structure with "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure, and form a "non-balanced nuclear deterrent" structure to strengthen nuclear weapons activities step by step; Secondly, the United States has been vigorously intervened in the Asia-Pacific affairs, implementing the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, and taking the DPRK nuclear activities as a reason to strongly promote the missile defense system building in the East Asian region especially in the South Korea. Both of them are the result of the vicious interaction of safety in Korean peninsula, which may eventually change the nuclear security structure of Northeast Asia overall. North Korea's nuclear weaponization services as one of the core security issues of the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War, which is the result of the vicious interaction between the internal and external elements of the Korean Peninsula security structure. After the third nuclear test, the DPRK had taken the nuclear weapons as a strategic issue instead of tactical chips, which had been causing the Korean Peninsula security dilemma around the DPRK nuclear issue increasingly difficult to resolve. The study on the internal logic of the DPRK's nuclear issue may contribute to find negotiating space in a seemingly unexplained security dilemma. There are two basic forces which have been driving North Korea for nuclear power. On the one hand, it’s trying to reduce the possibility of waging "hot war" by the Korea-US alliance to maintain regime and system security through establishing an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with them. On the other hand, they try to weaken South Korea's dominance of the Korean Peninsula reunification issue and strive for the reciprocity on it. Under the impetus of the two major powers, the DPRK gradually built a prototype structure of the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" against the ROKUS alliance after five nuclear tests. The structure of "nuclear deterrence without power equilibrium" is concerned with the steady growth of conventional armaments on the basis of steady economic development. This “nuclear deterrent” structure, legally defending the regime and system security, is the ultimate goal of North Korea's nuclear-weapon effort. If the DPRK regime eventually did not "collapse" under the internal and external pressure, it would work towards this ultimate goal. THAAD taken into the ROK may produce an illusion for the North Korea, that the nuclear weapons from the DPRK had formed an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with the KoreanAmerican alliance at least in the psychological level. THAAD may be taken as an excellent evidence by the North Korea, that the Korean-American alliance began to take strong reaction and hedge measures to deal with the new security structure in Korean Peninsula. When the North Korea believes that the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure had been established and would not be broken in a short term, its nuclear activities will gradually enter into the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium "structural construction period. During the construction phase of the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium ", the nuclear weapons development will gradually give way to the conventional armaments promotion, at the same time, economic development which services as the prerequisite of conventional armaments promotion would become the basis and core work of the DPRK. At this stage, North Korea's demand for economic development is both a subjective desire and an objective necessity. Economic issues will provide a huge space for negotiating space to break the peninsula security dilemma.

목차

Abstract
 1. 引言
 2. 朝鲜的核武化初衷
  2.1能源替代方案与战术筹码
  2.2朝鲜半岛安全结构的失衡
  2.3 从战术筹码到战略方向
 3. 2016年朝鲜何以两次核试？
  3.2“经济与核武并举路线”——优化调配国家的资源
 4. 冷战后朝鲜核武化的基本动力
  4.1 降低“热战”可能性，维护和体制安全
  4.2 对冲韩国统一主导优势，争夺对等统一主导权
 5.冷战后朝鲜核武化的逻辑路径
  5.1 核威慑结构及其稳定性
  5.2 “单向核威慑”结构
  5.3 “非对称核威慑”结构
  5.4 “非均势核威慑”结构
 6. 朝鲜核武化终极目标——“非均势核威慑”结构
  6.1 “非对称核威慑”强化阶段，进入核试验多发期，将继续强化战略核威慑力量。
  6.2 “非均势核威慑”结构形成和强化阶段，进入核武活动稳定期，资源将集中于常规军备和经济建设。
 7. 结语
 参考文献

키워드

저자

• 马云鹏 [ 마운붕 | 柯소鏤屆돛댕欺 ]
• 李成日 [ 이성일 | 中国社会科学院亚太与全球战略研究院 ] Corresponding author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  Journal of China Studies

• 간기

  계간

• pISSN

  1975-5902

• eISSN

  3022-5590

• 수록기간

  2006~2026

• 등재여부

  KCI 등재

• 십진분류

  KDC 912 DDC 951