Earticle

초록

영어

One of the most important issues for startup companies is to secure financing. Indeed, it is essential for startups to signal their projects’ profitability to potential investors. We develop a model of single-stage startup financing with signaling under ambiguity. Nature determines the ability of a technology entrepreneur (startup), who strategically chooses a costly patent level as a signal to inform his ability to potential investors. Since the project taken by a startup may involve highly innovative technology and may not be well known to agents, they would face ambiguity about project value. To examine ambiguity effects on startup financing, we provide three different financing models in view of the degree of ambiguity: (1) no ambiguity; (2) only investors face ambiguity; (3) all agents face ambiguity. In each model, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria and refine them into a unique equilibrium by imposing Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) or its extension. We analyze the refined equilibria in perspectives of agents’ equity shares, equilibrium patent levels, and his expected profit.

목차

Abstract
 1 Introduction
 2 Model
  2.1 Startup Financing
  2.2 Profits of Agents
 3 Equilibrium
  3.1 Benchmark Model: No Ambiguity
  3.2 Model I: Only Investor Faces Ambiguity
  3.3 Model II: All Agents Face Ambiguity
 4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
 5 Comparative Statics
 6 Concluding Remarks
 Appendix
 References

키워드

저자

• Guangsug Hahn [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH, Korea ]
• Kwanho Kim [ Department of Economics, Chungbuk National University, Korea ]
• Joon Yeop Kwon [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH, Korea ] Corresponding author

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발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330