Earticle

초록

영어

This paper solves the coordination strategies of a supplier and a manufacturer separately under the condition of decentralized, centralized and revenue sharing supply chain based on Steinberg non-cooperative game theory. The research presumes: 1)The manufacturer completely inspects materials of supplier; 2) The manufacturer repairs the unqualified products resulting from supplier’s raw material quality defects; 3) the single manufacturer faces a random demand under single period newsboy model. We find out that marginal effect will be enlarged when the manufacturer repairs the unqualified productions. When supply chain is coordinated, EOQ, total profit and total risk-sharing of centralized supply chain are larger than that of non-coordination or decentralized supply chain. The integrated model of revenue sharing supply chain can achieve the performance of centralized supply chain. The establishment of this integration will not be affected by changes in wholesale price of suppliers. Our research can provide some theoretical basis for supply chain to reduce internal and external risk loss costs.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Literature Review
 3. Model Descriptions
 4. Model Constructions
  4.1. Decentralized Supply Chain Condition
  4.2. Supply Chain Coordination with Restriction of the Contract of Revenue Sharing
  4.3. Centralized Supply Chain Condition
 5. Numerical Analysis
 6. Conclusions
 Acknowledgments
 References

키워드

저자

• Li Yongfei [ School of Economic and Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi'an, China, Shaanxi Philosophy and Social Science Research base - Information Industry Development Research Center, Xi'an, China ]

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology

• 간기

  격월간

• pISSN

  2005-4246

• 수록기간

  2008~2016

• 십진분류

  KDC 505 DDC 605