Earticle

초록

영어

We develop a model of two-stage startup financing with signaling under ambiguity. In our model, the nature determines the ability of technology entrepreneur and he strategically chooses a costly patent level as a signal to inform his ability to potential investors. Angels participate in investments for seed money in the first stage after observing the patent level and then venture capitals offer investments to the entrepreneur in the second stage based on angels’ behavior. We provide three different financing models in view of the degree of ambiguity: (1) no ambiguity; (2) only investors face ambiguity; (3) all agents face ambiguity. In each signaling game between the entrepreneur and investors who may have ambiguous beliefs about the types of the entrepreneur, we find a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium by imposing the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) and characterize the refined equilibria. In particular, angels ask the highest level of patents in order to ensure the ability of the entrepreneur when only investors have ambiguous information. We also find that the entrepreneur can obtain a higher utility under ambiguity than without it if his project is sufficiently overvalued. On the other hand, when investors have ambiguous information, the entrepreneur can be better off by resolving ambiguity if the project is sufficiently undervalued.

목차

Abstract
 1 Introduction
 2 Model
  2.1 First-Stage Financing
  2.2 Second-Stage Financing
  2.3 Payoffs of Agents
 3 Equilibrium
  3.1 Benchmark Model: No Ambiguity
  3.2 Model I: Investors with Ambiguity
  3.3 Model II: All Agents with Ambiguity
 4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
 5 Comparative Statics
 6 Concluding RemarksAgents
 Appendix
 References

키워드

저자

• Guangsug Hahn [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH, Korea ]
• Kwanho Kim [ Department of Economics, Chungbuk National University, Korea ]
• Joon Yeop Kwon [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH, Korea ] Corresponding Author

참고문헌

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간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330