Along with fierce e-commerce market competitions, some sellers may be worried about losing their customers so they bribe advisors by material means. The behavior of the advisor not only depends on their intrinsic properties, but also depends on their motivation that they may provide untruthful information to obtain additional material reward. The balance between profit and information truth constitutes the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. A trust model of electronic commerce based on iterated prisoner's dilemma game theory is proposed in this paper. Experimental results show that it can effectively inhabit advisor fraud.
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Related Work 3. A Trust Model of E-commerce 3.1. Foundation of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game 3.2. Analysis of Advisor Game Strategy 3.3. A Trust Model of E-commerce based on Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game 4. Experiment and Simulation 5. Conclusion Acknowledgements References
키워드
Trustmodele-commerceiterated prisoner’s dilemma
저자
Chun Guan [ Dept. of Computer Science, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China ]
Jun Hu [ School of Software, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330047, China ]
Corresponding Author
Xinzhou Lu [ School of Software, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330047, China ]
보안공학연구지원센터(IJUNESST) [Science & Engineering Research Support Center, Republic of Korea(IJUNESST)]
설립연도
2006
분야
공학>컴퓨터학
소개
1. 보안공학에 대한 각종 조사 및 연구
2. 보안공학에 대한 응용기술 연구 및 발표
3. 보안공학에 관한 각종 학술 발표회 및 전시회 개최
4. 보안공학 기술의 상호 협조 및 정보교환
5. 보안공학에 관한 표준화 사업 및 규격의 제정
6. 보안공학에 관한 산학연 협동의 증진
7. 국제적 학술 교류 및 기술 협력
8. 보안공학에 관한 논문지 발간
9. 기타 본 회 목적 달성에 필요한 사업
간행물
간행물명
International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology
간기
격월간
pISSN
2005-4246
수록기간
2008~2016
십진분류
KDC 505DDC 605
이 권호 내 다른 논문 / International Journal of u- and e- Service, Science and Technology Vol.8 No.8