This paper investigates whether informed ownership alleviates information asymmetry in bank loan pricing. We use local long-term institutional ownership (LLTIO) as a proxy for exogenous ownership that possesses geography-related soft information, and show that it is negatively associated with the spread charged by syndicate lenders. The negative relation between LLTIO and loan spread is salient only when geography-related soft information helps the lender to evaluate the borrower’s creditworthiness and when conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders are unlikely. We show that the mechanisms for the LLTIO effect include the alleviation of both moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
목차
Abstract I. Introduction 2. LLTIO and Bank Loan Pricing 3. Data and Summary Statistics 3.1 Loan Data 3.2 Institutional Ownership Data 3.3 Control Variables 4. Empirical Results 4.1 The LLTIO Effect 4.2 LLTIO as a Proxy for Exogenous Ownership 4.3 LLTIO, Relationship Banking, and Soft Information 4.4 Conditions that Influence the LLTIO Effect 4.5 Within-Syndicate LLTIO Effect 4.6 Mechanisms of LLTIO Effect 4.7 Propensity Score Matching Analysis 5. Conclusion References Appendix
저자
Kiyoung Chang [ University of South Florida Sarasota-Manatee, Sarasota, FL ]
Ying Li [ University of Washington, Bothell, WA ]
Corresponding author
Ha-Chin Yi [ Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, ]