We examine corporate lobbying activity and mergers & acquisitions. If eective, rm lob- bying expenditures could in uence legislation and facilitate favorable regulatory treatment, which would be positively re ected in market reactions to merger announcements. However, average announcement returns for lobbying rms are lower than for non-lobbying rms. In addition, lobbying rms tend to have powerful CEOs that receive more cash compensation after a merger. CEO turnover is unaected by lobbying activity. These results suggest that corporate lobbying may be indicative of CEO entrenchment rather than a rm's attempt to maximize shareholder wealth.
목차
Abstract 1. Introduction 2. Data description and variables 2.1. Sample and variable construction 2.2. Lobbying database 2.3. CEO turnover, compensation, and other governance charac-teristics 2.4. Rival rms 2.5. Stock Market Analysis of Acquisitions 3. Empirical Findings 3.1. Sample characteristics and univariate analysis 3.2. Event-study analysis 3.3. Responses of rival rms of merging rms 3.4. Determinants of Lobbying Expenditure in M&A deals 3.5. CEO turnover and lobbying eects 3.6. CEO compensations and lobbying eects 4. Conclusion References
키워드
LobbyingMergers and AcquisitionsCEO turnoverCEO compensationCorporate Governance
저자
Daejin Kim [ Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST) ]
Tim Mooney [ Daejin appreciates the 2014 research fund (1.140072.01) of UNIST for nancial support. ]