Earticle

초록

영어

This study examines whether firms’ decisions to offer company stock in defined contribution (DC) plans are explained by managers’ corporate control motives. Using a large sample of proxy voting outcomes, I find that employee ownership in DC plans is significantly and positively associated with the level of voting support for management sponsored proposals. This suggests that managers encourage employee DC holdings in company stock in order to receive higher voting support in favor of management. The effects of employee ownership on voting outcomes are significantly greater in subsample tests than in full sample tests: management proposals opposed by Institutional Shareholder Services, management proposals of close votes, director election votes receiving more than 20% of votes withheld, and say-on-pay frequency proposals.

목차

Abstract
 I. INTRODUCTION
 II. BACKGROUND
  2.1. Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans
  2.2. What Motivates a Firm to Offer Company Stock in DC Plans?
 III. HYPOTHESES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS
  3.1. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
  3.2. Source of Data and Sample Construction
  3.3. Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics
 IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
  4.1. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcomes
  4.2. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcome by Proposal Types
  4.3. Employee Ownership, Voting Outcomes, and Corporate Governance
  4.4. Employee Ownership and Managerial Ownership
  4.5. Two Stage Least Squares
 V. CONCLUSION
 REFERENCES

저자

• Heejin Park

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330