Earticle

초록

영어

The paper investigates how long term value of publicly trading firm and its stock prices affect managerial compensation under asymmetric information. To do this, we incorporate Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model into conventional principalagent problem. We analyze comparative statics of weights on the long term value and stock prices in managerial contract. Each weight is affected by information cost and supply shock. When traders are sufficiently averse to risk, as information cost decreases, the proportion of informed traders increases and this leads to the increases informativeness of stock prices. Then the weight on the long term value decreases and that on the stock prices increases. The changes of supply shock provide the reverse effect to the weights.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. The Model
  2.1. Managerial Contract
  2.2. Stock Market and Traders
 3. Equilibrium
 4. The Manager’s Contract
 5. Concluding Remarks
 Appendix
 References

키워드

저자

• Guangsug Hahn [ Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, POSTECH, Korea ]
• Joon Yeop Kwon [ Graduate Program for Technology and Innovation Management, POSTECH, Korea ] Corresponding Author

참고문헌

발행기관

간행물

표지보기 관심저널 등록

• 간행물명

  한국재무학회 학술대회

• 간기

  부정기

• 수록기간

  2006~2024

• 십진분류

  KDC 325 DDC 330