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An Analysis of Withdrawn Shareholder Proposals

첫 페이지 보기
  • 발행기관
    한국재무학회 바로가기
  • 간행물
    한국재무학회 학술대회 바로가기
  • 통권
    2014년 경영관련학회 통합학술대회(재무학회-증권학회 세션) (2014.08)바로가기
  • 페이지
    pp.299-324
  • 저자
    Maggie Foley, Richard Cebula, Chulhee Jun, Robert Boylan
  • 언어
    영어(ENG)
  • URL
    https://www.earticle.net/Article/A243464

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원문정보

초록

영어
In this study we analyze withdrawn shareholder proposals to gain insight into the role of shareholder proposals in the governance of public corporations. A cursory look at the data suggests that unions are the most likely group to withdraw proposals. We focus on the behavior of unions and find that unions often resubmit a shareholder proposal which had garnered significant support in the previous year, only to withdraw the proposal in the second year. Interestingly, about fifty percent of those resubmitted proposals are withdrawn but are not resubmitted in year 3 or later. Our contention is that the proposals were withdrawn in year 2 because the issue was settled in a manner agreeable to the union. Furthermore, our research suggests that unions are more likely to withdraw proposals when the prior years’ appeal is higher, when firms have a record of poor performance, lower insider ownership, or relatively independent boards. This phenomenon suggests that unions submit and withdraw shareholder proposals strategically. We contend that unions use shareholder proposals and the withdrawal of proposals to improve conditions for union workers at the expense of shareholder value.

목차

Abstract
 1. INTRODUCTION
 2. The Hypotheses and the Data
 3. Withdrawn shareholder proposals
  3.1 The general factors associated with the likelihood that a proposal is withdrawn
  3.2 The issues around which proposals were withdrawn
  3.3 Withdrawn proposal’s sponsors
  3.4 Proposal Sponsorship and Proposal Issues Combined
  3.5. Proposals withdrawn by unions
 4. CONCLUSION
 References
 TABLE
 Appendix

키워드

Corporate Governance Agency Costs Shareholder Proposals Unions.

저자

  • Maggie Foley [ Assistant Professor, Jacksonville University Address: 2800 University North Blvd, Jacksonville, Florida 32211 ]
  • Richard Cebula [ Chair of Finance Department, Jacksonville University ]
  • Chulhee Jun [ Assistant Professor, University of Macau Av. Padre Tomás Pereira, Taipa, Macau, S.A.R. P.R.C. P.R. China ]
  • Robert Boylan [ Department Chair of Accounting and Finance, Jacksonville University ]

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

간행물 정보

발행기관

  • 발행기관명
    한국재무학회 [The Korean Finance Association]
  • 설립연도
    1988
  • 분야
    사회과학>경영학
  • 소개
    본 회는 재무학 및 이와 관련되는 분야를 발전시키며 회원 상호간의 친목 도모를 목적으로 한다.

간행물

  • 간행물명
    한국재무학회 학술대회
  • 간기
    부정기
  • 수록기간
    2006~2024
  • 십진분류
    KDC 325 DDC 330

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